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Abstract 
Although the contribution of international civil aviation to climate change 
seems small (with a global share of just 3.5 percent of emissions of CO2), the 
projected growth in air traffic means that it is highly significant. There is thus an 
urgent need to explore legal regulations for limiting and/or reducing the adverse 
impacts of aircraft emissions on the environment. This thesis examines the progress 
which has been made on international aviation emissions abatement and provides an 
analysis of the reasons for delay. It concludes that the contribution of aviation to 
climate change is a multi-scalar problem and as such neither conventional top-down 
international legal regimes, nor any single regulatory instrument can solve it. The 
research question for this thesis is how to break the deadlock of conventional legal 
approaches and overcome the barriers to international aviation greenhouse gas 
emissions abatement. New governance theory provides the theory within which the 
future of aviation emissions regulation has been explored. Drawing on the scholarly 
literature on new governance, this thesis argues for a multi-scalar regulatory 
architecture which simultaneously engages multi-level governance, and a 
multi-party and multi-instrument approach to the problem. First, multi-level 
governance includes an international sectoral target on reducing aviation emissions, 
national efforts in allocating and implementing reduction targets on aircraft operators, 
and regional cooperation in between, as well as sub-state level governance although 
this is not a feature of this thesis. Second, a multi-party approach requires efforts 
from both public and private actors (international organisations such as the 
UNFCCC and ICAO, nation states, the airline industry and IATA). Finally, a 
combined use of multiple regulatory instruments (conventional command and 
control type mechanisms and multiple market-based instruments) should be included. 
The failure of the UNFCCC to regulate international aviation emissions means that 
the problem has remained largely unaddressed. Recognizing climate change as a 
multi-scalar problem that needs multi-scalar regulatory approaches would allow the 
international aviation emission problem to move beyond the deadlock of 
conventional inter-state approaches. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
This thesis addresses the challenge of regulating the climate change effects of 
international civil aviation emissions. It argues that the legal regulation of 
international civil aviation emissions should be developed in a multi-scalar 
architecture, which simultaneously engages a multi-level governance approach to the 
problem, multiple parties and multiple instruments. The preferred response to the 
contribution of international aviation to climate change would be to agree an 
international sectoral target on reducing aviation emissions. A burden sharing system 
would require multiple parties at multiple levels of governance to contribute to the 
sectoral mitigation target. If such burden sharing is difficult to agree in practice, this 
thesis argues for a global emissions trading system as an alternative form of allocation 
of the sectoral mitigation target. As a second best response, in the absence of 
international agreement, the multiple levels, parties and instruments take on a more 
central role. 
This chapter provides an introduction. Section 1 sets out the research questions 
addressed and the “thesis” argued in the following chapters. Section 2 describes the 
thesis and the sequencing of the chapters which follow and how they contribute to the 
thesis. This section also sets out the scope of the thesis. Section 3 addresses 
methodology.  
 
1. The Thesis 
 
This thesis starts with the assumption, explored further in Chapter 2, that the 
contribution of civil aviation to climate change is significant1 and there is an urgent 
                                                        
1 The aviation sector represents approximately 3.5 percent of the global anthropogenic radiactive 
forcing (a measure of warming). Radiative forcing “is a measure of the importance of a potential 
climate change mechanism.” It “expresses the perturbation or change to the energy balance of the 
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need to identify effective legal regulation of international aviation emissions.2 The 
legal literature on climate change emissions from aviation concentrates 
overwhelmingly on the need for global agreement, within the framework of the 
UNFCCC (the United Nation’s Framework on Climate Change) and/or ICAO (the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation). By contrast, my thesis is that the legal 
regulation of international civil aviation emissions should be developed in a 
multi-scalar architecture. Curbing the growth of aviation emissions should focus not 
only on traditional top-down, international-level approaches grounded in international 
organisations, but on a multi-level, multi-party, multi-instrument approach. Drawing 
out this multi-scalar architecture is a challenging task, requiring the development of a 
complex and dense regulatory framework, and demanding expertise in a range of 
legal and policy areas.  
As is discussed and argued in Chapters 3 and 4, the current approach to 
regulating international aviation emissions is largely failing. Therefore, the research 
question for this thesis is how to break the deadlock of conventional legal approaches 
and overcome the barriers to international aviation greenhouse gas emissions 
abatement. Focusing on the need for improved energy intensity in the aviation sector, 
but also considering some measures to encourage less flying, I explore alternatives 
that take seriously the multi-scalar nature of the aviation emissions problem. This 
allows me to develop an innovative way of developing legal regulation to curb the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Earth-atmosphere system in watts per square meter (Wm-2).” Joyce E. Penner et al. (eds.), Aviation 
and the Global Atmosphere: Special Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1999), (IPCC 1999 Report), p. 3; For a more general explanation of 
climate concepts and metrics, see David S. Lee, ‘Aviation and Climate Change: The Science’ in Stefan 
Gössling & Paul Upham (eds.) Climate Change and Aviation: Issues, Challenges and Solutions 
(Edward Elgar, London 2009), pp. 31-32.  
Many pieces of research have been carried out since the IPCC 1999 Report to further estimate the 
effects of aviation on climate, see for example, Guy P. Brasseur (ed.), ‘A report on the way forward 
based on the research gaps and priorities’ (Aviation Climate Change Research Initiative, 2008) 
Sponsored by the Environmental Working Group of the US NextGen Joint Planning and Development 
Office, available online at <www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/aep/aviation_climate/> 
last accessed 23.02.10.  
Total aviation radiative forcing was still 3.5 percent as updated in 2005 for 2000 by Sausen et al, see 
Robert Sausen et al., ‘Aviation radiative forcing in 2000: An update on IPCC (1999)’ (2005) 14/4 
Meteorologische Zeitschrift 555. 
2 The primary driver of the aviation industry’s growth has been the growth of international flights. See 
ICAO, Annual Report of the Council (ICAO, Canada, 1991 to 2008) and International Air Transport 
Association (IATA), World Air Transport Statistics (54th ed., IATA, Canada, 2010). 
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growth of aviation emissions. However, it is supported by the burgeoning new 
governance literature that has engaged with the complexities of regulatory scale and 
the appropriate role of traditional top-down and alternative approaches. My thesis 
accepts the idea that aviation emissions is a global issue which needs global solutions, 
but argues that conventional international agreements cannot be the whole answer to 
curbing the growth of international aviation emissions. The impact of aviation 
emissions on climate change is not only an international problem, but is also a local, 
national and regional problem. As such, effective legal regulation should not be 
limited to conventional inter-state approaches. This requires a re-scaling of the legal 
regulation of aviation emissions. New governance provides the theoretical foundation 
upon which the failure of traditional regulatory approaches will be analyzed and the 
future of regulating aviation emissions will be explored. Drawing on the scholarly 
literature on new governance theory, this thesis explores multi-scalar regulatory 
approach to climate change associated with aviation, which simultaneously engages 
multi-level governance, and a multi-party and multi-instrument approach to the 
problem. I argue that regulating aviation emissions should involve a range of parties, 
including both public and private actors (international organisations such as the 
United Nation’s Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), nation states, the airline industry and IATA). It 
should involve multiple regulatory instruments, including conventional command and 
control type regulatory mechanisms (a sectoral mitigation target and 
technology-based standards) and market-based instruments (fuel taxes and emissions 
trading). And it should involve different scales. For example, an international sectoral 
target on reducing aviation emissions in the UNFCCC system, multi-level burden 
sharing in applying a sectoral target to the aviation sector, nation states’ efforts to 
implement reduction targets through introducing fuel taxes, regional efforts on 
emission trading and some sub-state level governance (although the local level is not 
a feature of this thesis). 
Put simply, the best solution would be to agree an international sectoral target on 
reducing aviation emission through the UNFCCC-led climate change negotiations. 
 12 
Achieving the sectoral mitigation target requires nation states’ efforts to implement 
reduction targets through introducing fuel taxes and regional efforts on emission 
trading. If the application of a multi-level burden sharing is difficult in practice, a 
global emissions trading system could provide an alternative form of allocation of the 
sectoral mitigation target on international aviation emissions. And if a sectoral target 
cannot be agreed, non-traditional approaches, incorporating multiple parties and 
multiple instruments, including industry voluntary guidelines and market-based 
instruments at a regional and national level provide a secondary solution. In this way, 
the international aviation emissions problem should move beyond the deadlock of 
conventional inter-state approaches and recognise climate change as a multi-scalar 
problem that needs multi-scalar regulatory approaches. 
 
2. Description of the Thesis 
  
This thesis examines the complexity of the international aviation emissions 
problem, the limitations of existing legal regulations, and the opportunities for 
designing an innovative regulatory architecture to address this problem. A core 
argument of this thesis and a core requirement in any future regulatory regime is a 
multi-scalar approach (as described in Chapter 7) relying on multiple levels of 
governance, multiple public and private parties and multiple instruments of regulation. 
My preferred option would be for an international sectoral target on reducing aviation 
emissions. A burden sharing system would require multiple parties at multiple levels 
of governance to contribute to the sectoral mitigation target. However, in the absence 
of international agreement, the multiple levels, parties and instruments take on a more 
central role. 
The first step in problem solving is to recognise the nature of the problem. Thus, 
Chapter 2 discusses the nexus between climate change and aviation emissions and 
analyses the difficulty of regulating aviation emissions at an international level. Legal 
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regulations on aviation emissions should encourage technical measures to improve 
energy intensity in the aviation sector. International air transport should continue to 
serve the human community in a way that does not threaten the global climate. 
This thesis focuses only on aircraft emissions from international flights, which 
means flights passing through the air space over the territory of more than one nation 
state. 3  International and domestic aviation emissions are dealt with separately 
because of the nature of international transport and the UNFCCC/Kyoto greenhouse 
gas (GHG) accounting framework.4 Under the climate change regime (the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)5 and the Kyoto 
Protocol6 to it), emissions are attributable to a country if they result directly from 
activities that occur within its territory.7 However, international transport involves 
movement between countries, creating difficulties for allocating emissions to specific 
countries. Much of the fuel that is used in international transport occurs in or over the 
territory of countries that have no direct involvement in the relevant transport 
movement (e.g. when planes transit through a country’s airspace or fly over high seas). 
                                                        
3 The scope of this research covers only international civil aircrafts, which means it does not cover 
military aircraft emissions and domestic air traffic. 
4 Andrew Macintosh, ‘Overcoming the Barriers to International Aviation Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Abatement’ (2008) 33/6 Air. & Sp. L. 403. 
5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 may 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered 
into force 21 March 1994), (UNFCCC). 
6 Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, 
U.N.Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. 1 at 7, (Kyoto Protocol). 
7 IPCC guidelines require that “The IPCC methodology subtracts the quantities delivered to and 
consumed by ships or aircraft for international transport from the fuel supply to the country. In this 
manner, the CO2 emissions arising from the use of international bunkers are not included in the 
national total. To simplify the preparation of global estimates, these emissions should be brought 
together in a separate table.” (IPCC, Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse gas 
Inventories: Reference Manual (IPCC,1996), pp.1.9-1.10)  
The IPCC guidelines were first accepted in 1994 and published in 1995. UNFCCC COP3 held in 1997 
in Kyoto reaffirmed that the Revised 1996 Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories should 
be used as “methodologies for estimating anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases” in calculation of legally-binding targets during the first commitment period. See 
UNFCCC, ‘Kyoto Protocol Reference Manual on Accounting of Emissions and Assigned Amount’ 
(2008), p. 26. 
Accordingly, emissions from domestic flights are considered to be part of the national inventory of the 
country within which the flights occur. IPCC guidelines require international aviation emissions to be 
estimated by the country where the fuel is sold, although such emissions are not to be included in that 
country’s total emissions. However, to date, there has been no agreement among parties to the 
UNFCCC on any specific measure to allocate the emissions from international aviation bunker fuels to 
national inventories. Thus, emissions from international flights are excluded from the quantified 
national mitigation targets on Annex I countries of the Kyoto Protocol. See IPCC 1999 Report, (n. 7), 
section 10.2. 
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Under the Kyoto Protocol, the limitation or reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
from international civil aviation is to be achieved by working through the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).8 “Placing international transport in 
a separate category and transferring responsibility for these emissions to separate UN 
bodies was seen as a convenient solution to a difficult problem.”9 However, the long 
delay in implementing any effective regulation of this sector creates a serious 
regulatory gap in the task of combating climate change. 
Aviation has recently received the attention of politicians, legal scholars and the 
broader public as a significant sector in respect of climate change. Academic debates 
have largely been limited to promoting international negotiations or ICAO’s role in a 
top-down regulatory system10 or the legality of the EU’s inclusion of international 
flights in the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).11 However, 
aviation’s contribution to climate change is too complex to be solved either by 
conventional top-down legal regimes, or by any single regulatory instrument. This 
thesis places aviation in the context of the burgeoning new governance literature that 
has engaged with the complexities of regulatory scale and the appropriate role of 
traditional top-down and multiple levels approaches. The governance of aviation 
emissions needs to be developed in an innovative way, moving towards a multi-scalar 
regulatory architecture. 
Chapters 3 to 6 examine current efforts to seek global solutions to aviation 
emissions. It always makes sense to learn from history, but these chapters challenge 
the conventional wisdom on this subject, analysing the advantages and limitations in 
existing international law in a way that explains the need for an innovative 
regulatory architecture, and identifies how it should look. The findings of these 
chapters contribute to the introduction of multi-scalar regulation to be discussed in 
                                                        
8 Kyoto Protocol, (n. 6), art.2.2. 
9 Andrew Macintosh, (n. 4). 
10 Allen Pei-Jan Tsai & Annie Petsonk, ‘Tracking the Skies: An Airline-based System for Limiting 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions From International Civil Aviation’ (1999-2000) 6 Envtl. Law. 763; 
Ruwantissa Abeyratne, ‘ICAO: Some Recent Developments in Aviation and Environmental Protection 
Regulation’ (2001) 32/1 Environmental Policy and Law 32; Andrew Macintosh, ibid. 
11 Petersen, Malte, ‘The Legality of the EU’s Stand-Alone Approach to the Climate Impact of Aviation: 
The Express Role Given to the ICAO by the Kyoto Protocol’ (2008) 17/2 RECIEL 196. 
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Chapter 7. 
Chapter 3 explores the obstacles in the existing international climate change 
law regime to reducing aviation emissions. It provides some possible explanations 
for the slow path towards an international agreement on an effective climate policy 
in the aviation sector. Following a discussion of the legal obstacles to reducing 
aviation emissions in the current regime, especially the division between Annex 
I/non-Annex I countries in burden sharing under the common but differentiated 
responsibility (CBDR) principle, Chapter 3 examines the potential of a sectoral 
approach to international aviation in the UNFCCC system, new approaches on 
burden sharing in respect of aviation emissions, and the adequacy of the UNFCCC 
system. This chapter identifies a sectoral approach as the preferred option in 
regulating aviation emissions. 
ICAO, which is the subject of Chapter 4, has been granted authority under the 
Kyoto Protocol over international civil aviation greenhouse gas emissions. However, 
the organisation has failed to deliver effective regulation. This chapter examines the 
reasons for delegation to ICAO in the Kyoto Protocol. It explores the limitations of 
ICAO in terms of its aims and its rule-making function, which might explain 
ICAO’s failure in the past. Finally, this chapter contributes to the repositioning of 
ICAO’s role in the future. Although ICAO is not suitable as the sole regulator of the 
aviation emissions problem, I argue that the organisation should continue to play a 
key role on the technical front and it may also have a role regarding performance 
monitoring, reporting methods and auditing processes. ICAO’s technology-based 
standards and its international governance capacity are its most important 
contributions to the development of legal regulations on aviation emissions. The role 
of ICAO identified in Chapter 4 provides partial illustration of the need for multiple 
parties in regulating aviation emissions, as discussed in Chapter 7; the potential for 
ICAO-inspired technology-based standards provides partial illustration of, as 
discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, the need for multiple regulatory instruments. 
This thesis focuses on the UNFCCC/ICAO legal framework. Other legal 
frameworks inevitably feature in this area. First, the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
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that Deplete the Ozone Layer12 has emerged as a significant mechanism for the 
international regulation and phase-out of certain greenhouse gases. The primary 
objective of the Montreal Protocol is to phase-out the consumption and production of 
nearly 100 chemicals known as “ozone depleting substances” (ODS). 13  These 
ozone-depleting industrial gases were excluded from the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol.14 However, this thesis focuses on the very considerable proportion of 
aviation emissions that are not regulated by the Montreal Protocol. 
Secondly, international aviation is not the only sector that was excluded from the 
targets set by the Kyoto Protocol. International shipping15 was also excluded from the 
Kyoto emissions accounting system. 16  As with aviation, GHG emissions from 
international shipping cannot be easily attributed to any particular national economy 
due to the global scale and complex operation of the shipping industry. 17 The 
Protocol requires the countries listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC to pursue the 
limitation or reduction of GHG emissions from marine bunker fuels, working through 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO),18 paralleling the role of ICAO in aviation. 
As with ICAO, there has not yet been any agreement within the IMO on a scheme for 
                                                        
12 Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts, First Session, UNEP/WG 151/L4 (1986); 
Second Session, UNEP/WG 167/2 (1987); Third Session, UNEP/WG 172/2 (1987). See Richard Elliot 
Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy (2nd ed., Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.; London 1998); 
UNEP Ozone Secretariat, Handbook for the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer (7th ed., Nairobi 2006). 
13 The Montreal Protocol, (n. 12), art. 2. 
14 IPCC guidelines, (n. 7). 
15 International shipping was estimated to have emitted 870 million tones or about 2.7% of the global 
man-made emissions of CO2 in 2007. This data comes from the Second IMO GHG Study 2009, which 
is the most comprehensive and authoritative assessment of the level of GHG emitted by ships. See IMO, 
Second IMO GHG Study (IMO; London 2009). 
16 Article 2.2 of the Protocol stated that “The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or 
reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and 
marine bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the 
International Maritime Organization, respectively.” 
17 In Decision 2/CP.3 the December 1997 Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, recalling the 
1996 Revised Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change which state that emissions based upon fuel sold to ships engaged in international 
transport are not to be included in national totals but reported separately, urged the Conference’s 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to further elaborate on the inclusion 
of emissions from international bunker fuels in the overall inventories of Parties to the UNFCCC. 
18 IMO is an agency of the United Nations which has been formed to promote maritime safety. It was 
formally established by an international conference in Geneva in 1948, and became active in 1958 
when the IMO Convention entered into force (the original name was the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organisation, or IMCO, but the name was changed in 1982 to IMO). For a review on the 
role of IMO in general, see Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle, Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the 
Environment (3rd ed., Oxford University Press; Oxford 2009), pp.75-77. 
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capping global shipping emissions. 
This thesis focuses on aviation rather than shipping, and so there will be no 
detailed discussion of IMO’s role in climate change. However, a few words on some 
of the similarities between the challenges faced by ICAO and IMO are worthwhile at 
this point. So far, no mandatory energy efficiency standard or mandatory energy 
efficiency management plan regarding GHG emissions from international shipping 
have been agreed.19 An expert group is to report to the Marine Environmental 
Protection Committee (MEPC) of IMO on the feasibility of market-based mechanisms 
in international shipping in July 2011.20 Like ICAO, IMO is open to the criticism that 
it cannot on its own provide effective regulation for shipping emissions. No emissions 
target has been identified by IMO. In the most recent IMO MEPC meeting in October 
2010, there was little consensus on proposals to cut emissions. 21  Although 
environmental protection is one of the objectives of IMO22 (by contrast with ICAO), 
the organisation has been waiting for a mitigation target or timetable to be decided 
through the UNFCCC-led international negotiations. 23  This preliminary review 
suggests that the work of IMO is unlikely to provide a good model for regulating 
aviation emissions. Given the complexity of the different legal regulatory systems of 
aviation law and maritime law, comparing the role of ICAO and IMO in more detail is 
                                                        
19 IMO ship pollution rules are contained in the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 1973/1978). Detailed anti-pollution regulations are given in the 
annexes to this Convention, as adopted or amended by the IMO’s Marine Environmental Protection 
Committee (MEPC). In 1997, the MARPOL Convention was amended to included Annex VI, titled 
“Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution from Ships,” setting limits on NOx and SOx emissions 
from ship exhausts and prohibiting deliberate emissions of ozone depleting substances. However, 
Annex VI does not cover the emission of GHGs from ships. To amendment Annex VI in including 
energy efficiency regulations on GHG emissions from shipping has been considered under the MEPC, 
but it seems difficult to achieve an agreement to create mandatory energy efficiency standards or an 
energy efficiency management plan among its member States. See Note submitted by the International 
Maritime Organisation to the thirty-third session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical 
Advice (SBSTA 33), Agenda item 6. (a) Emissions from fuel used for international aviation and 
maritime transport, Outcome of the sixty-first session of IMO’s Marine Environment Protection 
Committee Further progress made on technical, operational and market-based measures, 4 November 
2010, (IMO submission at Cancun). 
20 See IMO website at 
<http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/GHG-Emissions.
aspx>. 
21 IMO submissions at Cancun. (n. 19). The committee will hold another meeting from March 28 to 
April 1 2011 to discuss a market-based mechanism for lowering emissions. 
22 IMO Resolution A.1011(26), Assembly 16th session Agenda item 8, adopted on 16 November 2009. 
23 See Note submitted by the International Maritime Organisation to the thirty-third session of the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA 33), Agenda item 6, (n. 19), para. 46. 
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beyond the scope of this thesis, which focuses in detail on aviation. Nevertheless, 
given the similarly challenging international nature of these two industries, further 
research would be valuable in the future. 
The issue of climate change is not part of the WTO’s ongoing work programme 
and there are no WTO rules specific to climate change. However, the WTO is relevant 
because climate change measures may have an impact on international trade and may 
be subject to WTO rules and procedures.24 In principle, the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) applies to air transport. The Air Transport Service Annex of 
the GATS excludes the application of the GATS from traffic rights,25 meaning that 
(again, in principle) air transport is regulated independently of the WTO. However, if 
it is accepted that the rules relating to “products” apply to a measure such as a fuel tax, 
then, broadly speaking, WTO rules that relate generally to environmental issues 
(including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XX, the 
processes and production methods issue and the definition of a “like product”) are 
relevant.26 The design of climate change regulations and the pursuit of international 
cooperation in aviation will need to take into account the potential trade impact of 
these measures.27 But, it is still very unclear how the WTO “tool box” of rules (WTO 
rules and jurisprudence) relates to aviation, particularly given the clear effort to 
exclude air transport from WTO disciplines in the GATS. Given the likely scale of the 
debate around the application of WTO rules to climate change related aviation 
measures, and the focus of this thesis, the WTO is not discussed here in any detail. 
                                                        
24 WTO, The multilateral trading system and climate change, online available at 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/climate_change_e.pdf > last accessed 28.02.11. 
25 Annex on Air Transport Services, para. 2. Traffic rights mean “the right for scheduled and 
non-scheduled services to operate and/or to carry passengers, cargo and mail for remuneration or hire 
from, to, within, or over the territory of a Member, including points to be served, routes to be operated, 
types of traffic to be carried, capacity to be provided, tariffs to be charged and their conditions, and 
criteria for designation of airlines, including such criteria as number, ownership, and control.” para. 6 
(d). 
26 Christopher Tran, ‘Using GATT, Art XX to justify climate change measures in claims under the 
WTO Agreements’ (2010) 27 EPLJ 346. 
27 See Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization (2nd ed. 
Cambridge University Press; Cambridge 2008), chapter 4. Eckhard Pache, ‘On the compatibility with 
international legal provisions of including greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation in the 
EU emission allowance trading scheme as a result of the proposed changes to the EU emission 
allowance trading directive’ (15.04.2008) Legal opinion commissioned by the Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, online available at 
<http://www.bmu.de/english/emissions_trading/doc/42364.php> last accessed 15.03.11. 
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Turning back to the contents of the thesis, the exemption of international 
aviation from a fuel tax, which has an undeniable impact on the development of 
legal regulation of aviation emissions, is the focus of Chapter 5. This chapter first 
discusses the positive value of a fuel tax as a price-based market-based instrument 
(MBI) in environmental law. It treats a fuel tax primarily as a way of influencing 
demand, but also as a way of providing incentives for innovation. It then examines 
the legal, policy and practical barriers to introducing a fuel tax on international 
flights. Finally, this chapter gives suggestions on how to overcome these barriers. A 
fuel tax cannot be a stand-alone solution. However, its effect on demand and on 
incentives for innovation is potentially important. The implementation of an aviation 
fuel tax by nation states additionally contributes to re-scaling the legal regulation of 
aviation emissions as discussed in Chapter 7. 
In Chapter 6, I explore the role of emissions trading as a quantity-based MBI 
in environmental law on two levels: the role of regional emissions trading and the 
role of a proposed global emissions trading scheme. After a brief discussion on the 
pros and cons of emissions trading in general, I explore the role of regional 
emissions trading, taking the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) as an example. 
I examine the key elements of the EU ETS and the legality of including international 
airlines in the EU ETS. I argue that regional emissions trading can contribute to the 
mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions by incentivising the airline industry to 
improve energy intensity. I also argue that multiple regional emissions tradings may 
provide an example of regional level’s efforts to regulating aviation emissions, 
which is especially valuable if a sectoral target cannot be agreed under the UNFCCC 
system. As well as analysing this regional scheme, I propose a global emissions 
trading scheme. The sectoral target discussed in Chapter 3 provides a cap for the 
global emissions trading. Airlines are the participants in the trading system. The 
initial allocation of allowances is undertaken by IATA through full auctioning. 
ICAO takes the role of verification and monitoring. This is only a sectoral emissions 
trading system for international aviation unless and until a more comprehensive 
global emissions trading scheme can be agreed. Such a global emissions trading 
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scheme for aviation could be a tool to allocate carbon allowances if a 
comprehensive multi-level burden sharing system does not happen under the 
UNFCCC’s sectoral approach on aviation emissions. It could also be a tool to 
mitigate aviation emissions through incentivising the airline industry to improve 
energy intensity. 
The discussion in Chapters 3 to 6 of different aspects of substantive law or 
legal regulatory tools paves the way to Chapter 7 which turns more explicitly to the 
re-scaling of legal regulation of international aviation emissions. Building on the 
earlier analysis of the complexity of the aviation emissions problem, Chapter 7 
argues that a proper regulatory architecture on aviation emissions should be 
multi-scalar, that it should simultaneously engage in multi-level governance, and a 
multi-party and multi-instrument approach to the problem. The discussions in this 
chapter are based on the literature on new governance.  
New governance theory is an emerging theory which has many consequences 
for various dimensions and spheres of social policy, including environmental 
protection.28 Seeking or stipulating a particular definition of new governance is a 
hard task, partly because it is a growing academic field. Although a large number of 
attempts have been made to define or describe the new governance phenomenon,29 
it “remains [a] relatively bland and imprecise descriptor of this family of governance 
                                                        
28 See e.g., Joanne Scott (ed.), Environmental Protection: European Law and Governance, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2009); the special issue of the European Law Journal (Volume 8, 2002) on 
“law and new approaches to EU governance”; Grainne de Búrca, ‘The Constitutional Challenge of 
New Governance’ (2003) 28 ELR 814; Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, ‘A Constitution of 
Democratic Experimentalism’ (1998) 98 Columbia L. Rev. 267; Daniel J. Fiorino, ‘Rethinking 
Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance’ (1999) 23 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 441; 
Jody Freeman, ‘Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State’ (1997) 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1; Eric 
W. Orts, ‘Reflexive Environmental Law’ (1995) 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227; Charles Sabel et al., ‘Beyond 
Backyard Environmentalism’ in Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers (eds.) Beyond Backyard 
Environmentalism (Beacon Press, Boston 2000), p. 3; Neil Gunningham, ‘The New Collaborative 
Environmental Government: The Localization of Regulation’ (2009) 36/1 Journal of Law and Society 
145. New Governance also develops in many other areas of public policy, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
‘ “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous 
Lumping’ (2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 471. 
29 See for the work on defying new governance in the European Union, e.g., the research have been 
done at <www.eu-newgov.org> and <www.connex-network.org>; Kenneth Armstrong & Claire 
Kilpatrick, ‘Law, Governance, or New Governance? The Changing Open Method of Coordination’ 
(2006-2007) 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 649. 
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innovations.”30  The notion is generally defined “by what it is not, more than by 
what it is,” 31  as it rejects “uniform one-size-fits-all rules” associated with 
conventional prescriptive regulation.32 It covers “a broad family of innovative 
modes of public governance” occurring within the European Union, the United 
States and elsewhere.33 We should know that the affix “new” cannot specifically 
distinguish between governance and what is referred to as new governance.34 
Scholars have warned that the affix “new” should not be used to overstate “the 
disjuncture between supposedly traditional regulatory methods and more 
experimental approaches” and especially that it should not be used to conceal the 
continuities between them.35 In fact, the term “new” is used in a broad way to 
include different approaches in “a shift away from a certain traditional mode of 
governing associated with government”36 to a system of governance which is 
“intensely fractured” as “[p]ower is shared among a multiplicity of actors, operating 
at different levels of government, in the private and public sphere.”37 As such, the 
affix “new” may be better used to refer to the “governance turn” as it was called by 
Kohler-Koch and Rittberger,38  rather than as necessarily entailing a claim of 
                                                        
30 Bradley C. Karkkainen, (n. 28), p. 473. 
31 Neil Gunningham, (n. 28), p. 146; See also, Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law 
and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union’ (2002) 8/1 Eur. L.J. 1. 
32 Bradley C. Karkkainen, (n. 28), p. 474; Orly Lobel, ‘The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and 
the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought’ (2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342. New 
Governance is often referred by contrast to traditional forms of regulation. See Julia Black, ‘Decentring 
Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World’ 
(2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 103, 105; Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, ‘Introduction: New 
Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’ in Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott (eds.), Law and New 
Governance in the EU and the US (Hart, Oxford 2006), pp. 1, 2-3; David M. Trubek & Louise G. 
Trubek, ‘New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation’ 
(2007) 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 539, pp. 542-43. 
33 Bradley C. Karkkainen, (n. 28), p. 472. De Búrca and Scott explained that New Governance “is a 
construct which has been developed to explain a range of processes and practices that have a normative 
dimension but do not operate primarily or at all through the formal mechanism of traditional 
command-and-control-type legal institutions.” Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, ibid., p. 2.  
34 Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, (n. 32); Jeremy Wilson, ‘ “New” and “Old” Modes of 
Environmental Governance: The Evolution of the North American Waterfowl Bird Policy Regime’ 
(2006) Paper presented at the Western Political Science Association Conference, online available at: 
<http://web.uvic.ca/polisci/wilson/articles/westernpolisciassociation.doc> last accessed 30.03.10. 
Oliver Treib, Holger Bähr & Gerda Falkner, ‘Modes of Governance: A Note towards Conceptual 
Clarification’ (November 17, 2005) European Governance Papers, Paper No. N-05-52, online available 
at: <http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-newgov-N-05-02.pdf> last accessed 20.03.10. 
35 Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, (n. 32), pp. 2-3. 
36 Kenneth Armstrong & Claire Kilpatrick, (n. 29), p. 651. 
37 Joanne Scott, (n. 28), pp. vii. 
38 Beate Kohler-Koch & Berthold Rittberger, ‘Review Article: The ‘Governance Turn’ in EU Studies’ 
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originality,39 or even reference to a time horizon.40 
What is more, there have been different academic contributions to identifying 
the characteristics of new governance. For example, Scott and Trubek clearly 
identify the following key characteristics of new governance: participation and 
power-sharing; multi-level interaction; diversity and decentralization; deliberation; 
flexibility and revisability; and experimentation and knowledge-creation.41 Orly 
Lobel has synthesized the literature on new governance and related approaches to 
regulation and has identified eight “organizing principles”: participation and 
partnership; collaboration; diversity and competition; decentralization and 
subsidiarity; integration of policy domains; flexibility and lack of coerciveness (or 
softness-in-law); fallibility, adaptability and dynamic learning; law as competence 
and orchestration.42 Gunningham has identified that new governance in the context 
of environmental protection has the following characteristics: “participatory 
dialogue and deliberation, devolved decision-making, flexibility rather than 
uniformity, inclusiveness, transparency, institutionalized consensus-building 
practices, and a shift from hierarchy to heterarchy.”43 Importantly, he has pointed 
out that not all of these characteristics necessarily have to be present for a particular 
case to fall within new governance theory, but “the more characteristics that are 
present, and the stronger the form in which they are present, the greater is the claim 
to be regarded as falling within this category.”44  
Although there is no specific definition or uniform description of the theory, 
new governance has become increasingly important both nationally and 
trans-nationally. The rise of new governance in the U.S. has been found in the use of 
                                                                                                                                                               
(2006) 44 J. Common Mkt. Stud. 27. 
39 B. Guy Peters, ‘Governance: A Garbage Can Perspective’ (2002) Institute for Advanced Studies, 
Vienna, Working Paper, online available at <http://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/wp_84.pdf> last 
accessed 30.03.10. 
40 Oliver Treib, Holger Bähr & Gerda Falkner, ‘Modes of Governance: A Note towards Conceptual 
Clarification’ (November 17, 2005) European Goivernance Papers, Paper No. N-05-52, online 
available at: <http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-newgov-N-05-02.pdf> last accessed 
20.03.10. 
41 Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, (n. 31). 
42 Orly Lobel, (n. 32). 
43 Neil Gunningham, (n.28), p. 146. 
44 Ibid. 
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litigation, e.g. in Habitat Conservation Plans under the Endangered Species Act and in 
the Chesapeake Bay and San Francisco Bay Delta Programmes;45 and in increased 
public-private partnerships and the emergence of new managerial technologies.46 A 
range of important developments in EU environmental law over the last decade are 
emblematic of new governance.47 On the international level, the book Governance 
without Government
48 showed that “[g]overnance has become a pervasive form of 
political steering.”49 New governance has been adopted by a number industrialized 
countries, e.g. through government-industry pollution control agreements.50 
Taken a step further on to a theoretical level, three different kinds of explanatory 
accounts of the development of new governance have been provided by de Búrca and 
Scott together with other scholars,51 and provides some initial insight into why new 
governance is helpful in addressing aviation related climate change. The first is that 
the absence of a conventional governmental framework or pre-existing blueprint 
necessitates a degree of experimentation with different kinds of public policy-making 
strategies. 52  The second is that the changing patterns and modes of domestic 
regulatory practices have resulted in a growth in the role of private actors and 
networks in governing.53 The third is the dissatisfaction with traditional forms of 
                                                        
45 Bradley C. Karkkainen, ‘Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism’ 
(2001-2002) 21 Virginia Environmental Law Journal 189; J. Freeman & D. Farber, ‘Modular 
Environmental Regulation’ (2005) 54 Duke Law Journal 795. 
46 Louise G. Trubek, ‘New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform’ (2006) 3 Ind. Health L. 
Rev. 140, 151. 
47 See general Ingmar von Homeyer, ‘The Evolution of EU Environmental Governance’ in Joanne 
Scott, (n. 28), p. 1; for some of examples of new governance in EU environmental law, see Maria Lee, 
‘Law and Governance of Water Protection Policy’; Joanne Scott, ‘REACH: Combinating 
Harmonization and Dynamism in the Regulation of Chemicals’, in the same book. 
48 James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Governance without Government: order and change in 
world politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; New York 1992). 
49 Renate Mayntz, ‘From Government to Governance: Political Steering in Modern Societies’, Speech 
on International Summer Academy, (September 7-11, 2003). 
50 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, ‘Strengthening International Regulation Through 
“Transnational New Governance”’ (2008) online available at: 
<http://works.bepress.com/kenneth_abbott/1> last accessed 30.03.10. 
51 Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, ‘Introduction’ (2006-2007) 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 513. See also 
discussions on the reasons of increasing use of new governance in the EU in Joanne Scott & David M. 
Trubek, (n. 31). 
52 See also Special Issue 8 Eur. L. J. (2002) and Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott (eds.), Law and New 
Governance in the EU and the US (2006); Bradley C. Karkkainen, (n. 28); Jody Freeman & Laura I. 
Langbein, ‘Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit’ (2000) 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 60, p. 63; 
Jody Freeman, (n. 28), p. 6. 
53 See also R.A.W. Rhodes, Understanding Governance: policy networks, governance, reflexivity, and 
accountability (Open University Press, Maidenhead 1997). For discussions of New Governance from a 
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command-and-control regulation for public policies.54 All of these three reasons point 
to the essence of new governance as providing “a new model of collaborative, 
multi-party, multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving.” 55  The emergence of new 
governance may in part be attributed to very complex problems which are hard to 
solve, on which we have limited experience,56 and where familiar approaches fall 
fnort. This includes climate change and aviation emissions.57 Given the failure of 
traditional international regulation of aviation emissions problem, regulatory design 
needs to break the barriers of a traditional international treaty-based approach and 
introduce innovative ideas. New governance theory provides a response to the failure 
of the current approach to aviation’s contribution to climate change, grounded in both 
a realistic analysis of the nature of the problem, and a solid theoretical framework. 
The value of new governance for regulating international aviation emissions will be 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 7 argues that we should regulate aviation emissions in the following 
way: a full range of parties should be involved, including both public and private 
parties (international organisations such as the UNFCCC and ICAO, nation states, 
the airline industry, IATA and NGOs); multiple regulatory instruments should be 
involved, including conventional command and control type regulatory mechanisms 
(a sectoral mitigation target and technology-based standards) and market-based 
instruments (fuel taxes and emissions trading); and multiple parties should be 
involved on different scales. This chapter picks up the arguments from previous 
chapters in identifying that the best solution is to agree an international sectoral 
target on reducing aviation emission through the UNFCCC-led climate change 
negotiations. Under the sectoral target, burden sharing in respect of aviation 
                                                                                                                                                               
public administration perspective, see Lester M. Salamon (ed.) The Tools of Government: A Guide to 
the New Governance (Oxford University Press, New York 2001). 
54 See also Marius Aalders & Ton Wilthaagen, ‘Moving Beyond Common-and-Control: Reflexivity in 
the Regulation of Occupational Safety and Health and the Environment’ (1997) 19 Law & Soc. Pol. 
415; Khatarina Holzinger, Christoph Knill & Ansgar Schafer, ‘Rhetoric or Reality? New Governance in 
EU Environmental Policy’ (2006) 12 Eur. L. J. 403. 
55 Bradley C. Karkkainen, (n. 28), p. 473. 
56 David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, (n. 32), p. 542. 
57 The value of new governance in solving climate change issue has been discussed, see Joanne Scott, 
‘The Multi-level Governance of Climate Change’, in Paul Craig & Gráinne de Burca (eds.), The 
Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010). 
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emissions should not be solely by nationality but through a multi-level approach. 
The developed/developing country dichotomy should be broken by considering 
changing contribution to the expansion of international aviation, and changing 
capacity for the provision of cleaner facilities for international aviation, as proposed 
in Chapter 3. Mitigation efforts will be made at multiple levels, by multiple parties, 
using multiple tools, as discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Chapter 7 also identifies a 
secondary approach based on the non-hierarchical decision-making of new 
governance. If a sectoral approach cannot be achieved, the multiple levels, parties 
and instruments take on a more central role. In this way, the international aviation 
emissions problem should move beyond the deadlock of conventional inter-state 
approaches and might recognise climate change as a multi-scalar problem that needs 
multi-scalar regulatory approaches. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
This thesis is based on doctrinal and theoretical legal analysis. It demands 
exhaustive analysis of the literature. 
First, analysis of primary and secondary legal materials leads to the 
development of a clear thesis on the legal position with respect to aviation emissions. 
The international climate change agreements58 and the Chicago Convention on Air 
Transportation59 are the main primary sources. The UN Framework Convention on 
                                                        
58 The international climate change law regime includes the provisions of the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),  the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, the Copenhagen 
Accord of 2009, the Cancun Agreements 2010, and the wealth of Party decisions and implementation 
activities occurring within the framework of those agreements. See Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle & 
Catherine Redgwell, (n. 18) Chapter 6, pp. 356-377; Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and 
International law: prevention, duties and state responsibility, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 
Boston, 2005), p. 43; Joanna Depledge, ‘Crafting the Copenhagen Consensus: Some Reflections’ (2008) 
17/2 RECIEL 154; Lavanya Rajamani, ‘From Berlin to Bali and beyond: killing Kyoto softly?’ (2008) 
57/4 ICLQ 909; Chris Spence, Kati Kulovesi, & María Gutiéñoz, ‘Great Expectations: Understanding 
Bali and the Climate Change Negotiations Process’ (2008) 17/2 RECIEL 142; Anita M. Halvorssen, 
‘Global Response to Climate Change – From Stockholm to Copenhagen’ (2007-2008) 85 Denv. U. L. 
Rev. 841. 
59 Convention on International Civil Aviation (adopted 7 December 1944, entered into force 4 April 
1947) 15 UNTS 295 (Chicago Convention). 
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Climate Change60 and the Kyoto Protocol61 are the starting point, together with 
international progress on a post-2012 climate change framework in the Copenhagen 
Accord62 and Cancun Agreements63.  
Secondly, I analyse the scholarly literature in a number of different legal fields. 
There is a limited literature explicitly addressing the linkage between aviation and 
climate change, but clearly that is the starting point. This thesis crosses disciplines 
within law, demanding analysis of scholarly literature in a number of fields. It is not 
possible to outline all of the scholarship here, but briefly, in the area of climate change 
regulation, the extensive literature on the UNFCCC climate change negotiations, the 
principle of CBDR and market-based mechanisms will be most significant. In aviation 
law, the literature on ICAO’s international standards and recommended practices 
(SARPs), the rule-making function of ICAO and environmental auditing will be 
analysed for its relevance to the potential of ICAO to control aviation emissions. 
Literature on the EU ETS, including on the legality of its application to international 
aviation is needed in identifying the role of a single regulatory mechanism and efforts 
on regional level in regulating aviation emissions. Wider literature on international 
environmental law, e.g. monitoring, reporting and compliance (MRV), 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and economic instruments, is also necessary. 
Thirdly, this thesis uses new governance theory as its theoretical framework. 
Given the failure of traditional international regulation of aviation emissions, 
regulatory design needs to break the barriers of a traditional top-down approach, 
moving beyond a complete reliance on international treaty making and introducing 
innovative ideas. New governance theory provides the idea of introducing “a 
governance turn”64, away from traditional ways of governing, towards approaches that 
rely on a range of public and private actors at different levels of governance. So, new 
                                                        
60 UNFCCC, (n. 5). 
61 Kyoto Protocol, (n. 6). 
62 Copenhagen Accord, Decision -/CP.15, found in Decisions adopted by COP 15, online available at 
<http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/items/5257.php>, (Copenhagen Accord). 
63 The Cancun Agreements include decisions under both the sixteenth session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP 16) to the UNFCCC (Decision -/CP.16), and the sixth Conference of the Parties serving 
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/CMP 6) (Decision -/CMP.6), online available at 
<http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_16/items/5571.php>, (Cancun Agreements). 
64 Beate Kohler-Koch & Berthold Rittberger, (n. 38). 
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governance provides the theoretical foundation upon which the failure of traditional 
regulatory approaches can be analyzed and the future of regulating aviation emissions 
can be explored. This theory also provides a response to the failure of the 
international approach to aviation’s contribution to climate change, grounded in both a 
realistic analysis of the nature of the problem, and a solid theoretical framework. 
Drawing on new governance literature, I approach aviation emissions’ impact on 
climate change through a scalar lens. The impact of international aviation emissions 
on climate change is not solely an international problem, but rather it is a multi-scalar 
one that deserves multi-scalar regulations. Introducing new governance theory in 
regulating aviation emissions aims to provide a theoretical overlay to the failure of 
traditional regulatory approaches; and to use the story of aviation emissions as a 
means of testing the ability of new governance theory to account in a “real life 
situation” for the failure of traditional, top-down regulation and to provide a solution. 
As such, the function of introducing new governance theory is two fold, both to 
challenge existing paradigms and to provide a solution. 
 
This thesis attempts to state the law as at March 2011. 
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Chapter 2. Climate Change and Aviation 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I explore possible reasons, arising from the nature of the 
contribution of international aviation to climate change, that might begin to explain 
the difficulty of regulating aviation. After a brief introduction to the topic of climate 
change generally, this chapter examines aviation’s contribution to climate change 
and analyses the particular difficulties faced in respect of international aviation. 
These include the difficulty of identifying the quantity of emissions involved in any 
flight and their atmospheric impacts; the difficulty in the balancing of any potential 
trade-off effects in environmental protection, aviation safety and air transport 
efficiency terms; and the difficulty in identifying who should take the mitigation 
responsibility. This analysis is crucial because only with a full understanding of the 
unique nature of aviation emissions can we tackle the complexity of designing legal 
regulations on the aviation climate change issue.  
The focus of this thesis and the suggested priority of the legal regime should 
be on technical measures and technological innovations to improve energy intensity 
in the aviation sector. However, one of the challenges of the climate change impact 
of aviation is that the increase in aircraft emissions attributable to the anticipated 
growing demand for air travel is unlikely to be offset by any reductions in emissions 
achieved through technological improvements. As such, whilst it is not a focus of 
this thesis, I return to this briefly in my discussion of tax in Chapter 5, measures to 
alter demand, and encourage behaviour change towards a lifestyle with less flying 
will be necessary. This chapter focuses on recognizing the nature of the problem. 
The following chapters will explore the design of regulation in order to ensure that 
aviation continues to serve the human community in a way that does not threaten the 
global climate. 
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2. Climate Change 
 
Climate change is now widely accepted as a real human-caused problem and a 
major threat to the worldwide human and natural environment. The climate change 
crisis (also known as global warming) results from anthropogenic “greenhouse 
gases” (GHGs) in the upper atmosphere and the harms of climate change have 
wide-ranging impacts on ecosystems which differ from many other environmental 
challenges.1 Scientific warnings on this urgent problem are becoming clearer. The 
phenomenon of climate change has now moved from being a scientific question to 
the political stage.2 This section examines the scientific understanding of climate 
change and the resulting need for policymakers to understand the significance of 
emissions control. 
Scientific discussion of the climate change problem has a history going back 
more than a hundred years, 3  although an international scientific and legal 
framework for dealing with climate change was only established in the 1990s.4 
There are many scientific studies addressing the climate change problem. Among 
them, the most authoritative source on the consolidation of scientific data on climate 
change is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).5 The IPCC was 
established by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United 
                                                        
1 See IPCC, Fourth Assessement Report: Climate Change 2007, online available at 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.htm#1 > last accessed 
22.02.10, (IPCC Fourth Assessment Report). 
2 See general, Dieter Helm (ed.), Climate-change Policy (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005). It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to neither identify the extent of the impact of climate change nor 
discuss the climate skepticism. See general, Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree about Climate Change 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009). 
3 Svante Arrhenius, ‘On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the 
Ground’ (1896) 41/5 London, Edinburgh, and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science 
237; Roger Revelle & Hans E Suess, ‘Carbon Dioxide Exchange between Atmosphere and Ocean and 
the Question of an Increase of Atmospheric CO2 During the Past Decades’ (1957) 9 Tellus 18; James 
Hansen et al., ‘Climate Impacts of Increasing Carbon Dioxide’ (1980) 213 Science 957; Roger Revelle, 
‘Carbon Dioxide and World Climate’ (1982) 247/2 Scientific American 35. 
4 On the scientific aspect, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 
1988. It works on scientific assessments of climate change risk and impacts. On the legal aspect, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) opened for signature on 9 May 
1992, and entered into force on 21 March 1994. 
5 Ibid. For the role of IPCC played as “policy-relevant” in ensuring a credible climate change regime, 
see Dagmar Lohan & Claudio Forner, ‘Science-Policy Interaction: Challenges for Ensuring a Credible 
Climate Change Regime’ (2005) 16 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 155. 
 30 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to provide “decision-makers and others 
interested in climate change with an objective source of information about climate 
change.”6 The role of the IPCC is to “assess on a comprehensive, objective, open 
and transparent basis the latest scientific, technical and socio-economic literature 
produced worldwide” concerning human-caused climate change. 7  The IPCC 
produces climate change assessments and technical papers which are underpinned 
by the contributions of climate scientists and other experts from around the world. 
Those assessments and papers are regularly cited by policymakers. 
The IPCC has now produced four comprehensive climate change assessments 
which have expanded its statistical analysis over time.8 Its latest report released in 
2007 (IPCC Fourth Assessment Report),9 is based on reports by the three Working 
Groups, which addressed the physical science basis of climate change, the impacts 
(including adaptation and vulnerability) of climate change and the mitigation of 
climate change.10 The Fourth Assessment Report declares that evidence of the 
warming of the climate system is “unequivocal” and this warming is “very likely”11 
due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations. The IPCC has 
warned that global warming of more than two degrees Celsius (2 ℃) above 
1990-2000 levels would have a variety of severe impacts, such as “increases in 
human mortality, loss of glaciers, increases in the frequency and/or intensity of 
extreme events,” “widespread loss of biodiversity, decreasing global agricultural 
productivity and commitment to widespread deglaciation of the Greenland and West 
Antarctic ice sheets.”12  
Limiting temperature rise to 2 ℃ above pre-industrial levels means stabilizing 
                                                        
6 IPCC website, ‘about IPCC’, online available at <http://www1.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm> last 
accessed 22.02.10. 
7 Ibid. 
8 The first three reports were published in 1990, 1995 and 2001. IPCC decided to prepare a Fifth 
Assessment Report at its 28th Panel Sessions in April 2008. By the time of writing this thesis, IPCC has 
been seeking the widest selection of experts nominated from governments and participating 
organizations. The nomination period was opened on 15 January and closed on 12 March 2010. For the 
progress of the Fifth Assessment Report, see IPCC website at 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/activities/activities.htm> last accessed 06.10.10. 
9 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, (n. 1). 
10 IPCC Working Groups Reports are available online at 
<www1.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/assessments-reports.htm > last accessed 06.10.10. 
11 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: the physical science basis, Contribution of Working Group I to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of IPCC, ibid, p. 10. “Very likely” is used to indicate a greater than 90 
percent probability. 
12 Stephen H Schneider, Serguei Semenov & Anand Patwardhan, ‘Assessing Key Vulnerabilities and 
the Risk from Climate Change’ in IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Impacts Adaptation and Vulnerability, 
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of IPCC, (n. 10), p. 781. 
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greenhouse gas emissions at 350 parts per million (ppm) CO2 equivalent (CO2-eq) at 
most.13 The total CO2-eq concentration of all long-lived GHGs was estimated by 
the IPCC in 2007 to be about 455 ppm CO2-eq.14 To achieve a 350 CO2 ppm 
atmosphere, atmospheric CO2 concentrations need to “be reduced quickly.”15 The 
IPCC report emphasized that if the world stopped emitting CO2 today, the stock of 
CO2 in the atmosphere in 2107 would remain at about 90 percent of what it is in 
2007.16 As such, stabilization at 350 ppm CO2 requires a substantial reduction of 
CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere. 
Policymakers are called on to “forestall climate change and to cope with its 
impacts.”17 Over the last two decades, climate change has matured into an issue of 
significant political concern and “has led to a profusion of legal developments that 
together coalesce to form the new body of law dubbed ‘climate change law’.”18 As 
a “new generation” issue characterised by diffuse sources and widespread effects,19 
climate change represents challenges to conventional governance and regulatory 
systems.20 Chapter 3 will identify those challenges in exploring the international 
climate change law regime and explain why it is difficult to achieve efficient, 
                                                        
13 CO2eq is a unit of measurement used to compare the climate effect of all greenhouse gases in 
relation to each other. See H-Holger Rogner et al., Introduction, in IPCC, Climate Change 2007: 
Mitigation of Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of 
IPCC, (n. 10), p. 100. Aiming to stabilize greenhouse gases at 350 ppm CO2-eq would reduce the mean 
probability of overshooting at a 2℃ temperature rise to 7 percent. See Matt Vespa, ‘Why 350? Climate 
Policy Must Aim to Stabilize Greenhouse Gases at the Level Necessary to Minimize the Risk of 
Catastrophic Outcomes’ (2009) 36 Ecology L. Currents 185; Malte Meinshausen, ‘What Does a 2℃ 
Target Mean for Greenhouse Gas Concentrations? A Brief Analysis Based on Multi-Gas Emission 
Pathways and Several Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty Estimates’ in Hans Joachim Schellnhuber (ed.), 
Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006), p. 268; James 
Hansen et al., ‘Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?’ (2008) 2 Open Atmospheric 
Sci. J. 217. 
14 H-Holger Rogner et al., ibid. 
15 Matt Vespa, (n. 13). 
16 See IPCC Working Group I Report, (n. 11), FAQ 10.3. Hansen and his colleagues have also warned 
that “if the world continues on a business-as-usual path for even another decade without initiating 
phase-out of unconstrained coal use, prospects for avoiding a dangerously large, extended overshoot of 
the 350 ppm level will be dim.” James Hansen et al., (n. 13), p. 227. 
17 Jonathan B. Wiener, ‘Radiative Forcing: Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in Environmental Law’ 
(2008-2009) 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 210, 210; see also IPCC Working Group I Report, (n. 11), pp. 2-5. 
18 Jacqueline Peel, ‘Climate Change Law: The Emergence of A New Legal Discipline’ (2008) 32 Melb. 
U. L. Rev. 922, 925. See also John C. Dernbach & Seema Kakade, ‘Climate Change Law: An 
Introduction’ (2008) 29 Energy L. J. 1. 
19 Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, ‘New Generation Environmental Policy: Environmental 
Management Systems and Regulatory Reform’ (1998) 22 Melb. U. L. Rev. 592. 
20 Jacqueline Peel, (n. 18). 
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effective and just regulations21 to reduce GHG emissions. In the next section, I will 
examine aviation’s contribution to climate change and analyse the particular 
difficulties faced in respect of regulating international aviation emissions.22 
 
3. Aviation and Climate Change 
 
International aviation has been experiencing fast growth, and is associated 
with a number of social and economic benefits and environmental harms, including 
impact on climate change. In climate change treaties,23 international aviation is 
distinguished from other industry sectors and its effect on the climate has become an 
extremely difficult problem because of the sector’s unique nature. This section sets 
out to provide an introduction to international aviation’s contribution to climate 
change and to identify what makes the aviation sector unique in relation to climate 
change regulation. It concludes that technical measures are not likely to deal with 
the whole problem, legal regulations on aviation emissions should encourage 
measures to improve energy intensity in the aviation sector, and also (although as 
mentioned above, this is not a focus of this thesis) encourage less flying. 
 
3.1. Effects of Aviation on Climate 
 
Efficient approaches to counteracting increases in international aviation 
emissions rely on a clear understanding of the contribution of aircraft emissions to 
climate change. Published reports on the contribution of aircraft emissions to global 
warming started since the 1990s.24 In 1999, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) published a Special Report on Aviation and the Global Atmosphere 
                                                        
21 William Nordhaus & Joseph Boyer, Warming the World (MIT Press, Cambridge, Cambridge, Mass.; 
London 2000), p.76. 
22 As noted in the introduction, the scope of this research covers only international civil aircrafts, 
which means it does not cover military aircraft emissions and domestic air traffic. 
23 See discussions in chapter 3, section 2. 
24 Anu Vedantham & Michael Oppenheimer, ‘Aircraft Emissions and the Global Atmosphere’ 
(Environmental Defense Fund, 1994) pp. 58-59, online available at <www.works.bepress.com/anu/3> 
last accessed 23.02.10. 
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(IPCC 1999 Report).25 It represents “the most comprehensive assessment available 
of the effects of aviation on the global atmosphere.”26 Even over a decade later, it 
still remains “a valuable referent point.”27 
The Report recognised the complexities of the science of aviation emissions 
and highlined some essential scientific understanding of aviation emissions, 
including that the aviation sector represents approximately 3.5 percent of the global 
anthropogenic radiactive forcing (a measure of warming);28 this was the result of a 
group of GHGs emitted from aircraft engines (including mainly CO2, and NOx, 
water vapour, sulphate aerosols and soot);29 this was estimated to increase to 5 
percent in 2050.30 Many pieces of research have been carried out since the IPCC 
1999 Report to further estimate the effects of aviation on climate.31 Total aviation 
radiative forcing was still 3.5 percent as updated in 2005 for 2000 by Sausen et al.32 
Aviation emissions are projected to increase due to the expected growth in air 
travel.33 The questions have shifted from “what is the magnitude of the (various) 
effects?” to “how can we reduce the (various) effects?” and “with what sort of 
metrics should we compare effects for mitigation?” and “what are the technological 
and atmospheric trade-offs in mitigation?”34 
3.5 percent of the total radiative forcing seems like a small number. In fact, it 
                                                        
25 Joyce E. Penner et al. (eds.), Aviation and the Global Atmosphere: Special Report of the 
International Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999), (IPCC 1999 
Report). 
26 Ibid., back cover. 
27 David S. Lee, ‘Aviation and Climate Change: The Science’ in Stefan Gössling & Paul Upham (eds.) 
Climate Change and Aviation: Issues, Challenges and Solutions (Edward Elgar, London 2009), p. 28. 
28 Radiative forcing “is a measure of the importance of a potential climate change mechanism.” It 
“expresses the perturbation or change to the energy balance of the Earth-atmosphere system in watts 
per square meter (Wm-2).” IPCC 1999 Report, (n. 25), p. 3; For a more general explanation of climate 
concepts and metrics, see David S. Lee, ibid., pp. 31-32.  
29 IPCC 1999 Report, ibid., p. 21. 
30 Ibid., p. 8. 
31 For example, Guy P. Brasseur (ed.), ‘A report on the way forward based on the research gaps and 
priorities’ (Aviation Climate Change Research Initiative, 2008) Sponsored by the Environmental 
Working Group of the US NextGen Joint Planning and Development Office, available online at 
<www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/aep/aviation_climate/> last accessed 23.02.10; 
David S. Lee et al. ‘Aviation and global climate change in the 21st century’ (2009) 30 Atmospheric 
Environment 1. 
32 Total aviation radiative forcing in 2005 was still 3.5% (excluding induced cirrus) or 4.9% (including 
induced cirrus) of total anthropogenic forcing. Robert Sausen et al., ‘Aviation radiative forcing in 2000: 
An update on IPCC (1999)’ (2005) 14/4 Meteorologische Zeitschrift 555. See also David S. Lee et. al., 
ibid. 
33 David S. Lee et al., (n. 31); Anu Vedantham & Michael Oppenheimer, ‘Aircraft Emissions and the 
Global Atmosphere’ (Environmental Defense Fund, 1994), pp. 58-59, online available at 
<www.works.bepress.com/anu/3> last accessed 23.02.10. 
34 David S. Lee, (n. 27), pp. 28-29. 
 34 
is comparable with the entire impact of Canada’s CO2 emissions from all sources.35 
If this is still not impressive, the severity of the aviation emissions issue may be 
explained by considering the following three perspectives. First of all, the aircraft 
emissions are injected directly into the upper troposphere and the lower stratosphere. 
The impact of burning fossil fuels at altitude is about double that of burning the 
same fuels at ground level.36 Second, the impact from the mix of emissions from 
aircraft goes far beyond the radiative effects of CO2 alone. Such a mixture of 
exhaust species was estimated as being two to four times more than if the exhaust 
were CO2 alone from aircraft causing radiative forcing.37 Third, the aviation sector 
has been growing rapidly and is expected to continue to grow as the globalisation of 
industry and commerce has increased.38 The most recent IPCC Fourth Assessment 
Report estimated that total air transport CO2 emissions were 280 Mt in 2000 and 282 
Mt in 2005. The report predicted that such emissions will be up to 584 Mt in 2010, 
860 Mt in 2020, 1262 Mt in 2030 and 2377 Mt in 2050.39 There is always some 
uncertainty in projections, and the industry experienced some publicized downturn 
after events such as the 11 September 2001 World Trade Centre attack and SARS 
(severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak and the recent widespread economic 
recession. According to the reports from the International Air Transport Association 
(IATA), released in June 2010, air travel and freight volumes are above 
                                                        
35 John Whitelegg, Aviation: the social, economic and environmental impact of flying (Ashden Trust, 
London 2000) section 4.2. Impacts of Emissions. 
36 Ibid. See also Joosung J. Lee et al., ‘Historical and Future Trends in Aircraft Performance, Cost, and 
Emissions’ (2001) 26 Annu. Rev. Energy Environ. 167. This is taken into account in the 3.5% figure; 
however, it still means that a reduction of carbon emissions from aircraft is more effective than an 
equivalent reduction at ground level. 
37 IPCC 1999 Report, (n. 25). 
38 Andrew Macintosh & Lailey Wallace, ‘International aviation emissions to 2025: Can emissions be 
stabilized without restricting demand?’ (2008) CCLP Working Paper Series 2008/1, ANU Centre for 
Climate Law and Policy; UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, ‘The Environmental 
Effects of Civil Aircraft in Flight’ (November 2002) online available at 
<http://www.rcep.org.uk/reports/index.htm>; Heather L. Miller, ‘Civil Aircraft Emissions and 
International Treaty Law’ (1997-1998) 63 J. Air L. & Com. 697. See also Laurie Michaelis, OECD, 
Special Issues in Carbon/Energy Taxation: Carbon Charges on Aviation Fuels, ‘Policies and Measures 
for Common Action’ Working Paper 12, Annex I Expert Group on the UNFCCC, Supported by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Energy Agency, p. 5 
(March 1997); David S. Lee, (n. 27), Emissions trends from 1970 to 2005 in Figure 2.1, p.30. 
39 Working Group III, IPCC, (n. 13), pp. 334-335. 
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pre-recession levels40 and airlines are expecting to have 16 billion travellers and 
handle 400 million tonnes of cargo in 2050 (a strong growth from 2.4 billion 
passengers and 43 million tonnes of cargo now).41 The recovery of the industry 
indicates that the civil aviation industry is resilient and the growth of aviation has 
continued.42 From these three perspectives, per-unit reduction in aviation emissions 
may be relatively more effective and urgent as a way of combating climate change 
than equivalent emissions from ground sources. 
 
3.2. Challenges of Regulating Aviation Emissions 
 
Much of the growth in aviation can be attributed to growth in international 
flights.43 Curbing the growth in international aviation emissions raises a number of 
difficult legal issues, particularly in relation to the potential of international 
negotiation to share reduction obligations among countries and the ability of 
countries to impose carbon prices on aviation (to be discussed in Chapter 3 to 6). 
The challenges rest on the unique characteristics of international air transportation 
and its emissions.  
First of all, there is a fundamental difficulty in identifying the quantity of 
emissions involved in any flight and their atmospheric impacts evolved. For 
example, we could refer to the average CO2 emissions per passenger km (pkm), 
which vary in different flights, because the occupancy rate, distance flown, take-off 
weight, atmospheric conditions and operational conditions all have significant 
impacts on energy use and emissions.44 As most medium and long distance flights 
carry both passengers and freight, assessing the emissions for both of them is 
                                                        
40 IATA, ‘Airlines Financial Monitor’ (May-June 2010), online available at 
<http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/AirlinesFinancialMonitorJune10.pdf> last 
accessed 30.06.10. 
41 Giovanni Bisignani, ‘State of the Air Transport Industy’ (7 June 2010) Director General and CEO of 
IATA, speech on the 66th IATA Annual General Meeting and World Air Transport Summit, Berline, 
Germany, online available at <http://www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/Pages/2010-06-07-01.aspx> last 
accessed 30.06.10. 
42 David S. Lee, (n. 27). 
43 See ICAO, Annual Report of the Council (ICAO, Canada, 1991 to 2008) and International Air 
Transport Association (IATA), World Air Transport Statistics (54th ed., IATA, Canada, 2010). 
44 Paul Peeters & Victoria Williams, ‘Calculating Emissions and Radiative Forcing’ in Stefan Gössling 
and Paul Upham, (n. 27), p. 69. 
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extremely difficult. 45  What is more, aircraft have different energy intensities 
depending on the aircraft type and flight distance. For example, a Boeing MD81 has 
44 percent higher emissions than a Boeing 737- 800 for a same distance flight.46 
For the same aircraft, the most energy efficient flight exists at medium distances,47 
because the energy-intensive take-off and climb sections comprise a relatively large 
share at a short distance, while the amount of fuel carried at take-off and climb-out 
requires extra energy on a long distance flight.48 In addition, the impact of non-CO2 
emissions is dependent on the altitude and location of emissions.49 It is currently 
not possible to use a radiative forcing index to compare different GHG emissions.50 
Second, regulation of aviation emissions as of any economic activity has to 
take notice of some trade-offs between different policy goals. For instance, focusing 
attention on reducing aircraft emissions of CO2 may increase NOx emissions.51 A 
wide range of objectives, including safety, reliability, noise, emissions and fuel 
efficiency are challenging aircraft engine design. Some of these objectives, 
unfortunately, are in conflict.52 More importantly, policymakers have to balance the 
environmental requirements and economic or social contributions of aviation. While 
the environmental impacts of air transport have been well recognised, it is worth 
noting the benefits of air transport, including its effect on international trade, 
international business and tourism.53 An industry report said that: 
  “Air transport is an innovative industry that drives economic and 
social progress. It connects people, countries and culture; provides access 
                                                        
45 Ibid., pp. 72-73. 
46 Ibid., p. 74. See also SAS Group, ‘Emission Calculator’ (2004) online available at 
<www.sasems.port.se/emissioncalc.cfm?sid=Calculate> last accessed 24.02.10. 
47 According to UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution’s report, the most fuel-efficient 
flight distance is around 2,300 nautical miles (4,300 km or 2,700 miles). In this thesis, short haul flight 
means flights are less than 1,000 nautical miles, long distance flights are more than 5,000 nautical 
miles, the distances in between are treated as medium distances. See UK Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution, (n. 38). 
48 Ibid., p. 73. 
49 IPCC 1999 Report, (n. 25), p. 199. 
50 Piers M. de F. Forster, Keith P. Shine, & Nicola Stuber, ‘It is premature to include non-CO2 effects 
of aviation in emission trading schemes’ (2006) 40 Atmospheric Environment 1117; Andrew Macintosh 
& Lailey Wallace, (n. 38). 
51 Paul Peeters & Victoria Williams, (n. 44), p. 82; Heather L. Miller, (n. 38); David S. Lee et al., (n. 
31). 
Nitrogen oxides (NOx) comprise nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2). NOx emissions have 
warming when they result in the production of ozone (O3) in the troposphere or cooling effects when 
chemical reactions associated with NOx remove methane (CH4) from the atmosphere. Robert Sausen 
et al, (n. 32). 
52 Heater L. Miller, ibid; David S. Lee et al., ibid.; see also Paul Page, ‘U.S. Wants Airline Emissions 
Studied by Global Panel on Aviation Environment’ (December 11, 1995) Traffic World, p. 39. 
53 Laurie Michaelis, (n. 38); Heather L. Miller, (n. 38). 
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to global markets and generates trade and tourism. It also forges links 
between developed and developing nations. …. benefits [of air transport] 
including the creation of jobs; contribution to gross domestic product 
(GDP) and tourism development; and the provision of humanitarian aid 
and medical assistance.”54 
 
The aviation industry has brought many economic benefits to society, 
including directly generating employment and wealth, and indirectly impacting on 
the performance of other industries. The economic contribution of aviation industry 
to the domestic economy has been used as a source of information for making 
domestic policies on the future development of air transport.55 Especially, the 
indirect economic benefits of air transport, known as the “catalytic” or “spin-off” 
benefits of air transport,56 affect industries “across the whole spectrum of economic 
activity” including facilitating world trade, being indispensable for tourism, and 
improving productivity by “encouraging investment and innovation, improving 
business operations and efficiency; and allowing companies to attract high quality 
employees.” 57  The economic benefits attributable to any industry are always 
contentious. However, the recent event of six days without aviation in large parts of 
the European continent as a result of the ash plume from an Icelandic volcano has 
shown clearly how the global economy would lose without aviation. Bisignani has 
said that  
“April gave us a vivid picture of life without aviation. Ten million 
people were stranded. Hotels and convention centers were empty. Seafood 
and flowers rotted. And just-in-time production was delayed. The volcano 
cost the global economy $5 billion – far more than the $1.8 billion of lost 
airline revenue. The volcano’s eruption was a wake-up call. It reminded us 
that without air connectivity, modern life is not possible.”58 
                                                        
54 Air Transport Action Group (ATAG), ‘The Economic and Social Benefits of Air Transport 2008” 
(2008) online available at 
<http://www.iata.org/pressroom/Documents/atag_economic_social_benefits_2008.pdf> last accessed 
11.05.10. 
55 There are two studies on the economic impact of air transport taken by the consultancy Oxford 
Economic Forecasting (OEF) have been used by the UK policymakers on the development of UK air 
transport. One is that ‘The Contribution of the Aviation Industry to the UK Economy’ (1999) was used 
as a source of economic information in ‘The Future of Air Transport White Paper.’ Another is that ‘The 
Economic Contribution of the Aviation Industry in the UK’ (October 2006) was used as a source in the 
‘Air Transport White Paper Progress Report 2006’ See OEF website on <www.oef.com>. 
56 ATAG, (n. 54), p. 6. 
57 Ibid. See also Ryan Tam & R. John Hansman, ‘Impact of Air Transportation on Regional Economic 
and Social Connectivity in the United States’ (2002), AIAA Aircraft Technology, Integration, and 
Operations Forum, Los Angeles, CA, October 2002. 
58 The figure is uncertain because that IATA represents the airline industry interest. However, it is very 
likely that the global economy would lose without aviation. IATA Press Releases, ‘Four Cornerstones 
of Change – IATA Launches Vision 2050’ (7 June 2010), online available at 
<http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2010-06-07-02.aspx > last accessed 30.06.10. 
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Apart from the economic activity it generates or facilitates, air transport also 
has social benefits, which include at least:  
“- making foreign travel and a wider range of holidays available; 
- increasing understanding of different cultures and nationalities;  
- supporting the development of multicultural societies;  
- and improving living standards by widening choice”59 
 
The public “had been enthusiastic about aviation” for about a hundred years.60 
It was regarded as “amazing and chic” in its incipiency.61 When flying is no longer 
such a luxury, more and more people have been enjoying the social benefits of air 
transport. Now, the flights of travellers to visit their family and friends are called 
“love miles.”62 “It is hardly thinkable that aviation could be eliminated,” even now 
that the “unintended adverse consequences” of air flying have been recognised.63 In 
distributional terms, the relative affordability of air transport today seems to mean 
that the middle classes fly more,64 although others argue that “the broadening of the 
collective horizon is likely to benefit society generally, even though the proportion 
of the global population who are able to travel in this way remains small.”65 For 
policymakers, the economic and social benefits of air transport provide enough 
reasons to develop policies to support the industry. “Job creation and economic 
growth” and “positive social consequences in terms of enhanced opportunities and 
choices” are the most obvious benefits of international aviation.66 Although it is 
difficult to quantify such benefits, air travel, at least, takes less time and has less risk 
of accidents than other transportation modes.67 As such, regulations on international 
aviation emissions should be established in the tension between mitigating the 
environmental impact of air transport and preserving and enhancing its economic 
and social benefits. There is no single solution which will satisfy all of the social, 
                                                        
59 Air Transport Action Group, (n. 54), p. 11. 
60 Daniel M. Warner, ‘Commercial Aviation: An Unsustainable Technology’ (2009) 74 J. Air L. & Com. 
553, 554; See also Joseph J. Corn, The Winged Gospel, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1983). 
61 Daniel M. Warner, ibid., p. 592. 
62 Ibid., See also George Monbiot, Heat: How to Stop the Planet from Burning (Penguin, London 2007) 
p. 177. 
63 Daniel M. Warner, (n. 60), p. 553. 
64 Sally Cairns & Carey Newson, Predict and decide: Aviation, climate change and UK policy (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2006). 
65 UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, (n. 38), p. 6. 
66 Robert Caves, ‘The Social and Economic Benefits of Aviation’ in Stefan Gössling and Paul Upham 
(eds.) Climate Change and Aviation: Issues, Challenges and Solutions (Edward Elgar, London 2009), p. 
36. 
67 Ibid. 
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economic and environmental concerns of flying. 
Third, the international nature and complex structure of air transport sector has 
confused regulators in identifying who should take the mitigation responsibility. 
This is in part about allocating responsibilities to states. While the industry has been 
experiencing worldwide cooperation in providing “seamless” service on air travel,68 
it is difficult to identify the emitters in a single journey. One of the major forms of 
cooperation between airlines from different countries is code sharing. In essence, 
this is an agreement between two airlines by which airlines offer a flight under two 
different codes. This means that one aircraft is flown but the non-operating airline 
can sell the flight as its own. Code sharing has become a common practice 
worldwide which may “involve the entire network or selected parallel and/or 
connecting routes of two or more large airlines, or a large airline sharing its code 
with a smaller or regional airline.”69 For example, on a one-way flight from London 
to Shanghai, a passenger may have bought a ticket from Lufthansa Airline, started 
the journey with a Boeing 747 from London to Frankfurt, changed to an Airbus 
A380 and continued the journey to Beijing, and changed again to an Air China 
service flight to Shanghai to finish the journey. This trip includes both international 
travel and domestic travel with different airlines and different aircrafts. From a legal 
perspective, no single jurisdiction can be identified. Thus, a technical difficulty 
facing regulators seeking to address international aviation emissions is how to 
identify who “owns” the emissions. What is more, the aviation industry is not a 
homogeneous sector. The structure of this business involves “a highly heterogeneous 
array of actors.”70 Meersman and his colleagues have examined the structure of the 
relationships between all the actors in the air cargo business case.71 The major 
actors, as they have identified, include airline companies, shippers, agents, 
forwarders, terminal operating companies (handling and storage) and hinterland 
                                                        
68 IATA, ‘Simplifying the Business’ see IATA website at 
<http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/stb/Pages/index.aspx> last accessed 13.05.10. 
69 Adrianus D. Groenewege, Compendium of International Civil Aviation, (2nd edition, IADC, 
Montreal 1998/1999), p. 438; see also Ian Humphreys, ‘Organizational and growth trends in air 
transport’ in Stefan Gössling & Paul Upham, (n. 27), pp.26-28. 
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Transport Sector’ (2009) Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department B: Structureal 
and Cohesion Policies, The European Paliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism, p. 9, online 
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71 Hilde Meersman, Eddy Van de Voorde & Thierry Vanelslander, ‘The Air Transport Sector after 2010: 
A Modified Market and Ownership Structure’ (2008) 8/2 European Journal of Transport and 
Infrastructure Research 71, p. 77. 
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transport companies. 72  A similar structure can be shown for the case of air 
passengers and the integrator of business. From the environmental responsibility 
perspective, it is not important to know who provides which services to whom, but 
the extent to which these actors are dependent upon each other shows how difficult 
it is to distribute emissions mitigation responsibility. Since “each company operating 
in the air transport business may have committed to different types of agreement 
with different players,” 73  cooperation between subsectors in the air transport 
industry is in different structures. The different kinds of links between the various 
actors indicate the complexity to identify every actor’s specific responsibility to 
combat climate change. In the international system, thus, allocation of 
responsibilities to states is difficult. Much of the fuel that is used in international 
transport occurs in or over the territory of countries that have no direct involvement 
in the relevant transport movement. 
Apart from the above three points, some of the other characteristics of air 
transport which challenge regulatory design on aviation emissions will be discussed 
in the following chapters. For example, the facts that development of low-cost 
airlines boosts artificial demand for air transport, and that there is no realistic 
alternative transport mode for long distance flight will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
These challenges to the regulation of aviation emissions are not fatal, but all of these 
considerations mean that international aviation must be singled out from other 
service sectors in terms of designing regulations on GHG emissions. 
 
3.3. Regulating Aviation Emissions 
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that there is no single solution to reduce 
air transport emissions without negative side effects. Climate change has become a 
condition74 under which policymakers value the air transportation and decide what 
to do about its increasing emissions. This section identifies that legal regulations 
should prioritise the encouragement of measures to improve energy intensity in the 
                                                        
72 Other service providers include cargo handlers, customs brokers and air traffic Control Customs, 
Airplane maintenance, Catering services, Fuel providers. Ibid. 
73 Ibid., p. 76. 
74 Climate change is more than an issue which needs to be solved. It “is changing the way we think, 
feel and act.” See Mike Hulme, (n. 2), especially chapter 4 ‘The Endowment of Value.’ 
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aviation sector. Because this is unlikely to suffice, well balanced regulations need to 
be designed to manage demand for more aviation service. 
There are two kinds of technical measures to improve energy intensity in the 
aviation sector. Neither is likely to curb the growth of aviation emissions without 
also cutting demand. One kind of technical measures is reducing emissions from 
source through technological improvements on fuel efficiency of aircraft, including 
aerodynamic changes, weight reductions, more fuel-efficient engines, and increased 
operational efficiency. 75  Some efficiency gains have come about through 
phasing-out of older aircraft, introducing improved airframe aerodynamics and 
material changes that have reduced weight, and improving air traffic management. 
For example, the introduction of turbofans on aircraft improved fuel efficiency by 
more than 60% than jet aircraft.76 Fuel efficiency of aircraft may also be improved 
through replacing fossil fuels with alternative fuels to kerosene in the longer-term. 
However, these technological improvements usually impose challenges. For 
example, design changes of aircraft in improving engine fuel efficiency have 
trade-offs between noise and emissions performance and requires testing to ensure 
compliance with safety and reliability requirements.77  Air traffic management 
systems provide “a one-off saving and not one that could be incrementally further 
improved upon.”78 Biofuels may be technically available for civil aviation, but there 
are concerns that they are not commercially practical and trigger land-usage 
conflicts between food and fuel production.79 The International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) initiated the development of a Global Framework for Aviation 
Alternative Fuels in 2009, but it recognised that it may be premature to use 
alternative fuels to solve the aviation emissions problem.80 Each technological 
                                                        
75 David S. Lee et al. (n. 31); Stefan Krüger Nielsen, ‘Air travel, life-style, energy use and 
environmental impact’ (2001) Danish National Research Database, BYG Repport, online available at 
<http://forskningsdatabasen.dk/Search.external?operation=search&search-query=au:"Nielsen+Stefan%
20Kruger"> last accessed 23.02.10. 
76 David S. Lee et al., ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 See ICAO, ‘Conference on Aviation and Alternative Fuels’ Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 16 to 18 
November 2009, Global Framework for Aviation Alternative Fuels, ICAO working paper 
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improvement requires a large investment with no guaranteed result.81 As such, 
technological improvements on fuel efficiency of aircraft should be encouraged, but 
it is not a stand-alone solution to reduce aviation emissions. 
Another kind of technical measures is to counteract the effects of changes in 
atmospheric chemistry through large-scale engineering of our environment.82 These 
are actions that might qualify as geoengineering – a modern concept taken to mean 
proposals to deliberately manipulate the Earth’s climate so as to counteract the 
effects of climate change from greenhouse gas emissions. It is a matter of “using 
technology to try to slow the global temperature rise by either removing carbon 
dioxide (CO2) directly from the atmosphere or reflecting solar radiation back into 
space.”83 Given that geoengineering of the Earth’s climate is “very likely to be 
technically possible,”84 it offers a hope of temporarily reversing some aspects of 
climate change and taking early and effective action to preserve the natural climate 
whilst greenhouse gas emissions (including the emissions from air transport) are 
brought under control and removed from the atmosphere by natural or artificial 
processes. As such, geoengineering strategies can be regarded as part of the 
technical measures proposed by scientists and engineers rather than an alternative to 
emissions control.85 In 2009, the Royal Society published the findings of a wide 
                                                                                                                                                               
CAAF/09-WP/23, 18/11/09, online available at 
<http://www.icao.int/CAAF2009/Docs/CAAF-09_WP023_en.pdf> last accessed 15.05.10. 
81 Paul Peeters, Victoria Williams & Alexander de Haan, ‘Technical and Management Reduction 
Potentials’; Paul Upham, Julia Tomei and Philip Boucher, ‘Biofuels, Aviation and Sustainability: 
Prospects and Limits’ in Stefan Gössling & Paul Upham, (n. 27). 
82 The Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty (The Royal 
Society, UK September 2009) Report 10/09 RS 1636. Some other notable organisations, such as NASA 
and the Institute of Mechanical Engineers, have also held studies aimed at discovering and evaluating 
current knowledge of the geoengineering. See Lee Lane et. al., ‘Workshop Report on Managng Solar 
Radiation’ NASA/CP – 2007 – 214558, online available at 
<http://event.arc.nasa.gov/main/home/reports/SolarRadiationCP.pdf>; Tim Fox et. al., ‘Climate Change: 
Have We Lost the Battle’ (November 2009) Institution of Mechanical Engineers, online available 
at:<http://www.imeche.org/NR/rdonlyres/77CDE5E4-CE41-4F2C-A706-A630569EE486/0/IMechE_
MAG_Report.PDF> last accessed 13.05.10; Tim Fox et. al., ‘Geo-Engineering Giving Us the Time to 
Act’ (August 2009) Institution of Mechanical Engineers, online available at 
<http://www.imeche.org/NR/rdonlyres/448C8083-F00D-426B-B086-565AA17CB703/0/IMechEGeoe
ngineeringReport.pdf> last accessed 13.05.10. 
83 Tim Fox et. al., ‘Climate Change: Have We Lost the Battle’, ibid. 
84 The Royal Society, (n. 82). 
85 T.M.L. Wigley, ‘A Combined Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Cliamte Stabilization’ (2006) 
314/5798 Science 452. See also, Alex Steffen, ‘Geoengineering and the New Climate Denialism’ (2009) 
online available at < http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/009784.html> last accessed 13.05.10. 
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ranging study into geoengineering schemes, including “carbon dioxide removal” and 
“solar radiation management” approaches.86 The report evaluated geoengineering in 
terms of its effectiveness, affordability, timeliness and safety and it recommended 
that geoengineering be pursued as part of a wider package of options for addressing 
climate change. 87  The Royal Society also recommended that “Parties to the 
UNFCCC should make increased efforts towards mitigating and adapting to climate 
change, and in particular to agreeing to global emissions reductions”, and that 
“[nothing] now known about geoengineering options gives any reason to diminish 
these efforts.”88 So far, there is no general consensus that geoengineering is an 
appropriate or effective solution to combating climate change, but it should be 
researched.89 Many environmental groups and campaigners are reluctant to endorse 
geoengineering. For example, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace have typically 
been reluctant to advocate geoengineering for fear of weakening the fragile political 
consensus to cut greenhouse gas emissions.90 Geoengineering is one category of the 
technical measures that need to accompany emissions control technical methods that 
may contribute to reducing the climate impacts of greenhouse gas emissions. Legal 
regulations should support research and development, improving our understanding 
                                                        
86 The Royal Society, (n. 82). Similarly to the Royal Society report, Lenton and Vaughan also divided 
geoengerring into “carbon dioxide removal” and “solar radiation managemet” approaches that 
respectively address longwave and shortwave radiation. See T.M. Lenton & N.E. Vaughan, ‘The 
Radiative Forcing Potential of Different Climate Geoengineering Options’ (2009) 9 Atmos. Chem. Phys. 
5539. 
87 The Royal Society, ibid. 
88 Ibid., p. ix; There are various criticsms have been made of geoengineering. See for example, ‘AMS 
Policy Statement on Geoengineering the Cliamte System’ A Policy Statement of the American 
Meteorological Society, adopted by the AMS Council on 20 July 2009, online available at 
<http://www.ametsoc.org/policy/2009geoengineeringclimate_amsstatement.pdf> last accessed 
13.05.10. 
89 See Sarah Polborn & Felix Tintelnot, ‘How Geoengineering May Encourage Carbon Dioxide 
Abatement’ (May 2009) online available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1413106>; Gareth Davies, ‘Law 
and Policy Issues of Unilateral Geoengineering: Moving to a Managed World’ (January 2009) online 
available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334625> last accessed 13.05.10. 
90 David Adam, ‘Extreme and risky action the only way to tackle global warming, say scientists’ (1 
September 2008) Guardian Newspaper (London), online available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/sep/01/climatechange.scienceofclimatechange2>; Doug 
Parr, ‘Geo-engineering is no solution to climate change’ (23 May, 2009) Guardian Newspaper (London) 
online available at 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/sep/01/climatechange.scienceofclimatechange1>; 
Royal Geographical Society website at 
<http://www.21stcenturychallenges.org/focus/geo-engineering/> last accessed 13.05.10. 
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and encouraging the implementation of geoengineering.91 
The deep uncertainty around both categories of technical measures addressed 
above, together with continued projected growth in aviation, suggests that aviation 
emissions cannot be stabilised without addressing demand. The effectiveness of 
technical measures is hampered by two obstacles. First, any new and different 
technology, in general, would take “several decades to develop and be certified and 
another three decades to be introduced into the whole fleet.”92 And in any event, 
international aircraft have relatively long commercial lifetimes (15 – 35 years),93 
and so regulatory intervention is necessary to promote the deployment of state of the 
green technology at a faster rate94 and of demand control at the same time. Second, 
technological and operational developments are estimated as likely to offset no more 
than a third of total emissions growth,95 as aviation demand is estimated as likely to 
increase by 150-800 percent by 2050.96 A recent analysis addressed that “[a] traffic 
growth rate of 5% per annum carried through to 2050, along with the current fuel 
efficiency improvements of 1% per annum and a high-end estimate reduction of 
80% in CO2 emissions through use of alternative fuels would still result in aviation 
CO2 levels similar to those of today.”97 In other words, the increase in aircraft 
emissions attributable to the expected growing demand for air travel is unlikely to 
be offset by reductions in emissions achieved through technological improvements. 
So, if significant reductions are to be achieved, the development of lifestyles with 
less reliance on flying must also be involved.98 Cutting demand requires aggressive 
regulations to promote behaviour change, includes encouraging use of internet 
conference to replace part of business travelling, promoting domestic holidays to 
                                                        
91 See Robert W. Hahn, ‘Climate Policy: Separating Fact from Fantasy’ (2009) 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 
557; David G. Victor, ‘On the Regulation of Geoengineering’ (2008) 24/2 Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 322. 
92 Paul Peeters, Victoria Williams & Alexander de Haan, (n. 81), p.304. 
93 ICAO, ‘ICAO Environmental Report 2007’, online available at 
<http://www.icao.int/icao/en/env/pubs/Env_Report_07.pdf> last accessed 13.05.10. 
94 Andrew Macintosh & Lailey Wallace, (n. 38). 
95 Joosung J. Lee et al., (n. 36). 
96 Paul Peeters, Victoria Williams & Alexander de Haan, ‘Technical and Management Reduction 
Potentials’ in Stefan Gössling & Paul Upham, (n. 27), p. 304. 
97 Chris Lyle, ‘Aviation after Copenhagen: ICAO must now develop a bold strategic vision’ (2010) 
online available at 
<http://www.centreforaviation.com/news/2010/02/10/aviation-after-copenhagen-icao-must-now-develo
p-a-bold-strategic-vision/page1 > last accessed 15.05.10. 
98 Daniel M. Warner, ‘Commercial Aviation: An Unsustainable Technology’ (2009) 74 J. Air L. & Com. 
553; John Whitelegg, ‘The Case for ‘No Growth’’ in Stefan Gössling & Paul Upham, (n. 27), p. 237; 
Andrew Macintosh & Lailey Wallace, (n. 38); UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, (n. 
38), pp.3, 31-38. 
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reduce international air travel, and encouraging take high-speed train on short 
distance travels etc. Whilst demand management is not a key element of this thesis, 
Chapters 5 and 6 on market-based instruments will touch on these issues. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the complexity of the nature of aviation’s contribution to 
climate change is fundamental to explaining the difficulty of regulating aviation at 
an international level and to identifying opportunities to overcome obstacles in 
combating aviation emissions with an innovative legal architecture. This chapter 
argues that three things make the contributions of aviation to climate change 
particularly serious and three things make it legally challenging. So in terms of 
severity: aircraft emissions are injected directly into the upper troposphere and the 
lower stratosphere; the impact from the mixture of emissions from aircraft goes far 
beyond the radiative effects of CO2 alone; and the rapid growth of air transport is 
driving the increase in aircraft emissions. These three issues suggest that per-unit 
reduction in aviation emissions may be relatively more effective and urgent as a way 
of combating climate change than equivalent emissions from ground sources. In 
terms of challenge: it is difficult to identify the quantity of emissions involved in 
any flight and their atmospheric impact; it is difficult to balance potential trade-off 
effects in environmental protection, aviation safety and air transport efficiency terms; 
and it is difficult to identify who should take the mitigation responsibility. These 
three challenges are not fatal, but they represent key difficulties resting on the 
unique characteristics of air transportation and its emissions. The analysis of these 
challenges explains why international aviation must be singled out from other 
service sectors in terms of regulating greenhouse gas emissions. Only with a full 
understanding of the unique nature of aviation emissions can we tackle the 
complexity of designing legal regulations on the aviation climate change issue.  
Within a limited time scale, legal regulation needs new ideas to decide what to 
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do about aviation’s increasing emissions. In this context, curbing aviation emissions 
represents a bigger challenge than do climate concerns from other sectors. The 
increase in aircraft emissions attributable to the expected growing demand for air 
travel is unlikely to be offset by reductions in emissions achieved through 
technological improvements. I argue in this chapter that legal regulation of aviation 
emission should encourage the improvement of energy intensity through technical 
measures in the aviation sector and encourage behaviour change towards a lifestyle 
with less flying. The following chapters will explore how to design legal regulations 
on aviation emission in order to ensure that aviation continues to serve the human 
community in a way that does not threaten the global climate. 
 47 
Chapter 3. Aviation Emissions in International Law 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I explore the obstacles to reducing aviation emissions in the 
existing international climate change law regime. Such obstacles might explain why 
the path towards an international climate change agreement that covers the aviation 
sector is proving slow. I argue that aviation emissions are best addressed through a 
sectoral approach rather than within general mitigation targets. This means that a 
comprehensive climate change law regime should identify a mitigation target on the 
aviation sector at the international level. I argue that the best approach is an 
international allocation of mitigation responsibilities by the UNFCCC system 
through a sophisticated burden sharing arrangement. There are however difficulties 
in practice, and an alternative form of allocation through a global emission trading 
scheme will be explored in Chapter 6. 
After a brief review of the development of the international climate change 
law regime, this chapter examines two legal obstacles to reducing aviation emissions: 
the vague objective and the inadequate mitigation targets in the existing climate 
change agreements led by the UNFCCC. First of all, I explain why the vagueness of 
the “ultimate objective” as set out in Article 2 of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),1 is a barrier to progress from two 
perspectives: the standards provided by the “ultimate objective” and its arguable 
legal status.  
Then, I examine the current mitigation targets in three parts. First, I examine 
the mitigation commitments of Annex I countries of the Kyoto Protocol,2 under the 
                                                        
1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 
(entered into force 21 March 1994), (UNFCCC). 
2 Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. 1 at 7, (Kyoto Protocol). 
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Kyoto Protocol, Copenhagen Accord3 and the Cancun Agreements4, and explain 
why they are too weak to curb the growth of global emissions. Second, I explain 
why the absence of quantitative mitigation commitments from non-Annex I 
countries, and the failure of the Copenhagen5 and Cancun6 to require mitigation 
commitments from developing countries, is a mistake. Third, I examine the reasons 
for the division between Annex I and non-Annex I countries in the burden sharing 
principle, which might explain the barriers to reaching agreement on adequate 
mitigation targets. To this end, I examine the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility (CBDR), identify the role of the CBDR principle in the structuring of 
the climate regime and analyse the basis of differential treatment. I argue that 
simplistic and uncertain understandings of the CBDR principle are a barrier to 
reaching agreement on reducing aviation emissions, and more generally. 
The final section discusses aviation more specifically. I argue that aviation 
emissions are best addressed through a sectoral approach rather than within general 
mitigation targets. A mitigation target on the aviation sector should be identified at 
the international level in the UNFCCC system. Burden sharing in respect of aviation 
emissions should not by nationality but through a multi-level approach. It should 
also break the developed/developing country dichotomy. Differential treatment 
should consider the contribution to the expansion of international aviation at the 
regional, and city level as well as at the national level; consider countries’ changing 
contributions to aviation emissions; and consider their changing capacity for the 
provision of cleaner facilities for international aviation. This would allow the 
international target for international aviation to be shared between state Parties in an 
                                                        
3 Copenhagen Accord, Decision -/CP.15, found in Decisions adopted by COP 15, online available at 
<http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/items/5257.php>, (Copenhagen Accord). 
4 The Cancun Agreements include decisions under both the sixteenth session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP 16) to the UNFCCC (Decision -/CP.16), and the sixth Conference of the Parties serving 
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/CMP 6) (Decision -/CMP.6), online available at 
<http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_16/items/5571.php>, (Cancun Agreements). 
5 The UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark from 7 to 18 December 2009, 
including the fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the UNFCCC, and the fifth 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/CMP 5). 
6 The conference included the sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 16) to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the sixth session of 
Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/CMP 6). 
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international agreement. Although I prefer an international allocation of mitigation 
responsibilities through a burden sharing system in the aviation sector, this is 
difficult in practice. An alternative form of allocation through a global emissions 
trading scheme will be explored in Chapter 6. 
 
2. The Development of the International Regime 
 
The various gases and particles that are emitted by aircraft are part of the 
general anthropogenic emissions from one of the transportation sectors and can be 
regulated as such under the climate regime led by the UNFCCC.7 This section 
begins the chapter with some background on the development of the international 
climate change law regime. 
The international climate change law regime includes the provisions of the 
1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),  the 
Kyoto Protocol of 1997, the Copenhagen Accord of 2009, the Cancun Agreements 
of 2010 and the wealth of Party decisions and implementation activities occurring 
within the framework of those agreements.8 This climate negotiation process started 
in the 1980s, with the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC).9 In 1992, the UNFCCC was adopted and this has since become the 
centre piece of the international community’s efforts to combat the serious climate 
                                                        
7 Aviation emissions may also be approached as an industry specific issue, the regulation of which falls 
within the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) regulation. Chapter 4 of this thesis will 
discuss the failure of the ICAO’s regulation. 
8 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle & Catherine Redgwell, International Law and Environment (3rd ed., 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) Chapter 6, pp. 356-377; Roda Verheyen, Climate Change 
Damage and International law: prevention, duties and state responsibility, (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden, Boston, 2005), p. 43; Joanna Depledge, ‘Crafting the Copenhagen Consensus: 
Some Reflections’ (2008) 17/2 RECIEL 154; Lavanya Rajamani, ‘From Berlin to Bali and beyond: 
killing Kyoto softly?’ (2008) 57/4 ICLQ 909; Chris Spence, Kati Kulovesi, & María Gutiéñoz, ‘Great 
Expectations: Understanding Bali and the Climate Change Negotiations Process’ (2008) 17/2 RECIEL 
142; Anita M. Halvorssen, ‘Global Response to Climate Change – From Stockholm to Copenhagen’ 
(2007-2008) 85 Denv. U. L. Rev. 841. 
9 Chris Spence, Kati Kulovesi, & María Gutiéñoz. ibid. See chapter 2 of this thesis for more details of 
the scientific understanding of climate change. 
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change challenge. 10  This convention aims “to achieve… the stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”11 To meet this aim, 
in 1997 the Kyoto Protocol was signed, with commitments from the industrialized 
countries to reduce their overall emissions “by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels 
in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.”12 The rules for the implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol were detailed in the Marrakesh Accords in 2001. 13  Both the 
Protocol and the Accords were adopted in 2005. Since the Kyoto Protocol entered 
into force in 2005, the attention of the world has shifted to the design of the 
post-2012 climate regime. In 2007, the Bali Action Plan,14 the outcome of the 2007 
Bali Climate Conference, 15  recognised the seriousness of the climate change 
situation16 and provided a two year mandate to negotiate a final agreement on the 
post-2012 regime by the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen.17 
In other words, the Bali Action Plan sets a deadline of 2009, with a final agreement 
to be presented to the Copenhagen conference. However, the Copenhagen 
conference failed to achieve that. In January 2010, Yvo de Boer, the Executive 
Secretary of the UNFCCC, addressed the media, saying that the fact that 
                                                        
10 Peter D. Cameron, ‘The Kyoto Process: Past, Present and Future’ in Peter D. Cameron & Donald 
Zillman (eds.), Kyoto: from Principles to Practice (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001) 3, p. 8. 
11 UNFCCC (n. 1), art. 2.  
12 Kyoto Protocol, (n. 2), art. 3 (1). 
13 The Marrakesh Accords were agreed in 2001 but formally adopted as decisions by COP/MOP 1 in 
Montreal, Canada, 28 November – 9 December 2005. The decisions include 1/CMP.1 through 
36/CMP.1, in FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Adds. 1-4, 30 March 2006. 
14 Bali Action Plan (Decision 1/CP. 13), found in Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Thirteenth Session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007 (FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 March 
2008), Addendum. Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Thirteenth Session. 
15 The UN Climate Change Conference in Bali comprised several related meetings, including the 
thirteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 13) to the UNFCCC, the third Conference of 
the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/CMP 3), the twenty-eighth 
session of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the fourth meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further 
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol. 
16 The Bali Action Plan referred directly to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report which stated that 
“warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and that delay in reducing emissions significantly 
constrains opportunities to achieve lower stabilization levels and increases the risk of more severe 
climate change impacts.” Bali Action Plan, (n. 14); see also IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis 
Report, Summary for Policymakers, online available at 
<www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf> last accessed 22.02.10, (IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report). 
17 COP 15, (n. 5). 
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“Copenhagen did not deliver the full agreement the world needs to address climate 
change just makes the task more urgent.”18 The Copenhagen conference resulted 
only in a political agreement, the Copenhagen Accord,19  which was negotiated by 
a small group of Parties in the form of “friends of the chair”, because it was 
“unthinkable” that leaders would “return home empty handed.”20 The UN Climate 
Change Conference,21 held in Cancun, Mexico, from 29 November to 11 December 
2010, restored faith in the multilateral climate change process under the UNFCCC 
and provided a package of outcomes designed to secure long-term cooperation to 
combat climate change. The Cancun Agreements contain provisions on mitigation, 
adaptation, financing, technology, reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries (REDD+). The Agreements are not legally 
binding, but received support from all but one of the Convention’s 194 Parties.22 
Cancun is widely perceived as “a stepping stone toward a future agreement”,23 
although not it falls substantially short of a global agreement that will prevent 
dangerous climate. Given the absence of agreement on the second commitment 
period under the Kyoto Protocol, the legal form of the post-2012 climate change 
framework is still pending.24 
Regarding the issue of aviation emissions, as part of the whole transportation 
sector, the UNFCCC stipulates the necessity and possibility of regulating its climate 
impact in Article 4(1). All Parties will 
“…promote and cooperate in the development, application and 
diffusion, including the transfer of technologies, practices and processes 
that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in all relevant sectors, 
including the energy, transport…sectors.”25 
                                                        
18 UNFCCC Press Briefing on the outcome of Copenhagen and the way forward in 2010, online 
available < http://unfccc.int/2860.php> last accessed 25.01.10. 
19 Copenhagen Accord, (n. 3). 
20 Benito Müller, ‘Copenhagen 2009: Failure or final wake-up call for our leaders?’ Oxford Institute 
for energy Studies EV 49 (February 2010) p. i, online available at 
<www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/EV49.pdf> last accessed 12.01.2010. 
21 Cancun Conference, (n. 6). 
22 Bolivia, the only opposition, complained that the deal was being pushed through without consensus. 
23 ‘Summary of the Cancun Climate Change Conference’ 12/498 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, p. 28. 
24 Options for a post-2012 “agreed outcome” could be a legally binding agreement as an amendment to 
the UNFCCC or Kyoto, or a protocol to take the place of the Kyoto Protocol or subsequent to it; 
Conference of Parties Decisions which have a legal effect; or a non-binding agreement. 
25 UNFCCC, (n. 1), emphasis added. 
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The Kyoto Protocol provides that Annex I Parties shall adopt joint measures to 
mitigate the climate impact of multiple sectors, including transport.26 In addition, 
the Protocol refers to the climate impact of aviation more precisely than the 
UNFCCC. Article 2(2) of the Kyoto Protocol states that the Parties  
“shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases 
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation … working through 
the International Civil Aviation Organization…”27 
 
So far, the crucial point with respect to regulating aircraft engine emissions is 
the explicit mandate given to ICAO by the Protocol. This was not changed at the 
Copenhagen summit and in this respect the outcome of the Copenhagen negotiations 
– with no agreement on whether UNFCCC or ICAO should be in charge of cutting 
aviation emissions nor the level of cuts required – was described as “extremely 
disappointing.”28 The issue of how to limit and reduce emissions from aviation was 
on the agenda for Cancun conference held at the end of 2010,29 but no progress was 
forthcoming. The next sections will examine the legal obstacles in reducing aviation 
emissions in the UNFCCC system from two perspectives: the vague objective in the 
UNFCCC and the inadequate mitigation targets in the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Copenhagen Accord, and the Cancun Agreements. 
 
3. The Vagueness of the Ultimate Objective 
 
In this section, I argue that vagueness of the “ultimate objective” as set out in 
                                                        
26 Kyoto Protocol, (n. 2), art. 2 (1). 
27 Ibid, art. 2 (2). 
28 Transport and Environment, ‘Analysis: Aviation and Shipping Emissions after Copenhagen’ 
(January 04, 2010), online available at <www.transportenvironment.org> last accessed 12.01.2010.; 
GreenAir, ‘Copenhagen’s failure to deliver an aviation emissions deal leaves sector facing an uncertain 
future’ 22 Dec 2009, online available at <www.greenaironline.com> last accessed 11.01.2010; 
GreenAir, ‘Bunker fuels and Copenhagen – the disappointing outcome that leaves the aviation industry 
adrift on GHG emissions’ 19 Jan. 2010, online available at <www.greenaironline.com> last accessed 
20.01.2010. 
29 The chair of the AWG-LCA tabled a text to facilitate negotiations among Parties. See Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention Tenth session, Bonn, 1-11 June 
2010, UNFCCC/AWGLCA/2010/6 (May 17, 2010), Preparation of an outcome to be presented to the 
Conference of the Parties for adoption at its sixteenth session to enable the full, effective and sustained 
implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action now, up to and beyond 2012, 
item 20, online available at <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/awglca10/eng/06.pdf> last accessed 
02/07/10. 
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Article 2 of the UNFCCC is a barrier to progress in regulating climate change. The 
“ultimate objective,” as contained in Article 2 of the Convention, is to stabilize all 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a certain level in order to 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. 30  This 
objective, as Article 2 goes on to note, is “to be achieved within a time frame 
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change” and “to enable 
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.”31 The two emphasized 
parts of this article — “stabilization” and “prevent[ing] dangerous anthropogenic 
interference” — imply that the actual objective of the Convention is the stabilization 
of the climate itself at safe levels.32  
As a framework approach to climate change regulation, the Convention does 
not provide specific mitigation targets, partly because of the limited knowledge of 
climate change when the Convention was drafted.33 At the very early stage of 
regulating climate change, Article 2 of the Convention “acknowledges climate 
change as a problem and helps legitimize it as a matter of international concern.”34 
However, it is unclear whether the objective of the Convention is only to 
acknowledge climate change as a risk or whether it aims to reduce the risk to certain 
level. The Convention itself and negotiations afterword have not provided any 
clarified or quantified standard on the “ultimate objective of the Convention” 
written in its Article 2. It is far from assisting the lawmaking process more than 
“amidst great uncertainty.”35 
One possibility is that the objective of the Convention can be specified as 
being, rather than imposing a specific target, to establish “a mechanism for more 
                                                        
30 UNFCCC, (n.1), art. 2. Emphasis added. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Roda Verheven, (n. 8), p. 55. 
33 Bodansky discussed whether the UNFCCC is the framework vs. substantive approach and 
concluded that the Convention lies somewhere between a framework and a substantive convention. See 
Daniel Bodansky, ‘The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary’ 
(1993) 18 Yale J. Int’l L. 451, pp.493-96. 
34 Ibid., p. 500. 
35 David D. Caron, ‘Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer and the Structure of International 
Environmental Lawmaking’ (1991) 14 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 755, according to Daniel 
Bodansky, ibid., p. 494. 
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specific steps to be taken over time as scientific evidence evolves.”36 The threshold 
for dangerous climate change is derived from an interpretation “based on the 
available science” and “informed by value judgements.”37 Given that the scientific 
argument has been developing, the ultimate objective of the Convention may have a 
different meaning from time to time; thus, the climate negotiations have been 
plagued by the issue of how much warming we need to avoid.38 As was mentioned 
in Chapter 2, the IPCC Fourth Report provided an updated scientific view and it 
warned that global warming should not be more than two degrees Celsius (2 ℃) 
above pre-industrial levels, which means stabilizing greenhouse gases emissions at 
350 parts per million (ppm) CO2 equivalent (CO2-eq) at most.39 The Copenhagen 
Accord referred to the IPCC Fourth Report and it recognised that “the increase in 
global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius”.40 But it falls short of 
providing a benchmark and with no mention of the maximum concentration of GHG 
emissions that would ensure that the 2℃ target can be met.41 In the Cancun 
Agreements, the Parties have agreed to reduce emissions and to the need to a 
maximum overall 2℃ rise. In compromise language, however, they have also 
recognised a need to consider strengthening this long-term global goal “including in 
relation to a global average temperature rise of 1.5 degree Celsius”.42 To this end, 
                                                        
36 Albert Mumma & David Hodas, ‘Designing a Global Post-Kyoto Climate Change Protocol that 
Advances Human Development’ (2008) 20 The Georgetown Int’l Envtl. Law Review 619, 622. 
37 Andrew Macintosh & Lailey Wallace, ‘International aviation emissions to 2025: Can emissions be 
stabilized without restricting demand?’ ANU Centre for Climate Law and Policy, CCLP Working Paper 
Series 2008/1, p.8. 
38 There are a great diversity of views on how to define an adequate objective in combating climate 
change after Kyoto. See Bill Hare & Malte Meinshausen, ‘How Much Warming are we Committed to 
and How Much can be Avoided?’ (2006) 75/1-2 Climate Change 111. 
39 See Chapter 2, section 2. 
40 Copenhagen Accord, (n. 3), para 1. 
41 In fact, among country Parties in the negotiations, there is diversity of views on this objective. 
Despite the majority view of 2℃ as an appropriate maximum, small island states and many African 
nations argued that 2℃ was inadequate to protect the most vulnerable nations from the worst effects of 
climate change, and that 1.5℃ was a more appropriate target. The efforts of pushing for 1.5℃ 
resulted in a review provision at the end of the Accord to assess the implementation of the Accord and 
its adequacy by 2015, including the need to consider the 1.5℃ global average temperature limit based 
on the available science at that time. Copenhagen Accord, (n. 3), para. 12. 
42 Decision 1/CP.16, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, online available at 
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2>, para. 4. Decision 1/CP.16 
includes the outcome of work by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under 
the Convention (AWG-LCA) and covers the main elements of the Bali Road Map. 
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the Parties decided to periodically review the adequacy of the long-term global goal 
based on best available scientific knowledge. The first review should start in 2013 
and should be concluded by 2015.43 
Furthermore, the exact legal status of the ultimate objective of “stabilization” 
is arguable. Article 2 is characterized as an “objective” or “aim”44 of the Convention, 
but it does not fall under the category of an “objective and purpose” contained in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,45 as the Convention may not be able to 
be interpreted in the light of such a vague objective. “Stabilization” of the climate at 
safe levels has actually been treated as a long-term global mitigation target or should 
be better called as “a collective commitment.”46 In what may have been an attempt 
to distinguish this “collective commitment” from an “objective and purpose” in the 
Vienna Convention, the UNFCCC adds the qualification “ultimate” and addresses 
its detailed commitments in its Article 4. Such an “ultimate” “collective 
commitment” cannot help to explain what level of greenhouse gas concentrations is 
safe to stabilize the climate. The arguable legal status of an “ultimate objective” of 
stabilization leads to difficulties in agreeing a specific long-term mitigation target in 
the subsequent negotiations. 
Although the UNFCCC has proved useful in establishing the importance of 
climate change and providing a forum for its negotiation, it has not provided a 
useful objective and a target for ongoing detailed negotiations. Without a specific 
objective, it is not surprising that climate change negotiations afterwards have faced 
an ongoing “difficult and controversial issue”47 on what objectives are appropriate 
and how to share mitigation targets among the parties to the UNFCCC. But it would 
                                                        
43 Ibid., para. 138, 139 
44 Lavanya Rajamani, ‘The Nature, Promise, and Limits of Differential Treatment in the Climate 
Regime’ (2007) 16 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 81, p. 92. 
45 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340, 8 
I.L.M. 679. See also Daniel Bodansky, (n. 33). 
46 The term “objective” only appears on the title of Article 2. Bodansky has argued that the legal status 
of Convention’s stabilization objective “may be the subject of future discussion.” He has mentioned 
“some early proposals relating to the objective phrased it as a collective commitment.” See Daniel 
Bodansky, (n. 33), p. 500. 
47 Meinhard Doelle, ‘The Legacy of the Climate Talks in Copenhagen: Hopenhagen or Brokenhagen?’ 
(January 12, 2010). Online available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535669> last accessed 
09.03.10. 
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have been impossible to set a clear numerical target. The conventional top-down 
UNFCCC system cannot be the whole answer to curbing the growth of aviation 
emissions, which is a subject I will return in Chapter 7. 
 
4. The Inadequacy of the Mitigation Targets 
 
This section argues that the mitigation targets in the climate change regime are 
inadequate to curb the growth of global emissions. First, I examine the mitigation 
commitments given by Annex I countries in the Kyoto Protocol, in Copenhagen and 
in the Cancun Agreements, and explain why they are too weak. Then, I examine the 
absence of quantitative mitigation commitments from non-Annex I countries in the 
Kyoto Protocol and the failure of Copenhagen and Cancun in requiring mitigation 
commitments from developing countries. Finally, I explore why there is a division 
between Annex I and non-Annex I countries in examining the burden sharing 
principle. I argue that simplistic and uncertain understandings of the CBDR 
principle are a barrier to reaching agreement on an adequate mitigation target. 
 
4.1. Annex I countries 
 
The Kyoto Protocol commits its Annex I countries (including 37 industrialized 
countries and the European Union) to “ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic 
carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex I do 
not exceed their assigned amounts,”48 while the UNFCCC encouraged them to 
stabilize greenhouse gas emissions. Since the Protocol, these countries’ collective 
reduction commitments represent short-term mitigation targets in the climate change 
regime. Following the Copenhagen conference, Annex I countries offered their 
reduction commitments for the period of 2012 to 2020. In the Cancun Agreements, 
                                                        
48 The Kyoto Protocol, (n. 2), art. 3. 
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the Decision on nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions by 
developed countries, takes note of the quantified economy-wide emission reduction 
targets as communicated pursuant to the Copenhagen Accord. 49  Cancan now 
formally puts those pledges into the UNFCCC documents. I argue in this section 
that the Annex I countries’ mitigation targets, from the Kyoto Protocol to Cancun, 
are too weak to curb the growth of global emissions. 
The Kyoto Protocol represents only a first small step in regulating climate 
change. It sets out binding targets in for its Annex I countries for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions in Article 3. This article requires an overall anthropogenic 
GHG emissions from developed countries for the commitment period 2008 to 2012, 
on average, will be approximately 5 percent lower than 1990 GHG emissions.50 
However, the targets stated in the Protocol are too weak because they still allow 
global emissions to grow substantially until 2012.51 A deep cut in GHGs was not 
required in the Kyoto Protocol.  
In 2005, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I 
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) was established to negotiate further 
commitments beyond 2012 for such Annex I countries.52 Then, in Copenhagen and 
Cancun, it was agreed that “deep cuts” in global emissions were needed, but their 
content not agreed.53 According to the IPCC’s figures, developed countries need to 
reduce their emissions by 25-40% below 1990 levels by 2020 and 80-95% below 
1990 levels by 2050 in order to keep the rise in temperature to 2 degrees Celsius 
above pre-industrial levels.54 The views and positions of individual countries are 
different55 but collectively the reduction targets of all countries submitted after 
                                                        
49 Decision 1/CP.16, (n. 42), para. 36. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Roda Verheyen, (n. 8), p. 111. 
52 For the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto 
Protocol (AWF-KP), see UNFCCC website at < http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/4577.php> last 
accessed 14.05.10. 
53 Copenhagen Accord, (n. 3), para. 2. Decision 1/CP.16, (n. 42), para 36. 
54 Bert Metz et. al., (eds), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation of Climate Change, Contribution of 
Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, New York, NY, USA 2007) section 13.3.1 Evaluations 
of existing climate change agreements, Box 13.7, p. 776. 
55 See Meinhard Doelle, (n. 47). 
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Copenhagen56 “leave the world heading for a global warming of over 3℃ above 
pre-industrial levels by 2100,” according to an independent science-based 
assessment.57 The developed countries as Annex I Parties, according to paragraph 4 
of the Copenhagen Accord, “commit to implement individually or jointly the 
quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020, to be submitted in the format 
given in Appendix I by Annex I Parties to the secretariat by 31 January 2010.”58 The 
reduction targets offered by the developed countries as a whole are estimated to 
bring the effective reductions in industrial GHG emissions to about 7 – 14% below 
1990 levels by 2020.59 This indicates that developed countries have not offered 
adequate mitigation targets. In the Cancun Agreements, the decision on nationally 
appropriate mitigation commitments or actions by developed countries did not 
provide further commitments.60  Cancun called for countries to list under the 
UNFCCC the emission reduction targets which they announced in 2010. These 
targets form “the collective basis for the largest mitigation effort the world has ever 
seen”, however, UN estimates show, if all these targets are fully implemented, “they 
could deliver only 60 percent of the emission reductions that science says will be 
needed to stay below the agreed two degree rise in average temperatures”.61 Further 
commitments from Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol are still required and 
higher emissions cuts are necessary after Cancun.62 
                                                        
56 Information provided by Parties to the Convention relating to the Copenhagen Accord, online 
available at < http://unfccc.int/home/items/5262.php> last accessed 14.05.10. 
57 Climate Action Tracker, ‘Ambition of only two developed countries sufficiently stringent for 2℃’ (2 
February 2010) online available at <www.climateactiontracker.org> last accessed 10.03.10; ‘Climate 
Action Tracker Update: Little progress – Countries still heading for over 3℃ warming’ (10 June 2010) 
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58 Copenhagen Accord, (n. 3), para. 4. 
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It is not clear to what extent the AWG-KP may introduce a stricter emission 
reduction targets for Annex I countries in the post-2012 period. This is partly 
because of “the different views on the scope of necessary amendments to the Kyoto 
Protocol for the post-2012 period,”63 in the two track structure of the negotiating 
process, which is a subject to which I return in section 4.2. The AWG-KP, at its 
twelfth session in 2010, has identified various legal options available to ensure that 
there is no gap between the first and subsequent commitments periods in amending 
the Kyoto Protocol:64 
“There are various options which could be used to extend the first 
commitment period. For example, the same QELROs (quantified emission 
limitation or reduction commitment) to be applied to an extended first 
commitment period (e.g. until 2014) or the same QELROs to be applied in 
a specific time period immediately following the first commitment period 
(e.g. from 2013 to 2014) in order to bridge any gap and provide for 
continuity to assist Parties in meeting their QELROs for the subsequent 
commitment period.”65 
 
An extension to the first commitment period was identified as “provisionally 
applied” because “[t]he provisional application clause could be included either in 
the amendment to the Kyoto Protocol itself or in a CMP (the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol) decision.”66 
However, the same QELROs to be applied to an extended period certainly would 
not be sufficient target in terms of combating climate change. To what extent the 
AWG-KP may introduce a stricter emission reduction targets for Annex I countries 
in the post-2012 period would depend on whether, and how, Parties decide to extend 
the first commitment period. At Cancun, the Parties agreed that the AWG-KP will 
keep working to ensure that there is no gap between the first and second 
                                                                                                                                                               
launch of new climate bodies and funds’,Ibid.. 
63 Kati Kulovesi & María Gutiérrez, ‘Climate Change Negotiations Update: Process and Prospects for 
a Copenhagen Agreed Outcome in December 2009’ (2009) 18/3 RECIEL 229. 
64 ‘Legal considerations relating to a possible gap between the first and subsequent commitment 
periods’ FCCC/KP/AWG/2010/10, Distr. General 20 July 2010, Ad Hoc Working Group on Further 
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol, Thirteenth session, Bonn, 2 – 6 August 
2010. 
65 Ibid., para. 24, p. 8. 
66 Ibid., para. 26, p. 8. 
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commitment periods. 67  They also agreed to take note of existing quantified 
economy-wide emission reduction targets.68 Developed countries need to raise the 
level of ambition of the emissions reductions to be achieved individually or jointly, 
with a view to reducing their aggregate level of emissions of greenhouse gases in 
accordance with the range indicated by the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report.69 
The Parties have achieved an agreement on the base year for a second commitment 
period to be 1990, although, in addition, a reference year may be used by a Party on 
an optional basis for its own purposes to express its quantified emission limitations 
and reduction objectives.70 However, the question of whether country Parties will 
sign up for a second, legally binding, commitment period to cut emissions beyond 
2012 remains to be seen. Decisions on the future of the Kyoto Protocol were 
deferred until South Africa in 2011 and the work of the AWG-KP will continue. 
We can conclude very simply that the mitigation targets offered by Annex I 
countries in the Kyoto Protocol, in Copenhagen and in the Cancun Agreements are 
too weak. Adequate targets have not been agreed in the post-Kyoto negotiations by 
the time of writing. 
 
4.2. Non-Annex I countries 
 
Non-Annex I countries are developing countries. They have not been pushed 
to commit any quantitative mitigation target from Kyoto to Cancun. I argue that the 
absence of developing countries, especially those with strong and growing 
economies, on the list of those submitting to binding quantitative commitments 
contributes to the inadequacy of the mitigation targets in the climate change regime. 
A problem that comes from non-Annex I countries Parties is that the unlimited 
                                                        
67 Decision 1/CMP.6, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its fifteenth session, 
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emissions they may produce would weaken the overall reduction efforts made by 
developed countries. Then, the short-term mitigation targets achieved among 
developed countries might be meaningless for the stabilization of the climate. It has 
been argued that without the developing countries’ participation in the quantitative 
international greenhouse gas target, global emissions might be likely to rise even 
faster than business as usual path, due to the problem of leakage.71 Leakage of 
emissions could happen by relocating carbon-intensive industries from Annex I 
countries to non-Annex I countries, or by increased consumption of fossil fuels by 
non-Annex I countries in response to declines in world oil and coal prices. There are 
different estimates of the damage in tons of increased emissions for every ton abated 
in an industrialized country. IPCC in its 2001 reports concludes that “leakage rates 
in the range 5 to 20 percent are common.”72 Another survey in 2005 reports a range 
of global leakage rates between 25 to 130 percent.73 In the most recent IPCC report 
published in 2007, it concludes that “the ambiguous results of the empirical studies 
in both positive and negative spillovers warrant further research in this field.”74 As 
such, although the leakage rates are arguable, it is generally accepted that the overall 
mitigation target is inadequate to curb the growth of greenhouse gas emissions 
without commitments by developing countries. 
Probably the most serious shortcoming of the mitigation target is the absence 
of commitments for the strong economies among non-Annex I countries. The 
fastest-growing emitters, like China, India and Brazil, have no binding quantitative 
mitigation commitments. These strong economies have been the source of the big 
increases in emissions. Since “they will represent up to two-thirds of global 
emissions over the course of this century vastly exceeding the expected contribution 
of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) of 
                                                        
71 Jeffrey Frankel, ‘Formulas for quantitative emission targets’ in Joseph E. Aldy & Robert N. Stavins 
(eds.), Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007), p. 31. 
72 IPCC, Climate Change 2001: Mitigation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001), pp. 536 – 
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73 A study by Babiker in 2005 is cited in IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007, 
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roughly one-quarter of global emissions,” it has been argued that “emissions 
abatement by industrialized countries will not do much to mitigate global climate 
change” in the absence of major developing countries within the mitigation target.75 
I argue that requiring developing countries to take mitigation commitments is 
blocked by the two track negotiating structure that was established by the Bali 
Action Plan. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under 
the Convention (AWG-LCA) was to enhance international action, mainly from 
non-Annex I countries on climate change, including mitigation, adaptation, 
technology and capacity building, and finance – to develop an “agreed outcome” 
under the UNFCCC at COP-15. 76  Since then, the negotiations in respect of 
mitigation targets are proceeding in two distinct tracks: AWG-LCA and AWG-KP. 
The two track structure of the negotiating process has continued after Cancun. So far, 
the two AWGs have held their meetings in parallel with little substantive 
cooperation and coordination in between.77 Although several developed countries 
have called for close cooperation between the two AWGs, the developing countries 
have been insisting on “the firewall between Annex I and non-Annex I parties.”78 
The separated two tracks of the negotiating process challenges the expected 
comprehensive outcome for the post 2012 climate regime. The Copenhagen Accord 
represents “a tortuous compromise” with respect to developing country 
commitments. “As with developed country emissions targets, it establishes a 
bottom-up process by which developing countries will submit their mitigation 
actions in a defined format, for compilation by the UNFCCC secretariat (including 
both autonomous and supported mitigation actions) …. Non-Annex I parties ‘will 
implement’ these actions.”79 From the Copenhagen Accord text, it is not clear 
whether the mitigation actions of developing countries will be conditional on the 
                                                        
75 Jeffrey Frankel, (n. 71), p. 32. 
76 Bali Action Plan, (n. 14). 
77 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Post-Mortem’ (February 12, 
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 63 
available levels of support or whether all developing countries will carry out 
mitigation actions. The Accord only states that the least developed countries and 
small island developing states will be eligible for support.80 In Cancun, the Parties 
have agreed that developing country Parties would take nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions (NAMAs) in the context of sustainable development in order to 
achieve a deviation in emissions relative to business-as-usual by 2020.81 These 
actions will be supported by technology and financing and capacity-building 
provided by developed countries. A registry will be set up to record NAMAs seeking 
international support and to facilitate matching of finance, technology and 
capacity-building support to these NAMAs.82 Developing countries are invited to 
voluntarily inform the Conference of the Parties (COP) of their intention to 
implement NAMAs via the UNFCCC secretariat.83 The Secretariat will organise 
workshops, to understand the diversity of mitigation actions submitted, underlying 
assumptions, and any support needed for implementation of these NAMAs.84 There 
remains no cap as emissions from even the economically sharp developing countries, 
and even the question of quantitative reduction below business as usual remains 
open. 
The absence of quantitative mitigation commitment from non-Annex I 
countries, especially the strongest economies, weakens the overall reduction efforts 
made by developed countries. Even worse, it may lead to more global GHG 
emissions rather than less, because of leakage from those economies that impose 
sharp constraint on their industries. The next section will explore the reasons for the 
division of Annex I/non-Annex I countries in the burden sharing principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility. 
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4.3. Burden Sharing 
 
This section examines the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibility (CBDR) as one of the underlying themes85 that wield influence in the 
design of an international climate change regime, especially the division of Annex 
I/non-Annex I countries in sharing mitigation targets. I examine the role of CBDR in 
climate change treaties, analyse the nature of CBDR and especially the different 
approaches to the differential responsibilities. I argue that the principle of CBDR 
was aimed to encourage the participation of both developed and developing 
countries in combating climate change rather than to form a fixed division of Annex 
I/non-Annex I countries. Given that there is no fixed meaning of CBDR, states have 
various interpretations on differentiated responsibilities to suit their self-interest and 
policy priorities. These analyses are crucial in arguing that the current approach to 
CBDR in the climate change regime is an obstacle to reaching agreement on an 
adequate mitigation target to combat climate change. In particular, the 
developed/developing country dichotomy that has emerged in the climate change 
regime is too crude to be helpful in addressing aviation. 
 
4.3.1. The Role of CBDR in the Climate Change Regime 
 
CBDR is one of the key guiding principles set out by the UNFCCC 
international climate change regulations for the ongoing operation and adaptation of 
the climate change regime. It also affects the design of a legal architecture for 
international aviation emissions. Before discussing the nature of CBDR, it is 
necessary first to outline the role of CBDR in the climate change regime in order to 
identify the aim of applying differentiated treatment in sharing greenhouse gas 
mitigation responsibilities. 
Article 3 of the UNFCCC sets down the principle of CBDR as: 
                                                        
85 Many other themes may relate to the development of climate change law, e.g. the possible human 
rights dimensions of the climate change problem. 
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“In their actions to achieve the objective of the Convention and to 
implement its provisions, the Parties shall be guided, inter alia, by the 
following: 
1. The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of 
present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities …. 
2. The specific needs and special circumstances of developing 
country Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change ….”86  
 
It seems like this article uses vague language in introducing the CBDR 
principle, as the term “shall” gives a strong impression of command but the word 
“guide” is very soft.87 However, the CBDR principle certainly now governs all the 
negotiations in the climate change law regime88 in terms of “form[ing] the legal and 
philosophical basis for the interpretation of existing obligations and the elaboration 
of future international legal obligations within the context of the existing 
instruments in the ongoing regime-building process.”89 First of all, the principle of 
CBDR guides the future implementation of the Framework Convention as it 
provides “a set of standards by which the behaviour of Parties may be measured by 
other Parties, NGOs and the rest of the international community.”90 For example, 
the principle of CBDR requires taking into account the needs of certain categories of 
states, particularly developing countries, as Article 3 provides that developing 
country Parties “are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
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change.”91 Then, Article 4.8 applies the CBDR principle in the implementation of 
the commitments and requires as that: 
“the Parties shall give full consideration to what actions are 
necessary under the Convention….to meet the specific needs and concerns 
of developing country Parties arising from the adverse effects of climate 
change and/or the impact of implementation of response measures, ….”92 
 
Indeed, Article 3 of the Framework Convention which sets down the CBDR 
principle provides “a written constitution, which the Conference of the Parties is 
duty bound to apply when fulfilling its obligations under the Convention.”93  
Second, the CBDR principle guides the subsequent development of future 
climate change deals. In fact, the principle was put into operation in the subsequent 
Kyoto Protocol and post-Kyoto negotiations in terms of both differential 
commitments and resource redistribution.94 As discussed above, the Kyoto Protocol 
sets different mitigation obligations on developed and developing countries – the 
Annex I Parties (developed countries) are obligated to reduce their total GHG 
emissions to at least 5 percent below 1990 levels by 2008-2012, while the 
non-Annex I countries (developing countries) have no reduction obligations. 95 
Within the Annex I Parties, each country Party agreed to an individual emission 
reduction target as “appropriate burden sharing.”96 It means that differentiated 
responsibilities not only applied between developed and developing countries but 
also applied between developed countries. Then, the Copenhagen Accord “continues 
to reflect”97 the principle of CBDR in a more subtle manner than in Kyoto.98 It 
addresses the need for “deep cuts” in global emissions, while “recognizing that the 
time frame for peaking will be longer in developing countries and bearing in mind 
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that social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and 
overriding priorities of developing countries.” 99  So developed countries have 
different economy-wide emissions “targets,” which will be subject to international 
measurement, reporting and verification (MRV); and developing countries “will 
implement mitigation actions” which will be subject to international MRV only if a 
mitigation action receives international support and to national MRV otherwise.100 
Provisions regarding the provision by developed countries of financial resources and 
transfer of technology to developing countries or some developing countries (least 
developed countries and small island developing countries in the case the 
Copenhagen Accord) have been included in all of the agreements.101 Most recently, 
the Cancun Agreements emphasise that deep cuts in global greenhouse gas 
emissions are required, while acknowledging common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, and the historical responsibility of 
developed countries for the largest share of historical global emissions.102 In order 
to support to the developing world, the Cancun Agreements have made progress on 
setting up new funding channels and technology transfer mechanism to help 
developing countries access low carbon technology, adapt to climate change, and 
preserve and protect its forests.103 The CBDR principle is very likely to continue to 
guide the post-2012 negotiations in designing an equitable burden sharing 
arrangement. 
                                                        
99 Copenhagen Accord, (n. 3), para. 2. 
100 Copenhagen Accord, ibid., para. 4, 5. 
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The principle of CBDR is clearly “a significant force” within the climate 
change regime, although it “cannot be characterized as a substantive legal obligation 
in itself.”104 The application of CBDR principle in the climate change regime 
reflects the developed/developing world dichotomy in taking mitigation 
responsibilities. 105  However, it is important to recognise that differentiated 
responsibility is linked to the common responsibility in the principle of CBDR. It is 
a subject to which I will return in the next section. I argue that the aim of 
introducing differential treatment in sharing greenhouse gas mitigation 
responsibilities is to encourage the participation of both developed and developing 
countries, rather than to form a fixed division of Annex I/non-Annex I countries in 
the climate change regime. Differentiated treatment was expected to constitute “a 
useful tool to ensure universal participation and effective implementation of 
international environmental accords.”106 This can be realized by concretely giving 
participating states different obligations or allocations of financial assistance and 
transfer of technology. As French made clear, differentiated treatment has been “an 
essential component in negotiating a successful treaty,”107 but does not have a fixed 
content which drives the development of climate change regime in the 
developed/developing world dichotomy. The lack of fixed meaning on differential 
treatment will receive closer attention in the next section. I will argue that simplistic 
and uncertain understandings of CBDR are an obstacle to the development of 
climate change regime in examining the various interpretations on the differential 
responsibilities in section 4.3.3. 
 
4.3.2. The Nature of CBDR 
 
Before discussing how the current approach on CBDR principle becomes an 
obstacle to the development of climate change regime, it is necessary at this stage to 
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discuss the nature of CBDR, especially the philosophical basis of the differential 
treatment in the following paragraphs. It is crucial to understand the principle in 
order to analyse the various approaches on differential treatment. 
The principle of CBDR is widely recognised in international law. 108  It 
addresses the idea that all countries should “cooperate in a spirit of global 
partnership”109 in protecting global resources, like the atmosphere, as common good 
in which human society has a common interest; but not all countries should 
contribute equally in sharing the obligation to protect them.110  
There are two key elements in CBDR: “common” responsibilities and 
“differentiated responsibilities.” “Common” has a shared understanding with such 
international law expressions as “common heritage” and “common concern of 
mankind.”111 Both developed and developing countries have recognised a common 
responsibility for solving global environmental issues, but common responsibilities 
do not equal common obligations. Different treatment recognises the differences 
between states from historical, economic, political and other perspectives; and it 
responds to such differences by “instituting different standards for different states or 
groups of states.”112 It is “the essence of the compact between industrial and 
developing countries with respect to international environmental protection.”113 
Common responsibilities and differentiated responsibilities contribute differently to 
global environmental protection. The common responsibilities ensure the 
                                                        
108 See Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle & Catherine Redgwell, (n. 8); Philippe Sands, Principles of 
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participation of all states in international environmental law which provide the basis 
for international action; but the differentiated obligations make international 
environmental law politically acceptable which it is hoped will promote the efficacy 
of the international action.114 
The nature of differential treatment in the climate change regime is distinctive 
because of its various dimensions and its linkage to the idea of common 
responsibility. First, the term “differentiated” has several dimensions in multilateral 
agreements.115 As Stone said, “[a]n agreement can make differential substantive 
requirements; subject some parties to a more favourable compliance timetable; 
permit special defences; make noncompliance, if not forgiven, overlooked; or afford 
qualified nations financial and technical contributions, either to absorb the costs of 
compliance, or as a precondition for their own participation.”116 These dimensions 
can be divided into three categories: differentiation between industrial and 
developing countries with respect to central obligations, implementation methods, or 
financial assistance and technology transfer.117 All of them can be found in the 
climate change framework.118 
Second, there is a linkage between the “common” and “differentiated” 
responsibilities119 as provided in Article 4(7) of the UNFCCC that “[t]he extent to 
which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments 
under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed 
country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial 
resources and transfer of technology ….”120 The Copenhagen Accord “fails to 
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mention the idea that the mitigation ambitions of developing countries are 
conditional on the available levels of support.”121 Instead, its paragraph 5 provides 
that “[l]east developed countries and small island developing States may undertake 
actions voluntarily and on the basis of support.”122 It inherits the understanding that 
the differentiated responsibilities of countries should link to their common 
responsibilities. More importantly, it implies that the difference between developing 
countries should be considered. I will return to this below in examining the different 
approaches on differential responsibilities. 
With regard to the basis of the differential treatment, what we know from 
Article 3 of the UNFCCC together with its Preamble is that: seeking to achieve 
“justice and substantive equity” and “effective implementation of international 
environmental agreements,” 123  the differentiation is based on each country’s 
different “historical” contribution to global degradation, the “respective capabilities” 
of the two categories of country and “the legitimate priority needs of developing 
countries for the achievement of sustained economic growth and the eradication of 
poverty.”124 It is in this context that the philosophical basis of the principle of 
CBDR can be traced to the notions of justice and equity. The concept of equity has 
been given an important place in the climate change arena, as it almost “axiomatic 
that an effective international agreement to limit greenhouse gases will not be 
undertaken unless it is perceived as fair.”125 
From the point of view of an analysis of climate change justice, two of the 
stated reasons for the existence of differentiation – the historical responsibility of the 
industrialized countries for current environmental degradation and their present 
capability to remedy such problems – have been explained from a corrective justice 
and a distributive justice perspective.126 Because the existing stock of GHGs owes a 
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great deal to past contributions, corrective justice seems to require that the 
industrialized countries “pay damages to those who are hurt.”127 When the damages 
are not calculated according to tort law, the industrialized countries may pay by 
mitigation efforts as well as financing support. The argument from corrective justice 
refers to the equity that the measure of historical responsibility within the principle 
of CBDR aims to achieve. The basic idea is that the industrialized countries created 
the inequality as a result of the industrialization process that led to the accumulation 
of GHGs in the atmosphere, yet the costs are borne by everyone, including 
especially the poor countries “contrary to their interests and, presumably, without 
their consent.”128 So, the industrialized countries should take mitigation efforts in 
combating climate change in order to restore equality. As Chowdhury make clear, 
“contribution to global degradation being unequal, responsibility …. has to be 
unequal and commensurate with the differential contribution to such degradation.”129 
The argument from corrective justice is complemented by an argument from 
distributive justice: the rich should be required to reduce its GHGs “beyond the 
point that is justified by its own self-interest” as resources should be redistributed 
from the rich to the poor.130 This refers to the equity which requires that “[a]ll the 
relevant circumstances are to be considered and balanced.”131 In the climate change 
context, it requires us to consider the characteristics of developing countries,132 the 
unequal levels of economic development and different capacities to tackle climate 
change when we decide on levels of commitments for different countries.  
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A third point, with regard to the basis of the differential treatment, is that 
CBDR should encourage cooperation between developed and developing countries, 
rather than their separations. The existence of differentiation is to achieve effective 
implementation of the agreement. Implementing the climate change convention 
requires the involvement of all states in taking mitigation responsibilities. 
Differentiated responsibility is a tool to encourage the participation of both 
developed and developing countries in climate change convention. The flexibility 
inherent in CBDR allows the consideration of many factors (including countries’ 
different historical contributions of emissions and different capabilities) in the 
implementation of the climate change convention. However, the differentiated 
obligations are apparently universally applicable to all states as the benefits of 
differential treatment are for both developed and developing countries. The 
developing countries benefit from differentiated obligations in the form of transfers 
of financial resources and environmentally sound technology, as well as lower 
standards for mitigation responsibilities. The developed countries also benefit from 
differentiated obligations, as they “hope to generate international consensus on an 
environmental issue as to prevent future environmental harm to their own 
societies.” 133  The existence of differentiated responsibilities provides an 
“inducement” to all the states to participate in the climate change agreements.134 
The above discussion identifies two key elements of CBDR principle – 
“common” responsibility and “differentiated” responsibility. The differential 
treatment in the climate change regime is distinctive but linked to common 
responsibility. There are three dimensions of the differential treatment: the historical 
responsibility of countries’ contribution to environmental degradation, countries’ 
capability to remedy such problems and cooperation between developed and 
developing countries in order to achieve effective implementation of the agreement. 
Differentiated treatment should focus on the enhancement of substantive equity and 
international cooperation among countries. 
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4.3.3. Various Approaches on Differential Treatment 
 
In the previous sections, it has been argued that the aim of the CBDR principle 
is to encourage the participation of both developed and developing countries rather 
than to fix a division between developed and developing countries in sharing 
greenhouse gas mitigation responsibilities. However, although CBDR is in principle 
a positive aspect of international law, I argue that simplistic and uncertain 
understandings of the CBDR principle are an obstacle to the development of global 
partnership in combating climate change. Each country is able to develop its own 
understanding of CBDR. This understanding can reflect the self interest of those 
countries. In this section, I explore the perspective of the U.S. and of China. The U.S. 
argues that CBDR is about capacity to mitigate only,135 largely because of its own 
internal cost and benefit analysis approach. China argues that CBDR is about 
historical contribution and capacity,136 largely because of its sharp prioritisation of 
economic growth over environmental protection. These divergent approaches to 
CBDR support the more general approach to climate change in each country, which 
has been downplay their own responsibilities. 
Before discussing the various approaches on the CBDR principle, it is 
necessary to explain the reason for dispute. Although the CBDR principle has been 
applied for a long time in the climate change negotiations, it has been criticised for 
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being “over-argued; and … [it] breeds laziness in the negotiating process.”137 
Disputes over the scope of CBDR have been argued as being “a primary cause” of 
the collapse of the climate change regime in the still warming world.138 In particular, 
this differentiation led to the difficulty to extract reduction commitments from China 
and India, which was part of the reasons for the United States’ withdrawal from the 
Kyoto Protocol and therefore from much of the following negotiation progress.139 
Indeed, in the climate change regime, CBDR comes with some serious problems and 
difficulties for the parties because of its lack of “a strictly fixed content.”140 
The content of the differentiated responsibility is discussed above in section 
4.3.2. There are at least three dimensions to CBDR in the UNFCCC – the historical 
contribution to global degradation, respective capabilities of the two categories of 
country and the effective implementation of international environmental agreements. 
During the climate change negotiations, the industrialized countries and the 
developing countries held different interpretations of differentiated responsibility, 
even though they both supported the principle that “developed country Parties 
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”141 
The developing countries argued that the industrialized countries had historically 
born the “main responsibility” for the climate change problem; while the developed 
countries opposed this, but agreed to take the lead because of their greater financial 
and technical capabilities.142 The disagreement between developed and developing 
countries is whether the differentiated responsibility is about contribution to climate 
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change or capacity to mitigate. 
If the differentiated responsibility is about contribution, the question of 
applying corrective justice to the climate change problem would make the climate 
change regime very complex. Posner and Sunstein have pointed out the difficulty 
regarding applying the concepts of corrective justice and purely individual fault in 
the climate change context in arguing that the corrective justice model does not suit 
the climate change issue.143 They have made the point that “a crude state-to-state 
remediation scheme results in innocents being punished and non-victims being 
compensated,” because “[t]he current stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is 
due to the behaviour of people living in the past….people who are dead.”144 Daniel 
Farber agrees that applying corrective justice to the climate change problem is 
complex, but he disagrees with Posner and Sunstein. He has examined the 
contributions of living Americans to the climate change problem, based on the data 
from 1950, and has argued that “to think of harmful CO2 emissions as only a 
historical phenomenon, unconnected with the lives of current-day Americans, is 
clearly mistaken.”145  The questions for implying the principle of CBDR may 
include how to identify the victim and injurer in the climate change context, how to 
protect poor people in rich countries,146 and how to design “a compensation system 
that is reasonably well targeted to address the needs of climate change victims.”147 
There is also a need to distinguish between “current responsibility” and 
“conceptual responsibility.”148 French has argued that “it should not be presumed 
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144 Ibid., p. 22. 
145 Daniel A. Farber, ‘The Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in a 
Complex World’ (2008) 2008 Utah L. Rev. 377, 396. 
146 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, (n. 126). 
147 Daniel A. Farber, (n. 145), p. 397. 
148 Duncan French, (n. 89), p. 49. I borrow the words from French. He has provided that “current 
responsibility” refers to the present state of affairs at the end of the twentieth century when developed 
States are the largest contributors to global environmental degradation. “Current responsibility” is 
different from “conceptual responsibility”, which “sets out the general principle that responsibility is 
dependent upon a State’s contribution to environmental problems. This general principle is unqualitfied 
by the present situation and leaves open the possibility that it will not necessarily always be the case 
that it is developed States which are responsible for the greater part of global environmental damage.” 
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that primary responsibility will inevitably always fall upon developed States.”149 
Current responsibility refers to the present state of affairs as developed countries are 
the largest contributors to global environmental degradation. However, the general 
principle should set a state’s conceptual responsibility, which is different from 
current responsibility. For example, given the bigger share of population, land mass 
and areas still not industrialised, developing countries may cause more damage to 
the environment in the future and to be responsible for the greater part of global 
environmental damage.150 According to the Framework Convention, the burden 
sharing principle requires international community to consider the basic conceptual 
justification for differentiation. However, the principle of CBDR that sets out the 
conceptual contribution is “unqualified by the present situation.”151 Regulatory 
design may need to prepare for the possibility that developing countries will be 
required to take greater responsibility for climate change as their contribution to the 
problem increases. 
If the differential responsibility is based on different capacity to mitigate, there 
is again a need to considering changing capacities of countries, especially the big 
developing countries. For example, China’s capacity in terms of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions is growing quickly. 152  China is already the leading 
renewable energy producer in the world in terms of installed generating capacity,153 
and it ranked second for the absolute Dollar amount investment in renewable energy 
in 2007. 154  China is already a leading manufacturer of solar photovoltaic 
technology.155 China is also introducing measures to limit oil consumption from its 
growing motor vehicle fleet, implementing fuel efficiency standards for cars 40% 
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higher than those in the U.S.156 As such, in the move to a low carbon economy, 
“China will no longer be a developing country following where others have led, but 
a pioneer leading the way.” 157  Regulatory design may need to consider the 
possibility that some developing countries will be required to take greater 
responsibility for climate change as their capability to solve the problem increase. 
Crucially, in respect of both contribution and capacity, we need to be aware of 
the evolving nature of CBDR. As there is no fixed meaning of the differential 
treatment, states tend to have different understandings of CBDR principle and place 
emphasis on different elements to suit their self-interest. My position is that the 
current approach to CBDR is an obstacle to the development of global partnership in 
combating climate change. This is clear from an explanation of the positions of the 
U.S. and China in the climate change negotiations and their simplistic and uncertain 
understandings of the CBDR principle.158 There are several points that explain why 
I choose these two countries here. The U.S. has long been leading the world’s GHG 
emissions and China has now surpassed the U.S.159 But the two leading emitters 
have independently refused to take binding reduction commitments in climate 
change negotiations.160 The exit of these two countries is a significant impediment 
to the effectiveness of the climate change regime. The emissions from these two 
largest emitters “threaten to impose serious losses on other nations and regions, 
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including Europe but above all India and Africa.”161 Without the U.S. and China, 
half of the global emissions are not be covered by a legal agreement.162 These two 
countries have been identified as “a real obstacle to an international agreement to 
control greenhouse gases.” 163  From a legal perspective, it is their different 
approaches on CBDR that block the development of the climate change regime. 
Both China and the U.S. refuse to accept binding reduction commitments and 
hold different opinions on the content of CBDR. China, as a developing country, has 
been emphasizing its relative poverty, its low per capita emissions and the fact that 
the existing stock of GHGs was produced by the industrialized nations.164 It has 
been standing together with other developing countries and resisted all efforts to 
include them in any quantitative mitigation obligations under the climate change 
regime.165 Although China did make some offers at Copenhagen,166 along with 
other developing countries, it “view[s] the quid pro quo between them and 
developed countries not as, ‘action for action’, but as ‘action for action plus 
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support’.” 167  The U.S. opposed exempting developing countries from GHG 
mitigation obligations in negotiations.168 In the U.S. view, the CBDR principle 
requires that every nation make a commitment, and the “level and timing of each 
country’s commitments must be commensurate with its national abilities and level 
of development. Balance and fairness must be maintained.”169 The U.S. is against 
the exemption of developing countries from binding obligations, arguing that 
climate change is not created solely by the developed countries.170 Even prior to its 
rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. had argued that it would not assume 
binding obligations until the regime contained “meaningful participation from key 
developing nations.”171 By looking at China and the U.S., we see now states can 
interpret the principle of CBDR in a simplistic way to suit their self-interest. 
It is not difficult to find that the U.S.’s stance on climate change negotiations 
and burden sharing in particular, in fact, against the spirit of CBDR, especially the 
common responsibilities. As discussed earlier in this section, the common 
responsibilities are binding unconditionally on all states because global climate is 
treated as “common good”, “common interest” and “common concern of 
humankind.”172 Although CBDR lacks a common interpretation, we know that both 
developed and developing nations have a common responsibility for protecting 
global climate stabilization. Importantly, each country’s commitment to reduce 
GHG emissions does not need to take another country’s commitment as a condition. 
Otherwise, the common responsibilities would not ensure the participation of all 
states in international climate change regime. So, that the U.S. takes developing 
countries’ mitigation commitments as a condition for its own share of the common 
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responsibilities is actually against the spirit of CBDR principle. 
The U.S.’s approach on CBDR is simplistic as its over emphasises domestic 
cost-benefit analysis. Some U.S. scholars have argued that the U.S.’s domestic costs 
of GHG emission limitations would exceed the benefits.173 As Sunstein has argued, 
in terms of the U.S.’s domestic self-interest, the U.S. might not “perceive the 
optimal agreement from the global standpoint” as in its interest, simply because it 
seems “to have disproportionately little to lose from climate change and 
disproportionately much to lose from emissions reductions.”174 Cost issues are a big 
part of the political debate in the U.S. as elsewhere.175 From the U.S. perspective, it 
is found that the U.S. would have to spend over $300 billion to comply with the 
requirements of the Kyoto Protocol, while its monetized benefits would be about 4 
percent of that amount.176 It is worth noting that this is the economic calculation 
being made by U.S. experts to the government for policy making. The accuracy of 
the assumptions is highly contentious and the assumptions are arguably too 
narrow.177 This calculation is controversial on both sides of the equation: both in 
terms of the costs of mitigation and in terms of the costs of climate change. The U.S. 
believed that the costs of mitigation are high because taking a reduction 
commitment would “result in serious harm to the United States economy, including 
significant job loss, trade disadvantages, increased energy and consumer costs, or 
any combination thereof.”178 Posner and Sunstein have argued that if the U.S. has to 
help the poor, just because it is a wealthy country, it might better help them in a way 
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which would not hurt the U.S., such as “help to protect India and Africa or some 
other region from an asteroid or a tsunami.”179 However, the Stern Review has 
provided a reasonable conclusion as the benefits of strong and early mitigation 
action on climate change considerably outweigh the costs.180 In terms of the costs of 
climate change, the U.S.’s calculation is controversial as well. The U.S., as with 
some other wealthy nations, is in a better position in terms of the climate change 
crisis, considering its adaptive capacity and its cooler higher latitudes.181 Climate 
change may initially have limited negative effects or even small positive effects for 
the U.S., but it is likely to be very damaging for the much higher temperature 
increases expected under business-as-usual scenarios as Stern reviewed. 182 
Therefore, the U.S.’s domestic cost-benefit calculation of climate change and 
mitigation is highly contentious. In sum, the U.S.’s approach on CBDR responds to 
its own understanding of its self-interest. 
Although the climate has been acknowledged as common good and needs 
common efforts from all the countries to mitigate GHG emissions, the U.S. takes 
developing countries’ mitigation commitments as a condition for its own share of 
the common responsibilities and places emphasis on its domestic cost-benefit 
analysis to suit its self-interest. The absence of a fixed meaning of the CBDR 
principle enables the U.S. to take its own interpretation which becomes one of the 
reasons for the continued delay in climate change negotiation. As such, I argue that 
the U.S.’s approach on the CBDR principle is simplistic and is an obstacle to the 
global partnership in developing the climate change regime. 
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The same argument comes from China’s interpretation on CBDR as well.  
China’s approach on CBDR is simplistic. It has overemphasised the need for 
leadership from developed countries in cutting GHG emissions, but played down the 
spirit of global common responsibilities in interpreting the CBDR principle. China 
believes that differential treatment is mainly based on developed countries’ high 
contribution to climate change, which includes both historical and current 
contribution. China has argued that the historical emissions of the developed 
countries cause their obligation to provide financial assistance and to transfer 
technology to enhance the capacity of developing economies to address climate 
change.183 Since they are responsible for the greatest share of emissions, developed 
countries should use their wealth to help poor countries in the context of combating 
climate change.184 In terms of current contribution, China has emphasized the high 
contribution from developed countries in referring to the measure of per capita 
greenhouse gas emissions. It claims that any international agreement should 
consider that China’s per capita emissions rate is not high.185 Although China’s 
annual CO2 emissions have now surpassed those of the U.S., the U.S. has still been 
the world’s largest emitter of GHGs in terms of per capita energy consumption, 
which is twice as high as in Western Europe and eight times higher than that in 
China.186 
 China has also emphasized that any of its actions regarding climate change 
will be “within its capability based on its actual situation.”187 It appears that China 
has agreed to apply differentiated responsibilities based on capability. However, on 
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this point, its interpretation of CBDR is also an obstacle to developing an 
international climate change regime. This is because that China treats domestic 
economic growth as a key standard to measure its capability in taking mitigation 
responsibilities. Invoking the principle of CBDR, China has argued that developing 
countries, including China, should be bound only to take account of environmental 
issues as they continue to ensure that their economies grow.188 China holds the 
opinion that economic growth, which leads to benefits through raising the standard 
of living for its citizens, takes priority over any other social and environmental 
concerns.189 
China’s prioritisations of economic growth over environmental protection is 
highly controversial. The potential for harmonisation between economic growth and 
environment protection has been generally accepted in the debate of ecological 
modernization theory (EMT).190 This theory was originally aiming to “analyze how 
contemporary industrialized societies deal with environmental crises,”191 and argued 
that continued industrial development provides the best option for escaping from the 
global environmental crisis. 192  Linking this to the impact of globalization on 
                                                        
188 Liu Jiang, ibid.; see also China’s National Climate Change Programme, (n. 160). 
189 Ibid. See also Joanna Lewis, ‘China’s Strategic Priorities in International Climate Change 
Negotiations’ (2007) 31/1 The Washington Quarterly 155. 
Additionally, China has made gains in reducing energy intensity, which is also aimed to contribute the 
country’s economic development and to satisfy higher level of living standards for its citizens. Pew 
Center on Global Climate Change & Asia Society, ‘Common Challenge, Collaborative Response: A 
Roadmap for U.S. – China Cooperation on Energy and Climate Change’ (2009) online available at 
<http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/US-China-Roadmap-Feb09.pdf> last accessed 24.05.10.; see 
also Elizabeth Burleson, (n. 166). 
190 In an earlier time, Hajer made the criticism that EMT is “basically a modernist and technocratic 
approach to the environment that suggests that there is a techno-institutional fix for the present 
problems.” Maarten A. Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and 
the Policy Process (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995), p. 32; When critiques became more focused on the 
components of ETM, Christoff warned that “there is a danger that the term may serve to legitimize the 
continuing instrumental domination and destruction of the environment and the promotion of less 
democratic forms of government, foregrounding modernity’s industrial and technocratic discourses 
over its more recent, resistant and critical ecological components.” Peter Christoff ‘Ecological 
modernization, ecological modernities’ in Stephen C. Young (ed.) The Emergence of Ecological 
Modernisation: Integrating the Environment and the Economy? (Routledge, London 2000), p. 209, pp. 
227-28; more critiques on EMT from Martin Jänicke, ‘Ecological modernization: new perspectives’ 
(2008) 16 Journal of Cleaner Production 557; Jouni Korhonen, ‘Reconsidering the economics logic of 
ecological modernization’ (2008) 40 Environment and Planning A 1331; Dana R. Fisher & William R. 
Freudenburg, ‘Ecological Modernization and Its Critics: Assessing the Past and Looking Toward the 
Future’ (2001) 14 Society and Natural Resources 701. 
191 Arthur P.J. Mol & David A. Sonnenfeld (eds.) Ecological Modernization around the World: 
Perspectives and Critical Debates (Frank Cass., London 2000), pp. 3, 5. 
192 Ibid.; Arthur P. J. Mol, The refinement of production: Ecological modernization theory and the 
 85 
environmental quality, Mol used EMT to present a balanced interpretation of the 
implications of globalization on environmental standards from a sociological 
perspective and argued that globalization has the potential to improve the quality of 
the environment.193 However, discussions on EMT is clear that economic growth 
should not be an excuse for any country to withdraw from environmental 
responsibilities. Chinese scholars and many officials have embraced the concept of 
ecological modernisation, 194  but the Chinese interpretation is “limited to the 
technological-economic dimensions of sustainable development, without entering 
too much into relations with equity, equality, citizen empowerment and the like.”195 
China emphasised a primarily economic-technological approach to ecological 
modernization in China’s major production sectors, but did not refer to the more 
political innovations in EMT. 196  This Chinese interpretation of ecological 
modernization is linked to its implications for the concept of development. The 
development needs of developing countries should be considered in climate change 
negotiations,197 but this does not mean treating economic growth as having priority 
over environmental protection nor considering economic development only. 
Therefore, China’s understanding of the CBDR principle, which emphasises 
developed countries’ responsibility to take mitigation commitments and obligations 
on developing countries only to take account of environmental issues as they 
continue to ensure that their economies grow, is driven by its position that economic 
growth is a greater priority than environmental protection. China’s interpretation of 
CBDR principle actually becomes an obstacle to the global partnership in combating 
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climate change, especially the participation from the developing countries. 
All in all, because there is no fixed meaning of CBDR principle, states were 
able to interpret the principle according to their self-interest and policy priorities. 
The examples of the U.S.’s domestic cost-effectiveness analysis on the climate issue 
and China’s political standpoint on the priority of economic growth show how these 
two biggest emitters have become obstacles in climate change negotiations. I argue 
that simplistic and uncertain understandings of burden sharing are a barrier to 
reaching agreement on combating climate change. To overcome this obstacle, many 
proposals have been put forward to regroup the contracting Parties of the UNFCCC 
and amend the UNFCCC to include “Annex III”, consisting of the fast-growing 
developing countries that emit large amounts of GHGs. 198  Although such an 
amendment cannot be found in the Copenhagen deal or the Cancun Agreements, the 
Accord refers especially to the least developed countries, the small island 
developing states. It opens the door to many possible future approaches that may 
include different types and degrees of mitigation commitments according to the 
development status of the countries. Behind the dispute on CBDR principle, the 
main challenge is to provide positive incentives for both developed and developing 
countries to use more low-emissions fuels and production processes, and to 
accelerate investment in low-emissions energy technologies.199 The question of how 
to convince the U.S. and China that they do “have a great deal to gain from an 
international agreement” remains unanswered.200 In the international arena, the 
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question of how to realize cooperative maxima in combating climate change is 
open-ended. These questions are expected to be answered in the development of the 
CBDR principle. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
The weak mitigation commitments provided by Annex I countries and the 
absence of quantitative mitigation commitments from non-Annex I countries are 
barriers to the development of climate change regime. The inadequate mitigation 
targets are shaped in the division between Annex I and non-Annex I countries 
according to CBDR principle. CBDR principle was not intended to encourage such 
a division. This principle was aimed to encourage the participation of both 
developed and developing countries in combating climate change. The differentiated 
treatment is linked to the common responsibilities and focuses on the enhancement 
of substantive equality and international cooperation. However, there is no fixed 
meaning of CBDR. States have various interpretations on differentiated 
responsibilities to suit their self-interest and policy priorities. Simplistic and 
uncertain understandings of burden sharing are a barrier to reaching agreement. I am 
not of course suggesting that CBDR is the only reason that the U.S. and China 
disagree. However, its division of developing and developed countries is symbolic 
of a simplistic approach to the problem. 
 
5. Moving Forward on Aviation 
 
Moving on to aviation, this section argues that aviation emissions are best 
addressed through a sectoral approach in the UNFCCC system. Then, I examine 
how the controversial principle of CBDR has been an obstacle in designing burden 
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sharing in the aviation sector. I suggest a sophisticated application of CBDR to 
allow the international target for aviation to be shared between state Parties in an 
international agreement. 
 
5.1. A Sectoral Approach 
 
In this section, I argue that aviation emissions are best addressed through a 
sectoral approach rather than within general mitigation targets. A mitigation target 
on the aviation sector should be identified at the international level in the UNFCCC 
system for the following three reasons. 
First of all, the UNFCCC must work on aviation emissions after the failure of 
ICAO which will be discussed in Chapter 4. As the aviation industry’s own 
proposals outlined that “[i]t’s better to have an efficiency target that everyone can 
work to up till 2020 and then at a global level set the carbon neutral growth target 
from 2020 and then head towards the 50% reduction target by 2050.” 201 
Copenhagen was the first time that UNFCCC has been urged to directly set 
reduction targets for the aviation sector instead of through ICAO. A sectoral 
approach was called for by airline and airport representatives at the Copenhagen 
climate change conference, although the negotiations did not reach a deal on bunker 
fuel emissions in the end.202  In the negotiating text, a sectoral target was provided 
as “[g]lobal reduction targets for such emissions from aviation … shall be set as 
equal to, …., {X per cent}…. below {year XXXX} levels in the commitment period 
{20XX to 20XX}. Units from existing and potential new flexibility mechanisms 
may contribute towards achieving these targets.”203 It is understandable that setting 
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a genuine reduction target for this fast growing sector is difficult. It was after the 
failure of the industry-dominated ICAO over the last 13 years that environment 
ministers were called to take over ahead of the Copenhagen climate deal. 204 
Negotiations will take time. A sectoral approach on aviation emissions was on the 
agenda of Cancun conference but was not mentioned in the final decisions. So far, 
aviation has been identified as a critical area for global cooperation to accelerate the 
transition needed to address climate change. The occasion of wider negotiations is 
the opportunity for achieving a sectoral target on aviation emissions as a 
complement to the current regime. 
Second, a sectoral approach is needed because international aviation is not 
being effectively addressed within the general targets in the conventional inter-state 
approaches. Under the climate change regime, emissions are attributable to a 
country if they result directly from activities that occur within its territory.205 
However, international transport involves movement between countries, creating 
difficulties for allocating emissions to specific countries. Little of the fuel that is 
used in international transport is emitted in or over the territory of countries that are 
most directly involvement in the relevant transport movement (e.g., many of the 
emissions occur when plans transit through a country’s airspace or fly over high 
seas). As discussed in Chapter 2, there are also difficulties in identifying the quantity 
of emissions involved in any flight and their atmospheric impact. The difficulties in 
identifying who should take the mitigation responsibility, rest on the unique 
characteristics of air transportation and its emissions. Therefore, international 
aviation is not being effectively addressed within general mitigation targets in the 
current climate change regime. 
                                                                                                                                                               
June 2009, online available on <www.unfccc.int> last accessed 10.12.2009. 
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Third, airlines want to avoid the risk of a “patchwork quilt” of policies which 
may hit airlines twice through a global treaty and then through a national/regional 
climate policy.206 For example, the European emissions trading scheme, which will 
be discussed further in Chapter 6, included international air transports. It is a good 
model of regional level efforts in terms of building multiple levels approach to 
regulate aviation emissions if a sectoral target on aviation cannot be agreed on the 
international level. But, multiple regional emissions trading schemes plus other 
national emissions trading systems are very likely to provide only fragmented 
markets and regulations on aviation emissions. My discussions in Chapter 6 will 
explore the limitations of multiple regional emissions trading schemes. However, 
these limitations can be avoided if there is a sectoral approach to aviation in the 
UNFCCC system. I will argue in Chapter 6 that regional emissions trading under a 
sectoral approach can provide an important market-based instrument to curb the 
growth of aviation emissions but within the context of an international agreement. A 
sectoral approach at the international level provides an opportunity to avoid the risk 
of the “patchwork quilt” of regulations on international aviation emissions. 
For these three reasons, I argue that aviation emissions are best addressed 
through a sectoral approach in the UNFCCC system. A sectoral approach has been 
supported by some academics, airlines and NGOs.207 It has been argued that sectoral 
approach may establish politically acceptable mitigation targets in identified sectors 
and potentially engaging both developed and developing countries in combating 
climate change.208 A group of NGOs believe that the idea of raising a sectoral target 
on aviation is “to use the occasion of wider negotiations to break the political 
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deadlock” and to agree a global target.209 Airlines have put the idea of sectoral 
approach into their proposals as mentioned above. 
To make it clear, I am suggesting the use of a sectoral approach on aviation 
only, but not a multi-sectoral restructuring of the climate change regime. Because 
regulating aviation emissions is especially complex as discussed in Chapter 2, the 
aim of this suggestion is to give greater attention to the aviation industry in the 
international climate negotiations,210 and to deliver a sectoral mitigation target to 
lead the whole industry to work towards sustainable growth. It is important to 
identify the policy guidance and incentives which will underpin the shift to 
sustainable air transport growth or a low carbon aviation industry in combating 
climate change. It is also important to provide a vision of the way in which the 
structure of this industry or the whole transport industry and of our life associated 
with it will ultimately be different as a result. This vision “is needed to underpin 
planning and investment decisions by business and government, as well as the way 
in which individual behaviours may need to adapt.”211  
 
5.2. Burden Sharing in Respect of Aviation Emissions 
 
A sectoral approach to aviation emissions raises questions about how the 
country Parties could share the mitigation burdens. There are two key challenges in 
applying a sectoral target to the aviation sector. First is the difficulty of allocating 
aviation emissions by nationality, as discussed in Chapter 2. And secondly, the 
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developed/developing country dichotomy that we find in most approaches to CBDR 
does not suit the sharing of mitigation responsibilities in the aviation sector. The 
aviation sector requires a reclassification of countries according to their different 
contributions to the expansion of aviation, and their changing emissions reduction 
capacities. 
 
5.2.1. Allocating Emissions 
 
In Chapter 2 I explored some of the difficulties of allocating aviation 
emissions nationally: for example, it is difficult to identify the emitters in a single 
journey due to the worldwide cooperation between airlines through code sharing; 
the structure of air transport business involves a highly heterogeneous array of 
actors (the major actors include airline companies, shippers, agents, forwarders, 
terminal operating companies and hinterland transport companies); and much of the 
fuel that is used in international transport is used in or over the territory of countries 
that have no direct involvement in the relevant transport movement. Market 
deregulation and liberalization in the aviation industry212 has compounded these 
practical difficulties. First, for example, the nationality of airlines is getting more 
ambiguous due to globalization in the air transport industry, which, again, makes it 
more difficult for policymakers to measure environmental obligations by country. 
Since air traffic rights are governed by bilateral agreements, the airlines of each 
nation must in principle be substantially owned and effectively controlled by its 
citizens.213 The “substantial ownership and effective control” of airlines was not 
addressed in the Chicago Convention itself.214 The only multilateral international 
                                                        
212 See Paul S. Dempsey & Andrew R. Goetz, Airline Deregulation and Laissez-Faire Mythology, 
(Westport, Conn u.a. Quorum Books, US 1992); Paul S. Dempsey, European Aviation Law, (Kluwer 
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that there is no single agreed-upon definition of what is meant by substantial ownership and effective 
control. See ICAO, Working Paper ‘Worldwide Air Transport Conference on International Air 
Transport Regulation, Present, Future’ at Conf/4-WP47, p. 3. 
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agreement that actually addressed the issue of airline ownership restrictions is the 
International Air Services Transit Agreement. Article 1, Section 5, which provides 
that,  
“[e]ach Contracting State reserves the right to withhold or revoke a 
certificate or permit to an air transport enterprise of another State in any 
case where it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective 
control are vested in nationals of a Contracting State, or in case of failure 
of such air transport enterprise to comply with the laws of the State over 
which it operates, or to perform its obligations under this Agreement.”215 
 
These ownership restrictions are designed to contribute to national security, 
economic security, safety, competition issues, bilateral issues and other legal 
issues.216 Yet, the principle of the national substantial ownership and effective 
control of airlines has become a significant impediment to the air transport industry 
in the globalised economy. Bilateral agreements hamper the free market by 
restricting the ability of airlines to consolidate with foreign carriers through equity 
transfers. To circumvent such barriers, airlines enter into more indirect forms of 
cooperation, such as code sharing and joint market arrangements.217 As discussed in 
Chapter 2, such cooperation between airlines is one more thing that makes it 
difficult to identify which country should bear environmental obligations. 
Furthermore, there are many deviations from the substantial ownership and effective 
control principle which have been developed by the changing of national laws or by 
the airline industry itself. The proliferation of foreign investment, for example, has 
almost completely removed the national restrictions in both developed and 
developing countries. Lelieur has examined the factors behind the increased foreign 
investment limits in 1990s and he found that some developing countries (including 
Brazil, Thailand, Peru and Bangladesh) did so in order to “obtain the financing 
needed to keep their national air transport activity operational,” while some 
                                                        
215 International Air Services Transit Agreement, 7 December 1944, 84 U.N.T.S. 389, ICAO Doc. 
7500.  
216 Commission on Air Transport, ‘Foreign in Airlines: An ICC View’ (November 8, 1994), online 
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developed countries allowed 100 percent foreign investment in their airlines due 
primarily to their geographical setting, taking the example of Singapore in its 
emergence as a major transit hub in the Asian-Pacific region.218 The creation of 
multi-national airlines is also a deviation from the substantial ownership and 
effective control principle. For example, the Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS), 
created in 1951, is a joint operating organization of the national airlines of Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark. Since it is “the holder of traffic rights in each of the three 
bilateral agreements concluded with third countries,” 219  the commercial 
opportunities are shared and, equally, it has become more difficult to specify their 
environmental obligations. In sum, the principle of “substantial ownership and 
effective control” has undergone considerable erosion, which means that the 
nationality of airlines, and of their emissions, is ambiguous. 
A further challenge for the allocation of aviation emissions as a result of 
market deregulation and liberalization220 has been the change in airline network 
structure from “point-to-point” to “hub-and-spoke.” As Ian Humphreys has 
described:  
“Hub-and-spoke networks minimize airline operating costs per seat 
kilometre flown in relation to the airports served in a network. A hub can 
be defined as a central airport location used as a transfer point for services 
from outlying spoke airports. Airlines schedule waves of flights into the 
hub and then back out to where they came from within a short time period. 
Passengers transfer between flights at the hub. This allows the airlines to 
maximize the number of marketable connections between points of the 
network for the lowest airline operating cost.”221 
 
Hub-and-spoke networks may attribute economically to the development of 
airlines, but they make it more difficult to attribute their environmental effects to 
particular countries. International air service is booming in big cities, 
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agglomerations of cities and hub cities to feed the hub-and-spoke networks of the 
major carriers.222  
Difficulties in allocating responsibilities for “emissions” are not unique to 
aviation. Lesson might be learned for example in the ways in which international 
law has allocated responsibilities in respect of oil pollution at sea. Although there is 
a general endorsement of the polluter-pays principle for marine pollution damage, 
“who is the polluter is not self-evident in a complex industry such as shipping.”223 
The scope of possible polluters includes the operator of an oil or chemical tanker, 
the cargo owner, the ship owner or even a third party.224 The example of oil 
pollution illustrates that these questions are always a matter of policy choice rather 
than simple technical allocation. Aviation needs to be addressed on that basis. In any 
event, a multi-level approach is needed. The contribution to the expansion of 
international aviation should be considered at the regional (grouping of countries) 
and city level as well as at the national level. Allocating emissions by the regional or 
city level would be new but it would be sensible for aviation. The norm of 
differential treatment on the regional level has been accepted by the international 
community in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).225 
Article 207(4) (Pollution from land-based sources) provides that states, in 
endeavouring to establish regional and global approaches, shall “take into account 
characteristic regional features, the economic capacity of developing States and 
their need for economic development.”226 Some of the other articles (Article 197, 
Article 207(3) and 208(4)) provide that policies are to be harmonized on a regional 
basis for the protection and preservation of the marine environment. In terms of the 
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city level, it is worth noting the special role of the hub cities discussed above. 
Because of hub-and-spoke networks, some airports receive a relatively large share 
of all take-offs and landings. Such networks might have environmental benefits, due 
to environmental economies of scale: large aircraft with lower emissions per seat 
can be used because passenger flows are concentrated on fewer links. However, the 
negative environmental effects tend to exceed the positive effects.227 The hub cities 
contribute more emissions than other cities and as such, to develop a comprehensive 
multi-level burden sharing system may be more suitable to the international aviation 
sector. 
 
5.2.2. The Developed/Developing Country Dichotomy 
 
As well as the difficulty of allocating emissions by nationality, it is particularly 
problematic to apply any simplistic dichotomy between developed and developing 
countries in aviation. So for example, the hub cities discussed above exist in both 
developed and developing countries, for example New York and Shanghai. The air 
transport service in these hub cities directly contributes to regional economic 
development and global atmospheric pollution. Neither the contribution of aviation 
to climate change, nor the contributions of aviation to economic and social welfare 
are necessarily or easily linked to the development status of countries. 
In any event, aviation is necessary to most of the economies of the world, 
developed and developing. As within the railway a century ago, the global air 
transport system takes a role as a public transport system both in the developed and 
developing world, and “whether they travel or not, many people benefit from the 
facilities and services provided by aviation.”228 Air transport “has created a unique 
world of business connections, economic opportunities, travel and tourism.”229 
Although the benefits of aviation may be assessed in terms of contribution to 
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regional and national economies and social welfare, as discussed in Chapter 2, these 
benefits are hard to measure in a way that is useful for policymakers.230 Indeed, 
aviation is necessary to almost all the countries in the world. It assists the 
agricultural and rural development of isolated economies. For example, aviation 
enables the production of specialized products such as fresh fruit and flowers from 
Africa.231 Aviation contributes to developing countries in “promoting cultural unity 
within a country and allowing cultural, ethnic and educational links with the 
industrialized world.”232 Developed economies also benefit from aviation in the 
form of tourism and trade, as in the UK.233 It is impossible to measure to what 
extent aviation is more necessary to some groups of countries than others. 
A more sophisticated approach to burden sharing in respect of aviation 
emissions will need to break the developed/developing county dichotomy. It must be 
kept in mind that differential treatment should be a living norm which should “have 
the ability to constantly evolve and adapt to emerging realities.”234 This includes 
updating not only countries’ contributions to aviation emissions but also their 
capacity for the provision of cleaner facilities for international aviation. 
First, distinctions need to be drawn between different developing countries. 
Lessons from the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer are suggestive of how this might work. In addressing “the needs and 
circumstances of the developing countries”,235 Article 2 ( by reference to article 5), 
distinguishes between developing countries whose annual consumption of controlled 
substances is less than 0.3 kilograms per capita and all other countries. Although the 
countries not meeting the 0.3kg test include virtually all developing countries, this 
Convention treats countries quite differently based on their “annual consumption of 
controlled substances” rather than solely on their development status. This 
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measurement method raise the idea of considering countries’ contributions to the 
consumption of sources – the contribution to the expansion of air transport in the 
case of aviation emissions — in a way that provides a criterion for “differential 
treatment”. 
Secondly, countries’ capacity for the provision of cleaner facilities for 
international civil air navigation should be identified and updated. It is one of the 
distinctive features of the recent development of international aviation that airlines 
are increasingly focused on operational cost reductions with the rising price of jet 
fuel, and developed countries are by no means the only ones that are technically or 
financially able to enjoy the advanced operational system of air transport. China 
Eastern Airlines, for example, signed a $1.2 billion order for Rolls-Royce Trent 700 
engines in November 2010 which will enable China Eastern to enjoy a fuel 
management service for the airline’s fleet of more than 300 aircraft provided by 
Reston, the Virginia-based Optimized System and Solution (OSyS). 236  OSyS 
provides the fuel usage analysis, management and optimization that allow airlines to 
drive operational efficiencies, measure improvement initiatives and mitigate their 
environmental impact. This service is already in use by several other airlines 
including EasyJet, Qatar Airways and Thomson Airways.237 The China Eastern deal 
shows China’s capability to import new technology on emissions reductions without 
any financial assistance. As such, differential treatment should be used in a 
meaningful way to identify the continuing relevance of the differentiated capability 
of countries. The changes in the identified differences of countries238 have been 
acknowledged by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) regime. In the WTO regime, 
an evaluation of whether the existing differential commitments broadly reflect the 
existing differences between countries and if any changes to the existing structure of 
commitments are necessary does occur.239 There is no definition of developed or 
developing countries, but an evaluation process labelled “graduation” was used to 
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determine a particular country’s industrial status.240 The WTO experience shows 
that the continuing relevance of differentiated commitments in environmental 
treaties must be conducted through a time-to-time evaluation. In the context of 
aviation, the actual capacity of countries to reduce aviation emissions must be 
identified and updated. An evaluation mechanism could be established by ICAO, 
which is a topic to which I will return in chapter 4. 
 
5.2.3. Summary 
 
To summarise, burden sharing in respect of aviation emissions should not be 
solely by reference to nationality but should also consider the contribution to the 
expansion of international aviation at the regional, and city level. It should also 
break the developed/developing country dichotomy, by considering changing 
contributions to aviation emissions and changing capacity for the provision of 
cleaner facilities for international aviation. 
These criteria are likely to point in different directions in some cases. Any 
allocation will be complicated and sensitive, and will require the political will of 
country Parties in the negotiations of the UNFCCC system. Lack of political will is 
not only an obstacle to achieving a comprehensive multi-level burden sharing 
system on aviation emissions, but also a main obstacle in the general climate change 
negotiations.241 Unfortunately, Copenhagen showed again that “[d]istrust…. is the 
default.”242  Whilst the Cancun Agreements are widely perceived as having restored 
faith in the multilateral climate change process under the UNFCCC, Cancun has left 
many important details open and the legal form of the future of post-2012 climate 
change regulation is still pending.243 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the adequacy of the UNFCCC in 
detail. Whilst the adequacy of the UNFCCC system is clearly crucial, it is a central 
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part of the argument in this thesis that the conventional UNFCCC system cannot be 
the whole answer to aviation emissions. The UNFCCC system is needed to provide 
a legally binding mitigation target through a sectoral approach on aviation as argued 
above. The lack of political will in the international negotiations may make the 
suggested burden sharing system difficult in practice. The sectoral target might be 
easier to agree in the absence of allocated mitigation responsibilities. I will explore 
an alternative form of allocation through a global emissions trading scheme in 
Chapter 6. In Chapters 4 and 5, I will also explore multiple instruments and 
involving multiple parties. If the sectoral target cannot be agreed internationally, 
other measures at other levels of governance, for example national fuel taxes 
(Chapter 5), regional emissions trading (Chapter 6) may still contribute to curbing 
the growth of aviation emissions. Whilst not a focus of this thesis, voluntary 
initiatives from the industry (e.g. via IATA) coupled with pressing from NGOs may 
also be necessary. The argument that the traditional top-down UNFCCC system 
cannot be the whole answer is a subject to which I will return. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I argue that although the conventional top-down UNFCCC 
system cannot be the whole answer to the aviation emissions problem, it is part of 
the solution. Aviation emissions are best addressed through a sectoral approach in 
the UNFCCC system. I suggest an application of the CBDR principle which would 
allow the international target for aviation to be shared in an international agreement. 
First of all, I identify two barriers to progress in the existing international 
climate change law regime. One is the vagueness of the “ultimate objective” as set 
out in Article 2 of the UNFCCC. This is because that the “ultimate objective” to 
stabilize all greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere cannot help to explain 
how many and from where greenhouse gases emissions need to be cut. The arguable 
legal status of an “ultimate objective” of stabilization leads to difficulties in agreeing 
a specific long-term mitigation target in the subsequent negotiations. The other 
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barrier is the inadequate emissions reductions targets. I argue that the mitigation 
commitments given by Annex I countries are too weak to curb the growth of global 
emissions. The absence of quantitative mitigation commitment from non-Annex I 
countries, especially the strong economies of the non-Annex I countries, is a mistake. 
This is because the unlimited emissions that non-Annex I countries may produce 
would weaken the overall reduction efforts made by the developed countries. What 
is more, the current mitigation targets are shaped in the division between the Annex 
I and non-Annex I countries according to the CBDR principle. I argue that simplistic 
and uncertain understandings of burden sharing are a barrier to reaching agreement. 
In the case of aviation emissions, I argue that aviation emissions are best 
addressed through a sectoral approach in the UNFCCC system for three reasons: the 
UNFCCC must work on aviation emissions after the failure of ICAO which will be 
discussed in Chapter 4; aviation is not being effectively addressed within the general 
targets in the conventional inter-state approaches; and airlines want to avoid the risk 
of a “patchwork quilt”244 of policies which may hit airlines twice through a global 
treaty and then through a national/regional climate policy. Under the sectoral 
approach, a sectoral mitigation target on aviation emissions is agreed at the 
international level. As discussed in section 5.2, the allocation of this target should 
address the multi-level nature of air transport and the changing contributions and 
capacities of developing countries. 
I prefer an international allocation of mitigation responsibilities through a 
burden sharing arrangement. However, it is difficult to achieve a comprehensive 
multi-level burden sharing system on aviation emissions. An alternative form of 
allocation through a global emission trading scheme will be explored in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4. ICAO’s Failure in Regulating Aircraft Engine Emissions 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Established by the Chicago Convention 1944,1 the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO), has contributed considerably to the extraordinary 
development of civil aviation for more than sixty years. Article 2.2 of the Kyoto 
Protocol stipulates that “[t]he Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or 
reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases …. from aviation …. working through 
the International Civil Aviation Organization ….”2  However, the organisation has 
failed to deliver efficient regulation. This chapter examines the extent to which 
ICAO is empowered by the contracting states3 to combat the new challenge of 
climate change and it seeks to reposition ICAO’s role in the future. 
The first step toward such an examination is to inquire why aviation emissions 
have been delegated to ICAO, given the absence of any explicit responsibility for 
environmental matters in the Chicago Convention. To answer this question, this 
chapter begins by exploring the features of ICAO from three perspectives: the 
universal participation in the organisation, its technical expertise and its experience 
in adopting international standards and recommended practices (SARPs) on aircraft 
engine emissions before Kyoto. 
I argue that whilst there are apparently good reasons for asking ICAO to be the 
delegated authority, they are not unproblematic. In the second part of this chapter, I 
analyse the limitations of ICAO’s potential for reducing aviation emissions from 
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the Chicago Convention. In this thesis, the Contracting States of the Chicago Convention are the same 
as member States of the ICAO. 
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three points of view. First, as I have argued in Chapter 2, there is no available 
technical measure which can guarantee a particular emissions reduction target will 
be achieved for aviation. Given that the issue of reducing aviation emissions is in 
part about reducing flying, ICAO’s advantage in technical knowledge is not enough 
to achieve emissions reduction. Second, the emissions related standards which are 
addressed as SARPs in Annex 16 Volume II of the Chicago Convention4 are not 
efficient in combating the climate change issues associated with aviation. This is 
because some of these standards are in place to address the facilitation of orderly 
traffic growth, with no concern for the climate change issue. Some other standards 
focus only on aircraft engine certification, but not on aircraft certification, which 
limits its effectiveness in controlling aircraft emissions. 
Beyond these limitations to ICAO’s advantages, this chapter argues that the 
organisation’s failure has deeper roots in ICAO’s aims and its rule-making function. 
First, ICAO’s mandate is to ensure the safe, efficient and orderly evolution of 
international civil aviation.5 Climate change is not ICAO’s major concern. However, 
the organisation provides aircraft emission standards and it set climate protection as 
one of its strategic objectives for the period 2005-10.6 Thus, it is necessary to 
examine the relationship between climate protection and ICAO’s aims. Second, 
ICAO’s rule-making function necessarily influences the extent to which it can 
amend or make new standards to control aviation emissions efficiently. The ICAO 
made rules are not legally binding and an environmental or climate change 
perspective is inadequately represented in the decision making process. Thus, the 
legal status of the rules made by ICAO and ICAO’s rule-making procedure are 
examined in order to explain why ICAO is not the most appropriate body to develop 
a more efficient emissions standard on aircraft. 
Understanding the nature of ICAO’s past failures, I argue in this chapter that 
                                                        
4 International Standards and Recommended Practices: Environmental Protection; Annex 16 to the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, Volume II: Aircraft Engine Emissions, 2nd ed. July 1993, 
(Annex 16 Volume II). 
5 Chicago Convention, (n. 1), art. 44. 
6 ICAO, ‘Strategic Objectives of ICAO For 2005-2010’ Consolidated Vision and Mission Statement, 
(2004) <http://www.icao.int/icao/en/strategic_objectives_2005_2010_en.pdf> accessed 27 August 2010. 
The strategic objectives of ICAO have not been updated at the time of writing. 
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the organisation in the future is not suited to being the sole regulator of aviation 
emissions. The final part of this chapter contributes to the repositioning of ICAO’s 
role in the future. I argue that ICAO should continue to play a key role on the 
technical front, especially that it should be a focal point regarding the balancing of 
potential trade-off effects with reducing emissions in ensuring a safe, efficient and 
environmentally friendly development of the industry. In the light of its experience 
of collecting and processing emissions related data and its long-term service to the 
industry, ICAO may also have an important role regarding performance monitoring, 
reporting methods and auditing processes. Relying on the literature on 
environmental audit, I suggest that ICAO should establish a climate change audit 
programme to audit its member states’ aviation emissions reduction actions. As an 
environmental regulatory tool, this audit programme may also help to fit ICAO into 
a multi-party, multi-level and multi-instrumental regulatory architecture to solve the 
issue of aviation’s climate impact which will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
2. Why did Kyoto Protocol Require ICAO to Work on Aviation Emissions? 
 
At the end of the last century, the parties to UNFCCC had “protracted 
discussions” on aviation GHGs during the elaboration of the Kyoto Protocol, 
ultimately failing to allocate GHGs from international air transport to individual 
countries.7 In 1997, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol requested that ICAO address 
aviation GHGs.8 Thereafter, international aviation emissions were not subject to the 
national emissions targets agreed in the Kyoto Protocol, but the parties to the 
Protocol turned to ICAO as the body possessing authority in the aviation sector. 
However, over the past thirteen years, ICAO has failed to deliver any efficient 
                                                        
7 Sebastian Oberthür, ‘The Climate Change Regime: Interactions of the Climate Change Regime with 
ICAO, IMO, and the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement’ in Sebastian Oberthür & Thomas Gehring (ed.), 
Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict among 
International and EU Policies, (the MIT press, Cambridge, 2006), pp. 53-78. 
8 ICAO, ‘Kyoto Protocol Emphasizes ICAO’s Role in Addressing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
International Aviation’, News Release PIO 25/97, (12 December 1997) online available at 
<http://www.icao.int/icao/en/env/nrs.htm> last accessed 10.03. 09. 
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regulation of emissions stabilisation or reductions.9 The following sections will 
examine why ICAO was granted such authority. 
 
2.1. The Universal Participation in ICAO 
 
The first reason which explains why ICAO was selected as the delegated 
regulator in the aviation sector is the universal participation in ICAO. The very 
complex climate impacts associated with international air transport and the 
difficulties of allocating emissions to a particular state, discussed in Chapter 2, 
require worldwide participation and cooperation in curbing aviation emissions. 
Aviation emission is also a very complex issue that cannot be treated alongside other 
sectors in the international climate change law regime. In this context, a universally 
participating inter-governmental organisation specific to the aviation sector – the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation – might be well suited to deal with the 
complex aviation emissions issue. 
The first step toward explaining why ICAO is suitable to regulate aviation 
emissions would be to inquire into the nature of ICAO. Although ICAO was 
established by the Chicago Convention, there is no explicit description of the 
Organisation in the Convention, except for a short naming of the organisation in 
Article 43 and a description of its aims and objectives in Article 44 (which will be 
examined later in this chapter). 
Under Article 43 of the Chicago Convention, ICAO was established and it 
came into being: 
 
“Article 43 
Name and composition 
An organization to be named the International Civil Aviation 
Organization is formed by the Convention. It is made up of an Assembly, 
                                                        
9 EFTE, No Flight Plan: How the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Has Blocked 
Progress on Climate Change for a Decade (EFTE, Belgium 2007); “International aviation body comes 
to global agreement on emissions” (October 2010) 429 ENDS Report 29.  
Most recently, ICAO announced to improve fuel efficiency by 2% annually to 2050, cap greenhouse 
gas emissions from international aviation from 2020 and set a global efficiency standard for aircraft 
engines in 2013. However, the 2% ICAO target “represents little above what is already happening”. 
And the target to cap aviation emissions from 2020 is “merely a non-binding, aspirational goal.” See 
“ICAO’s aviation emissions reduction plan heads for Cancun” (November 2010) online available at 
<http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/11/23/349973/icaos-aviation-emissions-reduction-plan-hea
ds-for-cancun.html> last accessed 01.03.10. 
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a Council, and such other bodies as may be necessary.”10 
 
ICAO could be treated as an international intergovernmental organisation 
(IGO) because it has all the main features of an IGO: “a) it is set up by an 
international treaty; b) its members are sovereign States, and c) the organization 
possesses clearly defined aims of international nature.”11 More importantly, ICAO 
is a central institution for global governance in international civil aviation,12 
described at the end of every ICAO News Release, as: 
 
“A specialized agency of the United Nations, ICAO was created in 
1944 to promote the safe and orderly development of international civil 
aviation throughout the world. It sets standards and regulations necessary 
for aviation safety, security, efficiency and regularity, as well as for 
aviation environmental protection. The Organization serves as the forum 
for cooperation in all fields of civil aviation among its 190 Contracting 
States.”13 
 
This statement not only summarizes the responsibilities of the organisation 
arising from the Chicago Convention, but also identifies the role of ICAO, as part of 
the United Nations family, in the global governance of international civil aviation. 
What is more, the leading role of ICAO as “the central institution for global 
governance in international civil aviation”14 is reflected in the Preamble of the 
Chicago Convention, through descriptions in broad terms of the principles of and 
the rationale for international cooperation between contracting states.15 In addition, 
in Article 82 of the Convention, all contracting states which accept the Chicago 
Convention are treated as abrogating any obligations and understandings between 
themselves that are inconsistent with its terms: 
 
“Article 82 Abrogation of inconsistent arrangements 
The contracting States accept this Convention as abrogating all 
obligations and understandings between them which are inconsistent with 
its terms, and undertake not to enter into any such obligations and 
understandings. A contracting State which, before becoming a member of 
                                                        
10 Chicago Convention, (n. 1), art. 43. 
11 Michael Milde, International Air Law and ICAO (Eleven International Publishing, the Netherlands 
2008), p. 122. 
12 Silvério Espínola, ‘Global Civil Aviation Governance’ (2002) 27 Ann. of Air & Sp. L. 313. 
13 See ICAO News Release on ICAO website at < http://www.icao.int/icao/en/nr/> last accessed 
20.05.10. 
14 Silvério Espínola, (n. 12), p. 317. 
15 Chicago Convention, (n. 1), Preamble. 
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the Organization has undertaken any obligations toward a non-contracting 
State or a national of a contracting State or of a non-contracting State 
inconsistent with the terms of this Convention, shall take immediate steps 
to procure its release from the obligations. If an airline of any contracting 
State has entered into any such inconsistent obligations, the State of which 
it is a national shall use its best efforts to secure their termination 
forthwith and shall in any event cause them to be terminated as soon as 
such action can lawfully be taken after the coming into force of this 
Convention.”16 
 
Although the above evidence reflects the leading role of ICAO in global 
governance in civil aviation, there is no explicit description of the organisation in 
the Chicago Convention. This is mainly because that the notion of an international 
organization to handle international civil aviation was established during the 
Chicago Conference of 1944 before the establishment of the United Nations, of 
which ICAO later became a specialized agency.17 Thus, “the intention of the parties 
which led to establishing the meaning and purpose of ICAO” was to establish “an 
international technical organization – a permanent civil aviation agency.” 18 
Abeyratne has identified that ICAO was founded as an international organisation 
which must have “universality”, 19  namely the wide participation of countries 
around the world. This is a distinguishing feature of ICAO, because “a 
non-participating State might not do as [much] harm to other States in its actions in 
the food and agriculture or monetary areas [in the examples of the International 
Monetary Fund or the Food and Agriculture Organization], as much as it would in 
the field of air navigation and transport.”20 This argument could be supported by 
practical illustrations offered by Schenkman. “[I]f a non-member of ICAO were to 
operate an international air service that did not adhere to established ICAO rules of 
the air, the safety of operations of air services for all member States would be 
jeopardized.” 21  If “a non-member State closing its air space to other nations,” the 
action by a non participating state might effectively preclude the economic progress 
                                                        
16 Chicago Convention, ibid, art. 82. 
17 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, ‘The Legal Effect of ICAO Decisions and Empowerment of ICAO by 
Contracting States’ (2007) 32 Ann. of Air & Sp. L. 517. 
18 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, ibid., p. 518. See Proceedings of the International Civil Aviation Conference, 
Chicago, Illinois, 1 November – 7 December 1944, Department of State Publication 2820 (Washington, 
1948), vol. II pp. 1317 – 1319. 
19 Ibid., p. 519. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Captain Jacob Schenkman, International Civil Aviation Organization (Librairie E. Droz, Geneve 
1955), p. 125. Cited from Ruwantissa Abeyratne, ibid. 
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of the air transport industry.22 Nevertheless, the universal acceptance of ICAO by 
its member states is a sine qua non, and this principle has been growing in tandem 
with the exponential growth of air transport and the vast technical advances made in 
air navigation.23 
Universal participation in climate change mitigation is crucial, especially in 
the international aviation sector. Universal participation in ICAO provides a 
preliminary explanation of why ICAO was selected as the “delegated authority” in 
this sector. 
 
2.2. ICAO’s Technical Expertise 
 
A second reason for the turn to ICAO to regulate aviation emissions is the 
organisation’s technical expertise. However, curbing aviation emissions is not only a 
technical problem, but also a political and economical one, a subject to which I will 
return in section 3 of this chapter. The focus of this section is that aviation emission 
is a highly technical area that requires technical expertise. 
The need for technical expertise arises for two reasons. First, the role of 
expertise is to “[set] out the uncertainties, assumptions, and the probable 
consequences of action or inaction” in order to refine problem definition and to 
identify the range of response options.24 Scientific or technical experts are generally 
believed to be able to contribute significantly to a deeper understanding of global 
environmental change. 25  Scientific/technical bodies have been established 
“concomitantly with the international management bodies” and “as more or less 
                                                        
22 Ibid. 
23 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, (n. 17) He argued universal acceptance of the ICAO by its member states 
was considered a sine qua non by the founding fathers of the Organisation. 
24 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle & Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2009), p. 99; Lee Kimball, Treaty Implementation: Scientific and Technical 
Advice Enters a New Stage (ASIL, Washington 1996), p. 7; see also, William Edeson, ‘The Role of 
Technical Bodies’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben (eds.), Developments of International Law in 
Treaty Making, (Springer, Berline; Heidelberg; New York 2005), p. 63. 
25 Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards, ‘Introduction: The Globalization of Climate Science and 
Climate Politics’ in Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards (eds.), Changing the Atmosphere: Expert 
Knowledge and Environmental Governance, (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England 
2001), p. 12; Steven Yearley, ‘The Environmental Challenge to Science Studies’ in Sheila Jasanoff et al. 
(eds.), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, (Sage; Thousan Oaks, CA 1995), pp. 457-479; 
Steven Rayner & Elizabeth Malone, ‘Why Study Human Choice and Climate Change?’ in Steven 
Rayner & Elizabeth Malone (eds.), Human Choice and Climate Change (Battelee Press, Columbus, 
OH 1998). 
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integral parts of the decision-making system” in all of the international 
environmental regimes.26 It has been argued that “[t]he ability to call on expert 
knowledge has become a key component of strategies for legitimating public 
policies and securing trust in public institutions.”27 So, expert advice and expertise 
have become enmeshed in the making of environmental policies, including climate 
change policies. In the case of aviation emissions, technical expertise is needed in 
terms of assessing the present and future effects of air transport activity, given that 
the improvement of environmental regulations is “one of constant reassessment in 
the light of increased knowledge” of the potential environment impact.28  
Second, aircraft engine emissions cannot be considered separately from other 
concerns, including aviation safety, efficient air navigation and aircraft noise. For 
current technology engines, lower CO2 emissions result in higher NOx emissions 
and aviation noise.29 A lighter weight aircraft could emit less GHGs but it may 
create associated challenges for aviation safety.30 Initiatives in one area may “have 
knock-on effects in others”, and may “require the reconsideration of existing 
regulations under other regimes.” 31  The proper institution should be able to 
understand and balance these different and often competing issues,32 in particular in 
the light of regulations in other areas. The fact that different aviation issues overlap 
suggests that a unified body comprising all the relevant technical expertise would be 
the optimum solution in tackling the complexities of aircraft design. 
Decision-making on curbing aviation emissions needs technical expertise that may 
                                                        
26 Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey, The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental 
Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p. 190. 
27 Clark A. Miller & Paul N. Edwards, (n. 25), p. 14. 
28 The environmental quality standards can never be fixed, but are continually upgraded in accordance 
with the development of technology and against the background of economic conditions. Colin T. Reid, 
‘Regulation in a Changing World: Review and Revision of Environmental Permits’ (2008) 67/1 
Cambridge Law Journal 126, 128; The emission reductions we need to achieve in order to stop 
catastrophic climate change have changed over the last ten years. Emission limits must be set in 
accordance with the available technical measures, however, the achievements of such available 
techniques may not match to the perceived required environmental quality standards. In this case, 
reducing flying is necessary when technical measures do not work. See René Kemp, Environment 
Policy and Technical Change (Edward Elgar, UK 1997). 
29 See United States General Accounting Office, ‘Aviation and the environment: airport operations and 
future growth present environmental challenges’ report to the Ranking Democratic Member, 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives (DIANE Publishing, 
Washington D.C. 2000). 
30 A Joselzon, ‘Fuel Conservation: A manufacturer’s Perspective’ Presentation on ICAO Colloquium 
on Aviation Emissions with Exhibition (2007) 
<http://www.icao.int/envclq/CLQ07/Presentations/joselzon.pdf> accessed 10 April 2009. 
31 Colin T. Reid (n. 28), p. 129-130. 
32 Heather L. Miller, “Civil Aircraft Emissions and International Treaty Law” (1998) 63 J. Air Law & 
Com.
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cover all related trade-off problems and provide information for political judgement. 
Because of its technical expertise, ICAO is prima facie an appropriate 
regulator in the area of climate change associated with aviation. ICAO is a UN 
special technical agency which is responsible for the setting of international 
standards, particularly in the fields of aviation safety and security. Since the 1940s, 
the organisation, through its Assembly 33  and Council 34 , has taken numerous 
resolutions and issued statements of policy guidance on aviation activities. Many 
important decisions were formulated as Annexes to the Chicago Convention.35 The 
standards on environmental protection will be discussed in the next section. 
The technical expertise of ICAO can well be examined in considering how the 
Annexes to the Chicago Convention were adopted. To study and recommend to the 
Council the adoption and modification of the Annexes to the Convention has been 
the primary duty of the Air Navigation Commission (ANC) of ICAO. Articles 56 
and 57 of the Convention address the appointment of ANC and its duties. This 
Commission is currently composed of nineteen members appointed by the Council 
from among persons nominated by the contracting states. The primary duty of ANC 
is to study and recommend to the Council the adoption and modification of the 
Annexes to the Convention. Over the years many leading experts nominated by 
states have contributed to the work of the committee and to the formulation of the 
principles embodied in the Standards, Recommended Practices and Procedures 
approved by the Council. What is worth notice is that the members of ANC do not 
represent the state or states that have nominated them, but should act in their expert 
capacity. 36 They are expected to have suitable qualifications and experience in the 
science and practice of aeronautics. This enables ICAO to be an independent agency 
to make political judgements on the basis of expertise. 
In addition, ICAO has an appreciable understanding of the whole aviation 
industry’s needs and it has sound knowledge of the interactions between different 
                                                        
33 The ICAO Assembly, comprised of the Organisation’s 190 Contracting States, meets once every 
three years. Article 49 of the Chicago Convention sets the powers and duties of the Assembly. 
34 The Council is a permanent body reponsible to the Assembly. It is composed of 36 Contracting 
States. Article 54 and 55 of the Chicago Convention set the mandatory and permissive functions of the 
Council. 
35 The list of the Annexes is available online 
<http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/aviation/international/icao/annexes/index.aspx > accessed at 22 June 
2008. 
36 Michael Milde, (n. 11), p. 150; see also article 56 and 57 of the Chicago Convention which deal with 
the appointment of the Air Navigation Commission and its duties, the Chicago Convention, (n. 1). 
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departments of this industry.37 Therefore, from a technical perspective, ICAO is 
considered as the proper regulator of aviation GHGs. 
 
2.3. ICAO’s SARPs on Aircraft Engines 
 
The last reason which may explain why ICAO was selected to regulate the 
climate change issue in the aviation sector may be that the organisation has some 
experience of setting environmental standards.  
ICAO has expressed its concern about environmental protection in the form of 
international standards and recommended practices (SARPs), namely, Annex 16 of 
the Chicago Convention. Volume II of this Annex deals with aircraft engine 
emissions. Through an engine/engine emissions certification scheme, Annex 16 
Volume II contains SARPs for the control of smoke and gaseous emissions from 
aircraft engaged in international civil aviation.38 It also contains SARPs that require 
the certification of aircraft engines for the purpose of preventing international fuel 
venting, a practice which involves the intentional discharge into the atmosphere of 
liquid fuel from the fuel nozzle manifolds of aircraft during the process of engine 
shut-down following normal flight or ground operations.39 These standards relating 
to smoke and gaseous emissions certification are applicable to different classes of 
aircraft engines where such engines are fitted to aircraft engaged in international 
civil aviation.40 Thus, ICAO provides a forum whereby the standardization of 
aircraft engines/engine emissions has been introduced.41  
 Furthermore, ICAO standards “are highly authoritative in practice.”42 So far, 
there is no single SARP which has been disapproved by a majority of ICAO 
contracting states, although not all of the member states comply with all the 
                                                        
37 See the ICAO website for a brief structure of the organisation <www.icao.int>. 
38 John Crayston, ‘Civil Aviation and the Environment’ (1993) 16:1-2 UNEP Industry and 
Environment 51, 53; Leonie Dobbie, ‘ICAO Certification Standards for Aircraft Engine Emissions’ 
(1996) 21/2 Air & Space L. 62, 66; Heather Miller (n. 32), p. 713. 
39 Annex 16 Volume II (n. 4) part II; Heather L. Miller, (n. 32). 
40 Annex 16 Volume II, ibid. Foreword at v. 
41 The ICAO website says: “The ICAO provides a forum whereby requirements and procedures in 
need of standardization may be introduced, studied and resolved.” ICAO websit at <www.icao.int>. 
42 Frederick L. Kirgis Jr.., ‘Specialized Law-Making Processes’ in Oscar Schachter and Christopher C. 
Joyner (eds.) United Nations Legal Order (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995) vol.1, pp. 
109, 126. 
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standards in the 18 Annexes to the Chicago Convention.43 Milde comments that the 
Chicago Convention, like “any other legal instrument, provides only a general legal 
framework” so as to achieve “true life only in the practical implementation of its 
provisions.”44 “Active involvement of all contracting States, Panels, Regional and 
Divisional Meetings, deliberations in the Air Navigation Commission and final 
adoption of the standards by the Council”45 support the rule-making function of the 
ICAO Council through the setting and implementing of SARPs. A more detailed 
analysis of this function of the ICAO Council and on the legal status of the Annexes 
to the Convention will be given below in section 4.2.  
In addition, the ICAO standards on environmental protection, like any other 
ICAO standards, are based on scientific expertise (as was discussed in the last 
section), rather than purely made by diplomats.46 Essentially, these standards seek 
to create a comprehensive “code of international air transport” 47  in order to 
“provide for uniform aviation practices around the world.”48 They are “easily 
amended” and are “less threatening to States, who are likely to acquiesce [in] their 
adoption if indeed, State acquiescence is required”49 due to their non-binding nature 
which will be discussed later in section 4.2.1. Therefore, through adopting and 
amending SARPs, ICAO provided a certain level of predictability to its members by 
promulgating norms for the aircraft engine emissions of its contracting states before 
the Kyoto Protocol. Annex 16 Volume II consists of prima facie valuable references 
to regulating aircraft emissions. As such, it was very sensible that the Kyoto 
Protocol required ICAO to work on the international aviation emissions issue. 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
ICAO has been treated as the delegated authority in combating climate change 
associated with aviation, according to the Kyoto Protocol, which required Annex I 
                                                        
43 Ruwantissa Abeyratne (n. 17). 
44 Michael Milde, ‘The Chicago Convention – After Forty Years’ (1989) 9 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 203, 208. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Dieter Kerwer, ‘Rules That Many Use: Standards and Global Regulation’ (2005) 18/4 Governance 
615. 
47 José E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2005), p. 254. 
48 Simon Brinsmead, ‘Rulemaking in ICAO, the ILO and the IMF: The Rise of Standards’ (July 25, 
2007), p. 4, online available at SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1002758> last accessed 17.05.10. 
49 Ibid., p. 2. 
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countries (i.e. the industrialized countries) to pursue emissions limitations through 
this organisation. The above sections provided three reasons for ICAO’s role: the 
organisation’s universal participation, its advantage in technical expertise and its 
experience of setting aircraft engine emissions related standards. There is no doubt 
that ICAO has advantages over other organisations which enable it to play a key role 
in regulating aviation emissions. However, there has been a notable lack of progress 
towards emissions stabilisation or reductions in the aviation sector. In more than a 
decade since Kyoto, ICAO has failed to deliver any binding policy to meet the 
limitation or reduction of emissions from international aviation that the Kyoto 
Protocol was seeking to achieve. The following sections will question the 
advantages expected from ICAO and will criticize its inherent limitations in order to 
identify what accounts for ICAO’s failure. 
 
3. ICAO’s Advantages are not unproblematic 
 
Whilst there are apparently good reasons for selecting ICAO as the delegated 
regulator on international aviation emissions, even those reasons are not 
unproblematic. The following two sections will examine the limitations of ICAO’s 
technical competence and the shortcomings of Annex 16 Volume II. These 
discussions lead to the conclusion that the advantages of ICAO alone are not likely 
to provide any efficient regulation of aviation emissions. 
 
3.1. Moving beyond Technical Competence 
 
A proper regulator of aviation emissions must consider issues beyond technical 
innovations. Decision-making on curbing aviation emissions is apparently based on 
technical choices. However, such choices have political value based elements to 
them, as in the trade-offs with the benefits of aviation in policymaking discussed in 
Chapter 2 section 3.2. What is more, there is no absolute technical measure on the 
climate change issue at the current stage and in the near future, while the emergency 
of the climate changes hazard requires immediate reduction actions. This means that 
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demand constraint must be considered. In this context, the question needs to be 
raised as to whether ICAO would still be well suited to regulating aviation 
emissions beyond merely technical concerns. 
Of course, technological progress might have a significant influence on the 
development of more fuel-efficient aircraft and air traffic procedures. Indeed, new 
aircraft are 70% more fuel efficient than those of 40 years ago and have improved 
20% in the last decade.50 Airlines are aiming for a further 25% fuel efficiency 
improvement by 2020;51 however, these are expected to be largely offset by the 
increase in the volume of activity in the sector.52 The argument that “efficiency 
without sufficiency is inadequate” has been made by the efficiency sceptics.53 They 
have recognised that “conservation and action on consumption must also be part of 
an approach to the use of the earth’s resources.”54 It certainly is good to increase 
fuel efficiency in air transport, but the industry may reach a stage when fuel 
efficiency is no longer enough.55 So, the ethics of efficiency deserves further 
consideration along with the increasing demand of air transport. In this context, 
ICAO’s technical competence discussed above would not “have a catalytic effect on 
the reduction of the damaging effects of civil aviation upon the environment”56 
unless the total number of aircraft and engines engaged in international air 
navigation are regulated as well.  
To constrain the total number of aircraft means reducing air transport activities 
worldwide. This is a difficult mission which is much more about political and 
economic concerns, as has been mentioned in Chapter 2. One of the political 
concerns might be that reducing flying conflicts with longstanding policy of 
developing the aviation industry worldwide. For example, ICAO was in fact 
                                                        
50 IATA, ‘Debunking Some Persistent Myths about Air Transport and the Environment’ online 
available at 
<http://www.iata.org/NR/rdonlyres/11804248-06A7-44A2-A160-62F1953D9E44/0/BedunkingsomePe
rsistentMythsaboutAirTransportandtheEnvironment.pdf> last accessed 20.03.09. 
51 IATA website at <http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/environment/climate_change.htm>. 
52 Lucas M Z Mendes & Georgina Santos, ‘Using Economic Instruments to address Emissions from 
Air Transport in the European Union’ (2008) 40 Environment and Planning A 189. 
53 Barry Barton, ‘The Law of Energy Efficiency’ in Donald N. Zillman, Catherine Redgwell, Yinka O. 
Omorogbe & Lila K. Barrera-Hernández (eds.), Beyond the Carbon Economy: Energy Law in 
Transition, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p. 68. 
54 Ibid. see also H Herring, ‘Energy Eficiency: A Critical View’ (2006) 31 Energy 10, p. 15. 
55 Andrew Rudin has argued that “our environment does not respond to miles per gallon; it responds to 
gallons.” P. Roberts, The End of Oil: The Decline of the Petroleum Economy and the Rise of a New 
Energy Order (Bloomsbury, London 2004), p. 233. 
56 Mendes de Leon, ‘Aviation and the Environment: Changing Perceptions’ (1997) 22/3 Air & Space L. 
131. 
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established to foster the planning and development of international air transport.57  
Whilst this target was established at the end of World War II, when aviation was in 
its infancy, even the fostering of the growth of aviation is a policy that has never 
been changed, so that airport extensions are being undertaken worldwide. 
Economically, reducing flying may have a negative impact on international trade. 
Air cargo serves as “an indispensable” means of logistics for the manufacturing of 
modern merchandise, so that in the U.S. and Japan about 30% of internationally 
traded merchandise is transported by air.58 Policies aimed to reduce flying must 
include air cargo transportation, the reduction of which would challenge those parts 
of international trade which require fast and secure transportation. Of course, 
reducing flying would partly change people’s lives, so as to stop them taking 
holidays abroad or turning to internet conferencing more often. It would also reduce 
the job opportunities provided by airlines, airports, air manufacturers and other 
related employers. All of these concerns go beyond technology and ICAO’s 
technical competence would not be able to contribute to them. 
Given the strong projected growth of aviation industry, technological 
improvements (including energy efficiency in using renewable energy, advancing 
aircraft technology and managing operational practices etc., as discussed in Chapter 
2 section 3.3) would not effectively offset the effects of aviation emissions.59 
Reducing flying is necessary, but it is an issue that is primarily about political and 
economic concerns. In these circumstances, ICAO’s technical competence cannot 
ensure that it is able to perform as a proper regulator working on aviation emissions. 
 
3.2. The Effectiveness of Annex 16 Volume II 
 
ICAO’s experience in setting environmental standards on aircraft engine 
emissions was considered as another advantage of the organisation. These standards, 
such as Annex 16 Volume II of the Chicago Convention, are organized into three 
parts. Part I contains the definitions and symbols used in the Annex and the 
                                                        
57 Chicago Convention (n. 1), art.44. 
58 Katsuhiro Yamaguchi, ‘International trade and air cargo: Analysis of US export and air transport 
policy’ (2008) 44/4 Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review 653, 653. 
59 Jacqueline Etil Serrao, ‘Global versus Unilateral Measures to Protect the World’s Environment: 
implications for the Air Transport Industry’ (2002) 27 Ann. of Air& Sp. L. 551. 
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meanings ascribed to them. Part II contains standards relating to vented fuel and Part 
III contains standards relating to smoke and gaseous emissions certification, 
applicable to different classes of aircraft engines where such engines are fitted to 
aircraft which are engaged in international civil aviation.60 The effectiveness of 
these standards in combating the climate change issues associated with aviation can 
be doubted for two reasons.  
First, Part II of Annex 16 Volume II is clearly in place to address the 
facilitation of orderly traffic growth, with no concern for the climate change issue. 
This is not odd in the context of setting SARPs. Article 37 of the Convention vests 
ICAO with the authority to adopt and amend SARPs in dealing with: 
“a) Communications systems and air navigation aids, including 
ground marking; 
b) Characteristics of airports and landing areas; 
c) Rules of the air and air traffic control practices; 
d) Licensing of operating and mechanical personnel; 
e) Airworthiness of aircraft; 
f) Registration and identification of aircraft; 
g) Collection and exchange of meteorological information; 
h) Log books; 
i) Aeronautical maps and charts; 
j) Customs and immigration procedures; 
k) Aircraft in distress and investigation of accidents;  
and such other matters concerned with the safety, regularity, and 
efficiency of air navigation as may from time to time appear 
appropriate.”61  
 
This is an umbrella article, which is intended to cater for the adoption of 
SARPs to meet the growing needs of civil aviation. It is, however, limited to matters 
concerning the safety, regularity and efficiency of air navigation. Although Annex 
16 is named “Environmental Protection”, preventing international fuel venting or 
international pollution through aircraft certification is actually a regulatory activity 
carried out within the more narrowly conceived remit of safety. There is an absence 
of any specific power or duty to address environmental protection, and 
environmental protection is squeezed into a broader interpretation of the safety of air 
navigation. As such, ICAO’s standards on aircraft engine emissions are problematic 
in combating climate change issue. 
Second, Part III of Annex 16 Volume II focuses on aircraft engine certification, 
                                                        
60 Annex 16 Volume II (n. 4). Foreword at v. 
61 Chicago Convention, (n. 1), art. 37, emphasis added. 
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but not on aircraft certification, which limits its effectiveness in controlling aircraft 
emissions. It is worth noticing that the engine is only part of the whole aircraft 
design. It is significant in terms of fuel efficiency but it is not sufficient to determine 
how clean the aircraft is in terms of controlling emissions. For example, the weight 
of an aircraft also matters for its emissions level. We may recall that whereas the 
standards relating to vented fuel require the certification of aircraft, the standards 
relating to smoke and gaseous emissions require the certification of aircraft 
engines.62 Then, the certification of the aircraft as a whole rather than only its 
engine would appear to make more sense from an environmental perspective, but 
this would raise considerable difficulties as to the choice of the parameters on the 
basis of which the certification could be issued.63 Also a very wide variety of 
engine-airframe permutations would have to be certified, taking into account 
operational factors of all kinds. In view of these difficulties, the present system of 
certifying aircraft engines in relation to emissions seems reasonable. However, given 
the absence of concerns with other parts of the aircraft design (such as the aircraft’s 
weight),64 the aircraft engine certification scheme in Annex 16 Volume II cannot 
totally control aviation emissions. In October 2010, ICAO announced that it will 
develop a CO2 standard for aircraft with a target date of 2013.65 However, it is 
unclear of what would be the parameters on the basis of which the certification 
would be issued.  
Therefore, from investigating the contents of Annex 16 Volume II, it is clear 
that ICAO’s existing certification systems on aircraft engine emissions and aircraft 
engines would not effectively reduce aviation emissions. 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
 
The advantages of ICAO which were identified earlier cannot ensure that the 
organisation can deliver efficient regulations on aviation emissions. Its technical 
                                                        
62 Annex 16 Volume II, (n. 4), part III chapter 1§ 1.1. 
63 Leonie Dobbie, (n. 38), p. 68. It would be possible, in this regard, to carry out emissions certification 
of aircraft on the basis of features such as productivity, payload, mass or range of the aircraft. 
64 Alain Joselzon, ‘Fuel Conservation: A manufacturer’s Perspective’ Presentation on ICAO 
Colloquium on Aviation Emissions with Exhibition (2007) 
<http://www.icao.int/envclq/CLQ07/Presentations/joselzon.pdf> last accessed 10 April 2009. 
65 ICAO, Assembly resolution on international aviation and climate change (A37-19), para. 1.5. 
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competence is not sufficient to handle the climate change topic, which is a 
combination of issues arising from technical, economic and political perspectives at 
least. The organisation’s experience in setting environmentally related standards 
may not be helpful either, because Annex 16 Volume II addresses the facilitation of 
orderly traffic growth rather than aviation’s environmental impacts and has limited 
capacity to address aircraft, and so the limited certification issue of aircraft which 
cannot cover all the elements linked to producing emissions. Therefore, from a 
preliminary analysis, whether ICAO should be the delegated regulator on the 
aviation emissions issue is questionable. 
 
4. Inherent Limitations of ICAO 
 
Nevertheless, in 1997, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol agreed that GHGs 
from international civil aviation should be limited or reduced by working through 
ICAO. Since Kyoto, ICAO has failed to deliver an efficient international regulatory 
regime on emissions stabilisation or reductions.66 This cannot simply be explained 
by the above shortcomings of ICAO’s technical competence or its existing SARPs 
on aircraft engine emissions. The reasons should be sought deeper, arising from the 
organisation’s inherent limitations and from ICAO’s aims and its rule-making 
function. 
 
4.1. ICAO’s Aims 
 
ICAO is not a body with an environmental focus, but it has been pushed into 
the climate change regime by the failure to reach an agreement on aircraft emissions 
under the Kyoto Protocol. This raises doubts as to whether ICAO’s aims, listed in 
Article 44 of the Chicago Convention, limit the organisation’s actions on climate 
                                                        
66 EFTE, (n. 9); Chris Lyle, ‘Aviation after Copenhagen: ICAO must now develop a bold strategic 
vision’ (2010) online available at  
<http://www.centreforaviation.com/news/2010/02/10/aviation-after-copenhagen-icao-must-now-develo
p-a-bold-strategic-vision/page1 > last accessed 15.05.10; Andrew Macintosh, ‘Oversoming the Barriers 
to International Aviation Greenhouse Gas Emissions Abatement’ (2008) 33/6 Air & Sp. L. 403; Allen 
Pei-Jan Tsai & Annie Petsonk, ‘Tracking the Skies: An Airline-based System for Limiting Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions From International Civl Aviation’ (1999-2000) 6 Envtl. Law. 763. 
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change. If so, an important step would be to revise the Chicago Convention and set 
the addressing of climate change as a new objective. 
Examining the Chicago Convention, it appears that climate change is not a 
major concern for ICAO, as environmental protection does not exist as an explicit 
objective in the text of the Convention.67 This is widely believed to be the “key 
hurdle in developing and implementing effective measures to address aviation 
emissions”68 in the Chicago Convention and ICAO. However, ICAO states that one 
of the organisation’s strategic objectives for the period 2005-10 is “Environmental 
Protection—Minimize the adverse effect of global civil aviation on the 
environment.”69 It aims to “develop, adopt and promote new or amended measures 
to…. limit or reduce the impact of aviation greenhouse gas emissions on the global 
climate.”70 Thus, one may question whether combating climate change has been 
accepted as a new aim of ICAO. Clarifying the relationship between climate change 
and ICAO’s aims, must begin with an examination on ICAO’s aims as envisaged 
under the Chicago Convention.  
 The avowed aims and purposes of ICAO are set out in Article 44 of the 
Chicago Convention: 
“Article 44 
Objectives 
The aims and objectives of the Organization are to develop the 
principles and techniques of international air navigation and foster the 
planning and development of international air transport so as to  
(a) Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation 
throughout the world;  
(b) Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful 
purposes;  
(c) Encourage the development of airways, airports, and air 
navigation facilities for international civil aviation;  
(d) Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, 
efficient and economical air transport;  
(e) Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition;  
(f) Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully respected and 
that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international 
airlines;  
(g) Avoid discrimination between contracting States;  
(h) Promote safety of flight in international air navigation; 
(i) Promote the development of all aspects of international civil 
                                                        
67 Chicago Convention (n. 1) art. 44. 
68 Andrew Macintosh, (n. 66), p. 411. 
69 ICAO, ‘Strategic Objectives of ICAO For 2005-2010’, (n. 6). 
70 Ibid. 
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aeronautics.”71  
 
These aims and objectives are also reflected in the Preamble of the Convention 
that “sets out the reasons for which the Parties concluded the Convention and that 
should serve as a tool for the interpretation of the Convention”:72 
 
“WHEREAS the future development of international civil aviation 
can greatly help to create and preserve friendship and understanding 
among the nations and peoples of the world, yet its abuse can become a 
threat to the general security; and 
WHEREAS it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote the 
cooperation between nations and peoples upon which the peace of the 
world depends; 
THEREFORE, the undersigned governments having agreed on 
certain principles and arrangements in order that international civil 
aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner and that 
international air transport services may be established on the basis of 
equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically; 
Have accordingly concluded this Convention to that end.”73 
 
Accordingly, ICAO has a universally accepted role in the coordination and 
standardisation of international air transport in fields including air navigation, safety 
and operating procedures. The language in Article 44 and the Preamble is 
self-explanatory and it addresses in great detail the objectives of ICAO. It is 
obviously the case that the prominent objectives of ICAO are “safety”, “regularity”, 
“efficiency”, “economy” and “equality of opportunity.”74 The concepts of general 
safety and security were related to international peace rather than to any concern for 
environmental damage.75 These aims and objectives on which the Organisation was 
based in 1944 are fully valid at present. As such, ICAO which carries the 
responsibility for implementing these aims and objectives of the Convention has 
achieved remarkable records over more than 60 years. But the structured aims of 
ICAO are seemingly “weighed against the needs of the climate system.”76 
In that case, the revision of the Convention may be suggested as a suitable 
remedy. New aims emphasizing concern for those issues that could not be identified 
in 1944 should be added in any renewal of the Convention. Indeed, the Convention 
                                                        
71 Chicago Convention (n. 1) art. 44. 
72 Michael Milde, (n. 11), p. 123. 
73 Chicago Convention, (n. 1), preamble. 
74 Michael Milde, (n. 11), p. 123. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Andrew Macintosh, (n. 66), p. 411. 
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set its aims in 1944 in the context of a world war; a time when nobody was aware of 
the dangers of climate change or could possibly envisage the growth of civil 
aviation. Over the years, both the world and civil aviation have profoundly changed. 
Michael Mild has clearly addressed the fact that “any future renewal of the 
Convention would likely add the aims and principles [which] emphasized concern 
for…. the protection of the environment – issues that could not be identified in 
1944.”77 
If ICAO needs a clearly addressed aim of climate change concern, the Chicago 
Convention could be revised and amended in line with the changed situation. 
However, this is likely to be a time-consuming process, which may ultimately not 
succeed, and conflicts with the urgency of climate change regulation. It is likely that 
the amendment process would be time-consuming. Gilbert Guillaume, the former 
representative of France on the ICAO Legal Committee, examined the Chicago 
Convention’s future in early 2008, and he advised a revision of the Chicago 
Convention from a strictly legal point of view.78 Although Guillaume was not 
concerned with aviation emissions, he took examples from many important issues 
including aviation safety and security in Article 3 bis, the aircraft leasing issue in 
Article 83 bis, and other articles of the Convention.79 He asserted the importance of 
revising these articles, but warned about the difficulties of gathering the political 
will of the contracting states, as any revision requires a high number of ratifications 
(not less than two-thirds of the total number of counteracting states according to 
Article 94(a) of the Chicago Convention) and prior consultation with key 
countries.80 The need for the majority political will of 190 contracting states may 
remind us of the difficulties in achieving an international climate change regime led 
by the UN system, as I discussed in the last chapter. Therefore, it is predicable that 
the Chicago Convention’s responses to the climate change issue will not be quick 
enough, particularly in view of the urgency posed by the climate change challenge. 
While the final verdict is still pending, ICAO has responded to the request of 
Kyoto by adopting climate protection as part of the strategy objectives for the period 
2005-2010. Although this is not an alternative to the revision of the Chicago 
Convention’s aims, it may still work to guide the organisation in its attempts to 
                                                        
77 Michael Milde, (n. 11), p. 123. 
78 Gilbert Guillaume, ‘ICAO at the Beginning of the 21st Century’ (2008) 33 Air & Sp. L. 313. 
79 It includes art. 3 bis, art. 83 bis, art. 94, art. 69, art. 86, art. 87 and 84. ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
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combat climate change. However, I will argue that the driving forces for adopting 
this strategy objective are not pointing towards climate protection from the 
following two perspectives. 
First, the ICAO’s mandates have not been modified by its strategic objective. 
The legal nature of this strategic objective is not expressly provided for in the 
Chicago Convention or ICAO’s documents. This might suggest that ICAO takes 
climate concerns as secondary or subsidiary goals, with the management of air 
navigation and traffic its primary aim; or the passage of this strategic objective 
demands a broader interpretations of “safety” to include environmental concerns. 
However, the first possibility would seem to be in tension with ICAO’s insistence 
that, in developing, coordinating and implementing its air navigation plans, it acts so 
as to facilitate increased air traffic, and that this is indeed another of its strategic 
aims.81 This strategic aim would seem to conflict with the fact that a likely solution 
to climate change in the aviation sector will be a reduction in (or stabilisation of) 
aircraft travel, rather than an increase. Indeed, with the currently available 
technology, aviation emissions are not likely to be reduced within a regime of 
unlimited increasing flying.82 Thus, ICAO’s aims concerning the management of air 
navigation and traffic limits the organisation’s ability to tackle climate change and 
this may go some way to explain the organisation’s inactivity. Therefore, the 
primary function of ICAO’s strategic objectives, and that of its legal framework, has 
been exposed as being to facilitate orderly traffic growth.83 The second possibility 
is that the strategic objective reflects a broader interpretation of “safety” of air 
navigation, including climate change concern. It may be a very practical way to 
prioritise the climate change problem. However, it is not enough to ensure that the 
organisation makes good decisions to curb the aviation emissions, especially when 
reducing emissions have trade-offs to the narrow meaning of “safety” of air traffic. 
How to weight climate protection remains a question that requires political 
judgement. The organisation’s concern with environmental issues is not a 
stand-alone commitment to abating climate change. 
Second, the driving force for adopting this strategic objective is not climate 
                                                        
81 ICAO, (n. 69). 
82 So far, there is no technical solution could provide an absolute clean aircraft. Therefore, the 
emissions reduced by introducing cleaner aircraft would not compensate the increased emissions from 
the increased total amount of air transportation. See more discussions in Chapter 2. 
83 ICAO, (n. 69). 
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protection. ICAO’s concern on climate change may be driven by two reasons: 
regulatory competition, (that is the competition between regulators for jurisdiction 
and the consequent variance in standards), and the threat of unilateral action by the 
contracting states influenced ICAO’s attitude.84 The climate change regime has 
retained the general authority to regulate aviation GHGs in order to achieve 
effective climate protection. Under Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol, developed 
countries were asked to pursue limitations or reductions of aviation GHGs, 
“working through” ICAO. This expression is somewhat ambiguous. There is no 
evidence that the Protocol excluded aviation GHGs from the climate change regime, 
nor that it would not authorise or permit another organisation to take over ICAO’s 
work. The ICAO Assembly, which was desirous to avoid such implicit threats of 
regulatory competition, therefore called upon its Council not to leave the initiative 
on aviation matters related to the environment “to other organisations”.85 This 
attitude of ICAO is very sensible if we look back to my previous discussions on the 
universality of the organisation. Meanwhile, ICAO’s attitude on seeking uniform 
aviation practices around the world rests on its aim of facilitating safe and efficient 
air traffic, and because international air transportation is characterised by a 
transnational organised and operated industry, it prefers internationally uniform 
regulation over a disparate regulatory environment with widely varying national 
standards.86 The preference for uniform regulation has already led to a strong push 
towards ICAO to establish many other international standards on air navigation.87  
From the above discussions, it is clear that climate change is not among 
ICAO’s aims as set out in Article 44 of the Chicago Convention. Considering 
regulatory competition and the universality characteristic of international air 
transportation, ICAO set climate protection as part of the strategic objectives for the 
period 2005-2010. However, this is not a revision of Article 44 and ICAO’s driving 
forces are not pointing towards climate change. The absence of a specific aim of 
environmental protection, including a particular concern with climate impacts, is 
one of the inherent limitations of ICAO that account for its failure to provide an 
                                                        
84 Sebastian Oberthür, (n. 7). 
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86 Sebastian Oberthür, (n. 7). 
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efficient regulatory framework to reduce aircraft emissions. 
 
4.2. ICAO’s Rule-making Function 
 
One more inherent limitation of ICAO that accounts for its failure to regulate 
aviation emissions is the nature of its rule-making function through setting 
international SARPs on air transport operations. Earlier in this chapter, ICAO’s 
experience of setting environmentally related SARPs, as in Annex 16 Volume II, 
was considered to be one of its advantages that might make it suitable to be the 
delegated authority required by the Kyoto Protocol. The effectiveness of this Annex 
has been criticized above. I am not going to repeat the discussion of the problems of 
this Annex, but I will look at the value of the organisation’s rule-making function, 
including the legal status of the SARPs and the procedure for making them. These 
problems which will be explored below will help to explain why ICAO should not 
continue to be the sole delegated authority in the climate change context, even if 
new standards focusing on climate change can be agreed. 
 
4.2.1. The Concept of SARPs and their Legal Status 
 
Given that SARPs are the cornerstone of ICAO rule-making,88 the first step 
toward an exploration of this organisation’s rule-making function is to identify the 
legal force of SARPs. Sceptics question the effectiveness of ICAO’s standards, in 
particular as to whether they are legally binding on the contracting states, mainly 
because SARPs, adopted under the Annexes to the Chicago Convention, do not form 
an integral part of, or possess the same legal force as, the Convention.89 This raises 
                                                        
88 The ICAO produces some other regulatory documents that have a lower legal status than the SARPs, 
for example, the Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) and Regional Supplementary 
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89 Chicago Convention (n. 1), art 54 (1); Bin Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (Oceana, 
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serious doubts about the legal status and effect of ICAO SARPs. Some scholars call 
them “legislative”,90 others “quasi-legislative” competences,91 and others “a kind 
of delegation of legislative power”,92 and still others, administrative rule-making 
functions.93 Before discussing the legal status of SARPs, one previous issue that 
ought to be addressed is the concept of SARPs. 
There are two types of SARPs: “Standards” and “Recommended Practices.” 
The Chicago Convention does not define either of these terms. Definitions were 
subsequently provided by the ICAO Assembly in 1947.94 A “Standard” is: 
“Any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, 
material, performance, personnel, or procedure, the uniform application of 
which is recognized as necessary for the safety or regularity of 
international air navigation and to which Member States will conform in 
accordance with the Convention; in the event of impossibility of 
compliance, notification to the Council is compulsory under article 38 of 
the Convention.”95  
 
A “Recommended Practice” on the other hand is:  
 
“Any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, 
material, performance, personnel, or procedure the uniform application of 
which is recognized as desirable in the interest of safety, regularity, or 
efficiency of international air navigation, and to which Member States will 
endeavour to conform in accordance with the Convention.”96 
 
Accordingly, both the Standards and the Recommended Practices concern 
specifications “for physical characteristics, configuration, material, performance, 
personnel or procedure.” 97  However, they are set apart due to a substantial 
                                                        
90 Edward Yemin, Legislative Powers in the United Nations and Specialized Agencies (Leyden, 
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of Procedure for Their Conduct, Doc 8143 – AN/873/3, 1983, Part II, 2.1.1, 2.1.2, online available at 
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difference: Standards are “necessary” to ensure “the safety or regularity of 
international air navigation”, whereas Recommended Practices are merely 
“desirable” to attain such objectives; and member states “will conform” with 
Standards, whereas they will merely “endeavour to conform” with Recommended 
Practices. The difference was believed to rest on the necessary character of the 
Standards to attain safety and regularity.98  This difference reflects the ICAO 
directives, which determine the textual formulations of SARPs: “A Standard shall 
contain a statement specifying an obligation by means of ‘shall’……A 
Recommended Practice shall contain the same elements as a Standard but ‘should’ 
shall be used instead of ‘shall’ in the main statement specifying the 
recommendation.”99 Although the word “shall” has a mandatory flavour and has 
been used by ICAO, it by no means says that SARPs are legally binding. This is 
because of the ambiguity of the formulation of the relevant articles of the Chicago 
Convention. 
According to Articles 37 and 38 of the Chicago Convention, contracting states 
are required to comply with SARPs to the “highest practicable degree of 
uniformity,” and to give immediate notification to ICAO of “the differences between 
its own practice and that established by the international standards,” should the state 
find it “impracticable to comply in all respects” with the promulgated SARPs.100 
Together, these articles deprive SARPs of binding force, at least before the end of 
the notification period.101 In other words, SARPs prescribed in an Annex are not 
binding legislative enactments as traditionally understood. 102  The only duty 
incumbent upon a contracting state deciding to depart from an international SARP is 
to give immediate notification to ICAO of the differences between its own 
regulations or practices and those established by the international standard in 
question.103 
The reason for the “unconditional legal obligation of States to notify”104 any 
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differences from the international standards rests on the universality of air 
transportation, which has been discussed above. Milde has provided a clear 
explanation of this reason as follows: 
“there must be full international transparency as to which standards 
are not implemented in a particular location and other States must receive 
a timely warning in the interest of safety of air navigation that certain 
standards, procedures, facilities or services are not available. Without such 
notification the flight safety of foreign aircraft could be seriously 
jeopardized if they were to rely on the existence of particular facilities and 
services which in fact were unavailable.”105 
 
The number of notifications has been “relatively low” since the adoption of the 
first Annexes in ICAO in 1947. 106  These notifications have been issued in 
supplements to the relevant Annexes.107 One may argue that the standards are still 
legally significant, given that “States are strongly motivated to implement 
international standards by the sheer realities of international life: non-compliance 
with SARPs could eliminate the State concerned from any meaningful participation 
in international air navigation and air transport.”108 However, this relationship 
between full compliance and participation works where the standards are minimum 
standards for safety reasons, but it may not work in the case of climate change 
concerns. 
Therefore, the above examination of the concept and legal status of ICAO 
SARPs presents some intrinsic difficulties that may lead one to have doubts about 
the legal force of ICAO made rules. What we know for certain are that SARPs are 
not legally binding in theory and they are not equal to the legal force of the 
Convention itself. In practice, there might be powerful motivations for all states 
wishing to participate in international air transport to comply with such standards, 
although they are not necessarily as strong in relation to climate change as to narrow 
safety concerns. The non-binding legal status of SARPs partly explains why the 
ICAO’s rule-making function cannot provide an efficient regulation of aviation 
emissions. 
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4.2.2. The Procedure of Creating SARPs 
 
In exploring the limitations of ICAO rule-making in providing an efficient 
regulation of aviation emissions, the procedure of creating SARPs has to be 
addressed. The Council of ICAO is empowered by the Chicago Convention to adopt 
international SARPs.109  The Chicago Convention itself is silent about most of the 
issues on the decision-making procedures of the Council. Gathering together many 
relevant documents,110 scholars have produced some consistent summaries of the 
procedure of the enacting of SARPs.111 The most relevant stages, which may bring 
about new climate protection related standards, are the preliminary stage of 
formulating proposals for the creating of new SARPs, the development and review 
stage of proceeding with the proposals, and the adoption stage of approving the 
proposed SARPs. Examining these three stages, I argue that an environmental or 
climate change perspective is inadequately represented in the decision making 
process. 
First of all, environmental interests are likely to be inadequately represented in 
the preliminary stage of formulating proposals for the creation of new SARPs. 
Proposals for the creation of new SARPs or amendments can be put forward by 
ICAO bodies, the contracting states or international organisations.112  And so, 
environmentally related standards can be proposed by a broad range of entities, 
including ICAO’s Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP), bodies 
of ICAO which do not focus on environmental issues, ICAO member states, or 
aviation focused international organisations. 113  There is no opportunity for 
environmental bodies, such as environmental NGOs, to contribute. 
Second, the environmental interest is inadequately represented in the 
                                                        
109 Chicago Convention, (n. 1), art. 56. 
110 The relevant documents means ICAO published documents and unpublished working papers, 
including ICAO, ANC Procedureal Guidebook, C-DEC 176/12; ICAO, Directives for Panels of the 
ANC, Doc 7984/4, (1980). 
111 Tiago Fidalgo de Freitas, (n. 93); Edward Yemin, (n. 90), pp. 125-136. 
112 ICAO, ‘Making an ICAO Standard’, online available at < http://www.icao.int/icao/en/anb/mais/ > 
last accessed 21.05.10. 
113 “Internatioanl orgarnisations” in this context and the rest of this section mean outsiders of ICAO. 
For a list of such organizations see ICAO website at < http://www.icao.int/icao/en/m_links.html>. 
There is no environmental NGOs on the list. 
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development and review stage of proceeding with the proposals. Once the proposal 
has been presented the whole development and review procedure relating to it will 
be carried out by the Air Navigation Commission (ANC), in order to establish a 
final text of the proposed SARPs for consideration by the Council.114 The ANC is 
one of ICAO’s subordinate bodies. It is composed of 19 members who “shall have 
suitable qualifications and experience in the science and practice of aeronautics.”115 
All of the ANC’s functions are within the field of air navigation. In its activities, it is 
assisted by the ANC Panels, which are ad hoc temporary bodies composed of 
qualified experts.116 Panel members participate in their personal, expert capacity.117 
As such, the review procedure under the ANC apparently is technically based. 
However, during the whole development procedure of the proposal, all the 
contracting states and other entities outside of ICAO (like international 
organisations) would be invited to comment on the proposals.118 Given that the 
comments are to be analysed in the ANC, taken into account and also attached to or 
in some way incorporated into its final document, even non-contracting states or 
entities which provided feedback are taken seriously as consultative or advisory 
bodies.119 It is not clear however that these entities (member states of ICAO and 
interested international organisations) 120  effectively represent environmental 
interests, so that the critical issues of climate protection can be identified and 
adequately pondered. The development and review procedure of the proposed 
SARPs may not delivery a final text with sufficient environmental perspective for 
consideration by the Council.  
Finally, the adoption stage of approving the proposed SARPs may not 
adequately involve environmental interests. The Council adopts proposed SARPs by 
means of a Resolution of Adoption. As ICAO’s executive committee, the Council is 
composed of experts from 36 states who are elected by the Assembly (the sovereign 
body of ICAO)121 and of a President elected by the Council.122 To approve a 
                                                        
114 Chicago Convention, (n. 1), art. 57; see also Ibid.; Tiago Fidalgo de Freitas, (n. 93). 
115 Chicago Convention, (n. 1), art. 56. 
116 ICAO, ANC Procudureal Guidebook, C-DEC 176/12, 2.1.2; ICAO, Directives for Panels of the 
ANC, Doc 7984/4, (1980), 1, 2.1, 3.1 and 3.2. 
117 ICAO, Directive for Panels of the ANC, ibid., 4.1, 4.2,4.4, 4.5,5.2,5.3.1,5.3.3,6.2,7.2. 
118 ICAO, ANC Procudureal Guidebook, (n. 116), 4.2.13, 4.2.24. 
119 Tiago Fidalgo de Freitas, (n. 93). 
120 Listed by ICAO on its website, (n. 113). 
121 The Assembly is the sovereign body of ICAO. In the Assembly, every contracting State is 
represented according to an equality basis. (n. 33). 
122 Chicago Convention, (n. 1), art. 50. 
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proposal requires the vote of two-thirds of the Council at a meeting called for that 
purpose.123 So, the majority interests of those 36 member states who are represented 
determine whether and how the climate protection related standards may be 
produced. The 36 Council members, under the Chicago Convention, should 
represent: “1) the States of chief importance in air transport; 2) the States not 
otherwise included which make the largest contribution to the provision of facilities 
for international civil air navigation; and 3) the States not otherwise included whose 
designation will insure that all the major geographic areas of the world are 
represented on the Council.”124 These three conditions imply that the Council 
members must contribute to the air transport industry in some way, but do not 
necessarily represent environmental interest. As the Council members are 
representing states, the same fractures may appear as my discussions in the previous 
chapter on the failure of the international climate change negotiations led by the 
UNFCCC. Even worse, the limited number of Council member means that many 
countries are under represented, especially those with less air transport activity but 
presumably plenty of interest in climate change. In addition, ICAO says that its 
rule-making procedure takes on average 2 years from the preliminary review by 
ANC to the applicability date. 125  This is very likely to be a costly and 
time-consuming process, which may ultimately not succeed.126 So, the Council’s 
decision may not lead to effective standards being approved to combat climate 
change. 
This examination of the three stages of ICAO rule-making procedure suggests 
that environmental interests are inadequately represented in the decision making 
progress. Making a new standard on aircraft engine emissions may be easier, faster 
and more flexible than an amendment of the Convention or negotiations on a new 
treaty.127 It is possible that an environmentally related standard could be proposed 
by a contracting state, ICAO CAEP, or an international organisation. However, the 
proposed standard may not be effective to combat climate change or an effective 
standard may not be approved by the ICAO Council’s leading rule-making institute, 
                                                        
123 Chicago Convention, (n. 1), art. 90 (a). 
124 Ibid., art. 50 (b). 
125 ICAO, ‘Making an ICAO Standard’, (n. 112). 
126 Chris Lyle, (n. 66) 
127 See discussions in previous section 1.3 of this chapter. 
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because an environmental or climate change perspective is inadequately represented 
in the creation of SARPs. This is the second limitation of ICAO rule-making 
function which has been identified after the criticisms of its non-binding legal status. 
The primary way to improve the environmental sensibility of ICAO measures 
would be change the objectives of the organisation. However, improved 
representation of environmental NGOs, e.g. as observers at the ANC, would also be 
beneficial. The involvement of environmental NGOs as one of the multiple parties 
in regulating aviation emissions will receive closer attention in Chapter 7. 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
The above sections examined the inherent limitations of ICAO in terms of 
providing effective regulations to curb aviation emissions from two perspectives: the 
aim of ICAO and its rule-making function. ICAO’s mandate is to ensure the safe, 
efficient and orderly evolution of international civil aviation. Climate change is not 
among ICAO’s aims as set out in Article 44 of the Chicago Convention. Although 
the organisation has paid some attention to climate protection, the absence of a 
specific aim of environmental protection is one of the inherent limitations of ICAO 
that account for its failure to provide an effective regulatory framework to reduce 
aviation emissions. ICAO’s second inherent limitation is the legal status and 
decision making procedure of SARPs. I argue that ICAO made rules are not legally 
binding on its member states and cannot provide an effective regulation of aviation 
emissions in terms of combating climate change. Moreover, an environmental or 
climate change perspective is inadequately represented in the rule-making procedure 
of ICAO. Therefore, apart from the shortcomings of the ICAO’s technical 
competence or its existing SARPs on aircraft engine emissions as discussed in 
section 2, the organisation’s inherent limitations due to its aims and rule-making 
functions mean that it would be inappropriate for it to be the sole regulator of 
aviation emissions. While it should not be the sole regulator, however, ICAO no 
doubt has a key role to play in regulating aviation emissions, notably on the 
technical front. The following sections will explore what role ICAO should play. 
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5. The Role of ICAO in the Future 
 
This part aims to identify the possible role of ICAO in the regulatory 
architecture on aviation emissions. I will argue for a multi-party, multi-level and 
multi-instrument regulatory architecture in regulating aviation emissions in Chapter 
7. ICAO is one of the multiple parties that should work together with other entities, 
public and private, in combating climate change in the aviation sector. The above 
discussion has suggested some reasons for the organisation’s failure to provide an 
efficient regulatory framework to reduce aviation emissions and has argued that 
ICAO should not be the sole regulator. ICAO should not continue to be the 
“delegated authority” to control aviation emissions. The following sections will 
confirm that ICAO no doubt has to continue to play a key role on the technical front, 
and it may also have an important role regarding appropriate metrics, performance 
monitoring, reporting methods and auditing processes. 
 
5.1. A Key Role on the Technical Front 
 
There is no doubt that ICAO has to continue to play a key role in regulating 
aviation emissions, notably on the technical front. This is not only based on its 
emissions related SARPs but should be concerned with the fact that ICAO has been 
serving the industry for more than sixty years. Reducing aviation emissions is a 
comprehensive issue which has potential trade-offs between different aviation 
related hazards, e.g. concerning the complex relations between CO2 emissions and 
non-CO2 emissions from aircraft engines, between reducing emissions and 
controlling aircraft noise, and between reducing emissions and ensuring aviation 
safety. Such complex relations have not been part of the UNFCCC’s concerns, but 
they rest in the different departments of ICAO. The organisation could provide a 
global forum which would enable emissions reduction related actions to be 
transparent in order to avoid risks in the trade-offs for the following reasons. 
First of all, aviation’s non-CO2 impacts, compared to its basic CO2 effects, are 
estimated to be “well above the average multiplier or ratio for all man-made 
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emissions.”128 In designing a regulatory architecture, ICAO is a suitable place to 
deal with or at least advise on the transitional arrangements from the initial inclusion 
of CO2 only to the coverage of the climate impacts of all aviation emissions, once 
there is a clear scientific basis for this. ICAO has conducted work relating to 
aviation non-CO2 emissions for a long time. For example, ICAO has been proactive 
in proposing standards for Nitrogen Oxides (NOx).129 The organisation’s NOx 
emission standards have effect on its member states’ domestic standards. The latest 
ICAO NOx Emissions Standards became applicable in November 2005 and the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) applied ICAO’s NOx emission standards 
for new commercial aircraft engines in the same year.130 According to a policy 
paper from the US/EPA, the adoption of these NOx emission standards was bringing 
US aircraft standards into alignment with the international standards; which would 
satisfy both the public and the manufacturers.131 The EU has pledged to offer a 
legislative proposal to limit NOx emissions from aviation with tougher standards 
than those set by ICAO,132 which is at present under study. In addition, the launch 
of mid- and long-term technology goals for NOx emissions from jet engines in its 
seventh meeting (CAEP/7) held in 2007133 improved the whole package of ICAO’s 
NOx emission regulations. Although its NOx emissions regulation still needs more 
work to be complete,134 ICAO’s work in this area has been very successful against 
the UNFCCC’s silence on non-CO2 emissions. 
Second, ICAO has already addressed different environmental impacts caused 
by aircraft engines, especially aircraft noise and emissions issues. As mentioned 
                                                        
128 Chris Lyle, (n. 66). See also previous discussions in Chapter 1. 
129 For the impact of aircraft CO2 and NOx emissions on climate change, see R. Sausen & U. 
Schumann, ‘Estimates of the Climate Response to Aircraft CO2 and NOx Emissions Scenarios’ (2000) 
44 Climate Change 27. 
130 United States Environmental Protection Agency, ‘Regulatory Announcement: New Emission 
Standards for New Commercial Aircraft Engines’, (November 2005), online available at 
<http://www.epa.gov/oms/regs/nonroad/aviation/420f05015.htm#benefits> last accessed 6 April 2009. 
131 Ibid. 
132 See the Commission’s legislative proposal to include aviation in the EU ETS: European 
Commission, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission 
allowance trading within the Community. See also Delft Report, ‘Lower NOx at Higher Altitudes 
Policies to Reduce the Climate Impact of Aviation NOx Emissions’ (2008) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/environment/environment_en.htm> last accessed 6 April 2009. 
133 ICAO, Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection, 
Montreal, 5-16 February 2007, ICAO Doc. 9886, CAEP/7 (CAEP/7 Report); Independent Experts 
NOx Review and the Establishment of Medium and Long Term Technology Goals for NOx (Doc 
9887). 
134 Louis Tsague & Thomas Tamo Tatietsé, ‘Aircrafte cruise nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions 
prediction and environmental pollution factor’ (2007) 18/5 Energy&Environment 565. 
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above, reducing aircraft emissions has trade-off impacts on aircraft noise. ICAO is a 
suitable place to advice on such trade-off impacts, because of its long-term 
experience on aircraft noise management.135 Much of the organisation’s effort to 
reduce aircraft noise over the past 30 years has been aimed at reducing noise at 
source, which means improving aircraft engines and aircraft design.136 It provided 
noise certification standards for contracting states, which are addressed in Annex 16 
Volume I, entitled “Aircraft Noise,” of the Chicago Convention.137 In 2001, the 
ICAO Assembly endorsed the concept of a “balanced approach” to aircraft noise 
management, 138  which principle was reaffirmed in 2007. 139  Among different 
elements which may impact on aircraft noise, it analyses the various measures 
available to reduce noise through reduction at source (quieter aircraft). Under the 
aegis of ICAO, in 2006, a noise database, Noise dB, was developed in order to 
provide certification noise levels for each aircraft type guaranteed by the 
certification authorities. 140  This database is intended as a general source of 
information for the public. Thus, ICAO is well-placed to advise on potential 
trade-offs between aircraft noise and aircraft emissions impacts. 
Third, improving aircraft or engine design for emissions purposes may have 
negative impact on safety. Given that the ICAO goals all relate to one primary 
concern with the safety of air navigation, the organisation is well placed to deal with 
or advise on the development of technical methods to reduce aviation emissions 
while ensuring air navigation safety. For example, alternative energy is one of the 
technical measures which might be scientifically and commercially available in the 
future. But, using alternative energy would require the adjustment of aircraft engine 
design, which may cause safety concerns about air navigation. ICAO has been 
working on the possibility of alternative fuels as part of the solution to climate 
change and leading the way to making aviation “the first mover for sustainable 
                                                        
135 For literature on the ICAO’s aircraft noise management, see Gerald L. Baliles, ‘Aircraft Noise: 
Removing a Barrier to Aviation Growth’ (2001) 66 J. Air L. & Com. 1333; Ruwantissa Abeyratne, 
‘Legal and regulatory aspects of aircraft noise’ (2000) 25 Ann. of Air & S. L. 1; Jeffrey Goh, ‘Problems 
of transnational regulation: a case study of aircraft noise regulation in the European Community’ (1995) 
23 Transp. L. J. 277. 
136 ICAO, ‘Aircraft Noise’, ICAO website at < http://www.icao.int/icao/en/env/noise.htm> last 
accessed 22.05.10. 
137 ICAO, Annex 16 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, Volume I: Aircraft Noise, 4th ed. 
July 2005, (Annex 16 Volume I). 
138 Appendix C of Assembly Resolution A35-5. 
139 Appendix C of Assembly Resolution A36-22. 
140 DGAC, ‘General Information on the NoisedB database’, online available at 
<http://noisedb.stac.aviation-civile.gouv.fr/> last accessed 22.05.10. 
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alternative fuels.”141 In February 2009, ICAO organized a workshop studying the 
impact of alternative fuels on the sustainability of future aviation industry growth 
due to their potential to reduce aircraft engine emissions.142 Building upon the 
results of the workshop,143 the organisation held a conference on aviation and 
alternative fuels in November 2009.144 ICAO is expected “to stimulate a dynamic 
exchange of views and to establish a global roadmap to constitute an integral 
element”145 of the response to the climate change challenge. 
 Therefore, ICAO should continue to play a key role in regulating aviation 
emissions on the technical front. It should be a focal point regarding balancing 
potential trade-off effects with reducing emissions in ensuring a safe, efficient and 
environmentally friendly development of the industry. ICAO’s technology-based 
standards should be involved as one of multiple regulatory instruments in regulating 
aviation emissions. In the process of making ICAO standards, there is also a need to 
increase the participation of environmental interest, which could be represented by 
environmental NGOs. The role of ICAO’s technology-based standards and NGOs 
are a subject to which I will return in Chapter 7. 
 
5.2. Performance Monitoring, Reporting Methods and Auditing Processes 
 
In addition to its work on the technical front, ICAO may have another 
important role providing performance monitoring, reporting methods and auditing 
processes in respect of member states’ reduction actions. When designing a legal 
architecture to control aviation emissions, it is important to consider “how to 
accurately measure and account for greenhouse gas reductions”, “how to make sure 
that durable, lasting, and real reductions are taking place”, and “how to ensure that 
the system of enforcing these reductions is fair and transparent.”146 The auditing 
                                                        
141 ICAO, ‘Aircraft Noise’, (n. 136). 
142 ICAO, Aviation and Alternative Fuels, ICAO Headquarters, Montreal, Canada, 10-12 February 
2009. See ICAO website at < http://www.icao.int/waaf2009/>. 
143 A Summary of Research and Perspectives Presented at the ICAO Workshop on Aviation and 
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<http://www.icao.int/waaf2009/WAAF2009_Summary_final.pdf> accessed 29June 2009. 
144 ICAO Conference on Aviation and Alternative Fuels, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, (16-18, November 
2009), see its website at < http://www.icao.int/CAAF2009/> last accessed 22.05.10. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Stelios Pesmajoglou, ‘Measurement, Reporting, Verification and what they mean for international 
aviation’ Speech on ICAO Colloquium on Aviation and Climate Change, Montreal, Canada, 11-14 May 
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processes include monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV). In the context of 
general climate change commitments, the importance of MRV has been recognised, 
and they were included in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, in provisions relating 
to the measurement of and reporting on the parties’ actions. 147  The Cancun 
Agreements outline a system to enable the measurement, reporting and verification 
of how countries are living up to their promises to take action on emissions. 
Developed countries should submit annual greenhouse gas inventories and inventory 
reports and biennial reports on their progress in achieving emission reductions.148 
For developing countries, internationally supported mitigation actions will be 
subject to domestic and international MRV in accordance with guidelines to be 
developed, while domestically supported mitigation actions will be measured, 
reported and verified domestically in accordance with general guidelines to be 
developed under the Convention.149 
MRV mechanisms are thought to be important in international institutions for a 
number of reasons. Monitoring ascertains the state’s behaviour, reporting makes that 
behaviour transparent to the recipients of the reports, and verification contributes a 
system for quality and reliability checks of the reported data.150 MRV mechanisms 
                                                                                                                                                               
2010, Powerpoint available online at <http://www.icao.int/CLQ10/Docs/2_Pesmajoglou_MRV.pdf> 
last accessed 23.05.10. 
147 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 
(entered into force 21 March 1994), (UNFCCC), art. 12. 
The Copenhagen Accord also provided that mitigation actions by developed countries should be 
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Reporting and Verification in a Post-2012 Climate Agreement’ (April 2009) the Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change, online available at <http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/mrv-report.pdf> last 
accessed 23.05.10. 
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AWG-KP., para. 40. 
149 Ibid., para. 61, 62. 
150 Jorgen Wettestad ‘Monitoring and Verification’ in Daniel Bodansky et al., The Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008), p. 975. For an overview of 
MRV mechanism used in multilateral agreements, see generally Glenn M. Wiser, Compliance Systems 
Under Multilateral Agreements: A Survey for the Benefit of Kyoto Protocol Policy Makers (CIEL 1999), 
online available at <www.ciel.org/Publications/SurveyPaper1.pdf> last accessed 28/02/11; David G. 
Victor, Kal Raustiala, Eugene B. Skolnikoff (eds.), The Implementation and Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice (MIT Press, Cambridge 1998); 
Sandrine Maljean-Dubois & Vanessa Richard, Mechanisms for monitoring and implementation of 
international environmental protection agreements (IDDRI 2004) online available at 
<http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-debat/id_0409bis_maljeandubois&richar
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are “important in building trust between and among cooperating parties, and in 
strengthening wider societal confidence.”151 The value of the “information-giving 
function”152 of audits is recognised. In addition, in the international environmental 
law context, MRV mechanisms are thought to contribute to compliance, creating 
transparent links between a state’s actions and its international commitments, 
allowing both the state itself and the broader community receiving the report to 
reflect upon performance and to identify improvements.153 Bredenich and Bodansky 
have spelled out the significant of MRV in climate change generally. MRV “can 
provide an important means of tracking parties’ progress individually and 
collectively,” in respect of the ultimate mitigation objective. In addition, 
measurement “can facilitate parties’ actions by establishing baselines and helping to 
identify mitigation potentials.” International recognition is possible of actions 
properly reported. The verification stage “can enhance action through expert advice 
on opportunities for improvement”, with a particular role in support of developing 
countries’ actions. Finally, a good MRV system “can strengthen mutual confidence 
in countries’ actions and in the regime, thereby enabling a stronger collective 
effort.”154 
Clearly, the general MRV provisions in the international climate change 
agreements do not apply to aviation. But MRV of individual countries’ reduction 
actions is equally significant in the aviation sector. ICAO is well placed to take on 
such a role. 
In particular, ICAO is well placed because of its experience collecting and 
processing data. Greenhouse gas emission data is the backbone of any legal 
regulation. Such data would be used for different purposes and at different levels, 
including identifying key sectors and gases in regulatory planning; designing 
appropriate activities at a national level; monitoring the effectiveness of reduction 
projects. 155  ICAO has already developed an emissions quantification method 
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through its Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP). 156  This 
method is called the ICAO Carbon Emissions Calculator, which aims to develop a 
user-friendly, unbiased tool to compute carbon emissions from air travel. It is 
suitable for use with offset programmes and it applies the best publicly available 
industry data to account for various factors such as aircraft types, route specific data, 
passenger load factors and the cargo carried.157 It has been available since June 
2008. In April 2009, the UN Environmental Management Group adopted the ICAO 
Carbon Emissions Calculator as the official tool for all UN bodies to quantify their 
air travel CO2 footprint. 158  It is expected that ICAO could develop a set of 
guidelines to “enable interested parties to develop a carbon calculator methodology 
for belly freight.”159 I would suggest that ICAO’s experience in collecting and 
processing data through its carbon emissions calculator makes it well placed to carry 
out further work on measuring and accounting for greenhouse gas reductions from 
aviation. 
 What is more, ICAO may request its contracting states to report annually to 
the organisation, in an agreed format, in accordance with Article 67 of the Chicago 
Convention. This article provides that “[e]ach contracting State undertakes that its 
international airlines shall, in accordance with requirements laid-down by the 
Council, file with the Council traffic reports, cost statistics and financial statements 
showing among other things all receipts and the sources thereof.”160 The purpose of 
these reports is for the ICAO Council to produce its Annual Report, which “provides 
the world aviation community with comprehensive insight into the programmes, 
activities and achievements of the Organization in support of its mission as defined 
by the Convention on International Civil Aviation, namely, the safe and orderly 
development of international civil aviation.”161  
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In at least these two specific respects, ICAO has the experience and capacity in 
collecting and processing aviation emissions related data; however, these data are 
not at the moment gathered together in a specified programme aimed to combat 
climate change. In addition to these existing opportunities, which may support its 
monitoring of the member states’ reduction actions, I suggest that ICAO should 
build a climate change audit programme to provide for MRV of its member states’ 
reduction related actions. Such a programme would take advantages of experience 
with existing ICAO auditing programmes. 
The Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) and the Universal 
Security Audit Programme (USAP) are, at the time of writing, the only ICAO 
universal programmes to have articulated a clear philosophy with respect to aviation 
audit. The establishment of universal regulation of aircraft emissions is likely to 
result in a range of new regulatory mechanisms, including climate change audit. 
ICAO’s existing experience provides considerable insight into any such future 
auditing programme. 
USOAP, USAP and any future emissions auditing have common roots in the 
SARPs. The international standards that govern air safety and security are, like those 
that govern aircraft engine emissions, embodied in the Chicago Convention’s 
Annexes. Membership in ICAO is based on the assumption that each contracting 
state adheres to the international standards established by the Organisation. However, 
not all contracting states have fully implemented the standards, in part because, as 
discussed above, SARPs are not binding legislative enactments as that concept is 
traditionally understood.162Following widespread reports of failure to implement 
SARPs, the ICAO Assembly adopted Resolution A32-11,163 in its 32nd ordinary 
session held in 1998, to call for establishment of a Universal Safety Oversight Audit 
Program (USOAP). The ICAO Assembly directed that such programme should 
include a systematic monitoring and reporting mechanism on the implementation of 
safety-related Standards and Recommended Practices. 164  The USOAP was 
established and came into effect on January 1 1999. It comprises “regular, 
mandatory, systematic and harmonized safety audits, to be carried out by ICAO” in 
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all contracting states.165 Performed by the ICAO staff or seconded experts, the scope 
of the audits has gradually been expanded up to the Annexes concerning pilot 
licensing, operation of aircraft and airworthiness.166 The USOAP also identifies 
deficiencies and provides action plans to carry out corrective measures and direct 
assistance.167 A second round of audits started in 2005 and is to be completed by 
December 2011. The results of audits are disclosed to all states and have been 
published on the ICAO website since 2006.168 
Following the successful introduction of the USOAP in almost all contracting 
states by 2001, and prompted by the terrorist events of September 11 2001, the 
ICAO Assembly, at its 33rd ordinary session, adopted another Resolution169 on the 
consideration of a Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP). This programme 
was modelled along the lines of the USOAP to assess the implementation of SARPs 
relating to airport security arrangements and civil aviation security programmes. The 
ICAO Council was also directed to convene a High-Level Ministerial Conference on 
Aviation Security with the objective of strengthening ICAO’s role in adopting 
SARPs in this field, and in the auditing of their implementation. 170  At the 
High-Level Ministerial Conference, convened in February 2002, a global strategy 
for strengthening worldwide aviation security was adopted, a central part of which 
was an ICAO Aviation Security Plan of Action. The Plan of Action proposed 
“regular, mandatory, systematic and harmonized audits to enable the evaluation of 
aviation security in all member states.”171 The ICAO Council adopted the Aviation 
Security Plan of Action in June 2002 and the first security audit was carried out in 
November 2002.172 The second round of security audits commenced in January 
2008, and is expected to conclude in 2013. “To promote transparency and mutual 
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confidence between States,” the results of audits are disclosed to all ICAO member 
states on a restricted website.173 
The two audit programmes constitute “a significant development in 
international practice and international law.”174 ICAO’s role in improving safety and 
security has had success in the “elaboration of norms and in collecting and 
disseminating relevant information” in the audit programme.175 By 2006, only four 
states had not been audited under USOAP.176 The ICAO’s action under the USAP is 
thought to have significantly improved security.177 There is of course no guarantee 
that these programmes will continue to be adequately resourced and supported. 
Nevertheless, ICAO certainly has a role to play. 
The current universal audit programmes are confined to safety-related and 
security-related standards only. In particular, they do not cover the 
environment-related standards contained in Annex 16 Volume II. However, they 
provide a good model for the establishment of a programme for the audit of 
contracting states’ implementation of environmental standards. On the basis of this 
experience, a number of features would be necessary for an ICAO climate change 
audit programme in respect of its member states’ GHG emissions. 
As Gunningham and Prest have argued: 
“By virtue of a mandatory audit a regulated entity might be required 
to conduct an independent audit at its own cost or accede to the conduct of 
an audit by the [regulator authority]; to fully disclose the results; and to 
implement its recommendations by developing a remedial plan (or 
corporate management plan) to address the most serious problems 
identified by the audit.”178 
 
So the first requirement on the audit programme is that it should be mandatory, 
with three key implications attached to that: the regulated entity pays the cost of 
auditing; the auditing results are fully disclosed; and a remedial plan is developed if 
the audit identifies problems. These three elements determine the effectiveness of a 
mandatory audit.  
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First, imposing the cost of audit on member states, who are the regulated entity 
in the proposed audit programme, will release the financial pressure from ICAO, 
and make it easier for ICAO to manage a universal or wide-ranging auditing 
programme. 179  Secondly, public disclosure of the audit results is one of the 
determining elements of the successful operation of mandatory audits. For example, 
ICAO started to develop an ongoing process to allow for the release of relevant 
information to the public on safety oversight audits from 2006, so that the travelling 
public can make an informed decision when using air transportation. To this end, 
member states were encouraged to provide ICAO their consent to publish safety 
oversight audit information. While some states have given ICAO authority to 
disclose an executive summary and critical element graph of the auditing system, 
others have agreed to the release of the audit summary report in its entirety.180 
Public disclosure of audit results places pressures and incentives on the states. They 
will be more serious and responsible in taking appropriate actions, since such 
actions “will be subject to public scrutiny.” 181  In the environmental context, 
disclosure provides environmental groups with essential information, enabling them 
“to act as a countervailing force” and “put pressure” on, in this case, the state and 
ICAO, and even indirectly the airlines themselves.182 Thirdly, remedial plans have 
the potential to provide expert assistance and support, as discussed above. In 
addition, the mandatory audit itself is “an overlooked approach for increasing 
environmental compliance,”183 in this case compliance with the sector specific 
mitigation target discussed in Chapter 3 or with the more general obligation to 
address transport related emissions. However, the focus of the ICAO scheme is not 
compliance but the “information-giving function”184 of audits. Auditing would not 
be designed to focus on whether an individual carrier is green or not – the audited 
entities are member states of ICAO.  
As well as being mandatory, the audit programme should be systematic and 
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harmonized, including all aviation emissions related issues. The starting point must 
require each member state to provide a wide-ranging aviation emissions review. 
Such a review should be an initial comprehensive analysis of a country’s 
contribution to aviation and of its ability to commit itself to any aviation GHG 
reduction target that might be established in international climate change 
negotiations. The initial review should be broader and more comprehensive than a 
compliance audit. It should not only examine compliance with existing climate 
change laws and with domestic environmental laws, but also should examine all 
aspects of the country’s air transport operations and domestic policies that may 
impact on climate change. This would include issues such as any trade-offs involved 
in emissions reductions, including aircraft noise control, aircraft traffic management, 
aviation safety related issues and other issues related to aircraft design. After a 
comprehensive review, a climate change statement should be prepared by each 
member state and sent to ICAO. The state being audited would be visited by an 
ICAO audit team, including experts (either ICAO staff members or persons 
seconded from national administrations), to validate the information provided by the 
state and to conduct an on-site audit of the state’s overall capacity for emissions 
reduction. A climate change audit report would then be developed and compilated 
by the audit team, including any necessary corrective action plan. 
The climate change statements prepared by the member states should be more 
than a summary of the results of the audit, including an identification of all the 
problems discovered and a plan for correcting these deficiencies.185 The purpose of 
this statement would be to provide the benchmark from which subsequent climate 
change audits could measure progress and especially provide the reference for 
balancing different trade-offs. This is the main difference between ICAO’s audit 
programme proposed here and other types of environmental auditing. Generally, an 
environmental auditing report is a typical part of “postdecision monitoring” as an 
important part of environmental management.186 The data generated by monitoring 
provides a disciplined basis for the agency to test, verify and revise specific 
decisions in the light of experience, improving the knowledge base upon which the 
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agency acts in the particular case and over the longer run.187 However, under the 
proposed ICAO audit programme, the climate change statements from the 
contracting states would in addition serve ICAO’s rule-making and allow outsiders 
to put informal pressure on all parties as mentioned above, but would also, and 
importantly, aim to enable “more enlightened decisions”188 in respect of aviation 
under any future climate change negotiations improving transparency and 
accountability in the climate change negotiation process. It would provide different 
interest groups with information on the actual performance and capacity of each of 
the contracting parties. Over time, the systematic use of the proposed audit 
statement should contribute to improvements in the capacity of international 
decision makers to set reduction targets and manage regulatory mechanisms. 
Cook and Hearn have argued for the importance of “a standardized auditing 
procedure” in conducting audits, which might guide how an audit would “be in good 
faith.”189 They have advocated using “clearer rules and more predictable standards” 
to govern auditing. ICAO should take the responsibility to create such rules and 
standards. This could be in the form of a model aviation regulatory document, which 
consists of sets of aviation laws, regulations and standards that may be used by a 
member state’s civil aviation authority to review the country’s present laws and 
regulations.190 Such a model document would provide the basis for the review and 
modification of the existing civil aviation laws of a state, when ICAO comes to 
consider the modification of national regulations which will be necessary in order to 
comply with the international obligations under any future climate change deal. In 
addition, the proposed programme should investigate the level of compliance of the 
member states vis-à-vis the requirements of the aviation sectoral emissions target if 
there is one. Under the programme, ICAO should send teams of experts191 as 
mentioned above to member states to examine that nation’s aviation laws and 
regulations, as well as the methods used for certifying and supervising air carriers. 
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The teams would also review the country’s organizations which are involved in the 
control and supervision of flight operations and maintenance, as well as the 
development and use of market-based regulatory mechanisms. The audit programme 
should help member states identify the highest level of reduction of GHGs from 
aviation and enforce carrier compliance with ICAO aircraft engine standards to 
reach the sectoral reduction target.  
This outlines the nature and contents of the proposed ICAO audit programme. 
We should also note that the proposed ICAO audit programme alone cannot solve 
the aviation emissions problem. It should be linked to baskets of regulatory 
measures and fitted to a multi-scalar regulatory architecture for reducing aviation 
emissions. A multi-scalar regulatory architecture, in short, means a multi-party, 
multi-level and multi-instrument regulatory system which I will discuss in Chapter 7. 
An audit programme, according to Gunningham’s Smart Regulation theory and 
Osofsky’s argument on the need of multi-scalar climate regulation, should be treated 
not as a single regulatory tool, but as just part of an effective combination strategy.192 
This is partly because of the diagnostic nature of an environmental audit, which 
cannot by itself effectuate a cure for poor performance;193 and partly because of the 
imperfection of any single regulatory mechanism in respect of aviation emissions.194 
So, the audit programme alone cannot solve the aviation emissions problem, but it 
could contribute a valid diagnosis of the problem within the complex environmental 
regulatory jungle.195 
There are of course major challenges associated with introducing an auditing 
programme to ensure the MRV of aviation GHG. The first challenge is getting every 
contracting state to agree to audit. One official has said that:  
“…. ICAO faces the same policy issues as emerged at Copenhagen, 
exemplified by [the] current struggle to establish a useful new data 
collection on fuel consumption and on the contribution of alternative fuels, 
against the insistence of some States, which do not wish third parties 
formally to measure their progress in reducing GHG emissions.”196  
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These states would be unwilling to allow third parties to access their emissions 
related data, because those countries which were found deficient would be put in a 
disadvantageous position in any international negotiations and this would frustrate 
their cooperation.197 The success of the proposed audit programme and aviation 
emissions reduction requires a great deal of cooperation and negotiation between the 
ICAO and individual national aviation authorities. But there is real potential for 
development in this area. 
The Chicago Convention does not contain the notion “climate change audit”, 
“environmental audit” or “audit.” However, its contracting states are required to 
report annually to the organisation, in an agreed format, data on fuel consumption and 
traffic in accordance with Article 67 of the Convention, as discussed earlier.198 This 
article implies in principle an initial agreement of contracting states to audit. What is 
more, two mandatory audit programmes by ICAO on its member states have been 
successfully introduced as discussed above: the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight 
Audit Programme (USOAP) launched in 1999 and the ICAO Universal Security Audit 
Programme (USAP) launched in 2002. Although they are not environmental, they 
imply that mandatory audit is acceptable for contracting states as long as they have a 
common hazard to deal with – the main driving force to introduce USAP was the 
increased threat from world wide terrorism after 11 September 2001.199 The threat 
from climate change needs to exert a similar impetus towards the climate change audit. 
Although the question remains as to whether the less immediate threat from climate 
change can exert the same pressure to cooperation as terrorism, it is certainly the case 
that is increased pressure on individual states and internationally to be seen to be 
taking action on aviation emissions might incentivise contracting state to agree on 
introducing an environmental audit. 
In addition, experience from USOAP and USAP teaches us that any audit 
programme should respect the sovereignty of states. The audit missions could be 
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undertaken on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between ICAO 
and the state to be audited, as has happened under the safety oversight audit.200 
MOUs have proved to be a good way to ensure compliance with auditing, confirming 
that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace of its 
territory 201  and that ICAO fully respects a sovereign state’s responsibility and 
authority for emissions reduction, including its decision-making powers with respect 
to implementing corrective actions. It is sensible to believe that the use of MOUs 
would enhance member state acceptance of an environmental audit programme. 
Although in many circumstances mandatory audits are, as discussed above, preferable, 
in the current context, it is important that the sovereignty of the states be respected. 
Secondly, the provision of financial assistance to an audited member state 
without adequate resources is likely to be important. For example, ICAO established 
an “International Financial Facility for Aviation Safety” (IFFAS) in 2001, outside the 
ICAO budget, funded by voluntary contributions from states. The aim of such fund is 
to provide low-cost loans to support safety-related projects identified by USAOP for 
the benefit of states without adequate resources.202 The basic philosophy of IFFAS 
involves “identifying the most demonstrated need requiring financial support from the 
facility” in order to focus support and assistance toward the specific needs of member 
states.203 Like IFFAS, an environmental-related financial facility could be established 
as a mechanism to provide financial support both for the process of audit and for 
achieving the objectives of reducing aviation emissions through the implementation of 
the necessary measures mainly identified by the proposed environmental audit 
programme. Notwithstanding as in principle preference for, in may payment by the 
audited country, as discussed above, it is important an audited state without adequate 
resources receive financial assistance. 
The other major difficulty is that following apparent agreement to auditing 
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recalcitrant states will provide no statement, or an inaccurate or incomplete statement. 
As above, clear respect for national sovereignty will be important. There has been no 
recorded instance of a state refusing or deferring a safety oversight audit following the 
agreement of a MOU: “[e]ven the highly safety-conscious US has been audited by 
ICAO and several specific corrective actions were identified.” 204  Technical and 
financial assistance will make an important contribution to proper compliance with 
the auditing procedure, in particular in respect of quality of data and reporting. And ad 
discussed above, “it is important to establish a uniform format of reporting, with clear 
and precise requirements as to how and what to report.”205 While a group of experts 
will undertake the task of checking the reliability and accuracy of data as discussed 
above, “on-site monitoring with the consent of parties” may be an option to verify the 
reported information.206 In addition, some “moral” or “psychological” sanctions can 
be established. 207  For example, publishing the auditing procedure to all the 
contracting states or online to public will provide peer pressure or public scrutiny to 
the ones who provide no statement. The “name and shame effect”208 indeed can be 
useful and efficient in ensuring the compliance of environmental audit. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The Kyoto Protocol places the responsibility for reducing emissions from 
international flights on state Parties working through ICAO, but ICAO has failed to 
provide efficient regulation. This chapter identifies reasons for ICAO’s failure and 
repositions this organisation’s role in regulating aircraft engine emissions. 
ICAO has universal participation, technical competence in regulating aviation 
emissions and has adopted SARPs on aircraft engine emissions. However, climate 
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change is an issue which involves much more than technical concerns and the 
effectiveness of the ICAO’s technical standards on aircraft engine emissions are 
arguable in any event. In addition, a couple of inherent limitations of ICAO account 
for the organisation’s inability to respond effectively to the calls for greater 
abatement of emissions from the aviation sector. This chapter identifies these 
inherent limitations as including at least: ICAO’s mandate, which is restricted to the 
safety and the orderly development of international civil aviation; and ICAO’s 
rule-making function, in which an environmental or climate change perspective is 
inadequately represented. It is questioned, therefore, whether ICAO should be the 
sole delegated authority to work on climate change associated with aviation. 
It is certain that ICAO should not be “used as the standard excuse to postpone 
action to reduce aviation emissions.”209 Although I argue that ICAO should not 
continue to be the sole delegated authority, the organisation certainly has a key role 
to play in regulating aviation emissions. Before the Copenhagen Accord, one 
argument from inside ICAO claimed that the organisation would like to break the 
two parallel streams which the UNFCCC and ICAO have been developing on 
combating climate change and would like to work more directly in cooperation with 
the UNFCCC in the post-Kyoto deal.210 In the light of the tension between ICAO’s 
advantages on aviation issues, together with its failure to provide an efficient 
response to climate protection, a revision of the role of ICAO has been suggested in 
this chapter. I argue that ICAO should continue to play a key role on the technical 
front and in performance monitoring, reporting methods and auditing processes on 
member states’ reduction actions. Because of its technical competence and its 
long-term service to the industry, ICAO should be a focal point regarding the 
balancing of potential trade-off effects with reducing emissions in ensuring a safe, 
efficient and environmentally friendly development of the industry. Meanwhile, the 
organisation’s experience in collecting and processing emissions related data means 
that ICAO is well placed to measure, monitor and audit its member states’ reduction 
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actions. To perform such a role, I suggest that ICAO should build a climate change 
programme as a regular, mandatory, systematic and harmonized regulatory tool on 
aviation emissions. This is expected to be a regulatory tool which will help to fit 
ICAO for its role in the multi-scalar regulatory architecture on air transport 
emissions which I will be discussing in Chapter 7. The arguments in this chapter 
may provide a basis for ICAO to reposition its role on the issue of aviation 
emissions, if it is to sustain its credibility, by fitting into the more comprehensive 
architecture of the regulatory system which will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 5. Fuel Tax 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the legality of and practical barriers to taxing fuel on 
international flights and explores the role of a fuel tax in reducing aviation 
emissions. I argue that a fuel tax is an effective and a fair way to address prices in 
aviation, in order to affect demand and incentivise innovation. It cannot be a 
stand-alone solution to curbing the growth of aviation emissions, partly because of 
its uncertainty in ensuring a desired reduction in aviation emissions and because of 
practical difficulties. I argue that taxation could lawfully play an important role in 
reducing international aviation emissions and I suggest starting from introducing 
domestic national fuel taxes on short haul flights. 
This chapter starts from positive arguments on the idea of a fuel tax as a 
price-based market-based instrument (MBI) 1  in environmental law. There are 
different ways to tax aviation, e.g., having a tax on the ticket, the journey or the fuel. 
I prefer a fuel tax because it is a better way to capture the carbon (and equivalent) 
cost of flying and so will best incentivise carbon efficiency in the airline industry. It 
should be noted that whilst the focus of this thesis is on the incentilisation of 
improved energy intensity in the industry, it is likely that responding fully to 
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aviation emissions will require behaviour change, that is less flying or an avoidance 
of increased demand. Examining the purpose of pricing carbon through taxation, I 
argue that the value of a fuel tax is primarily as a way of constraining demand and 
secondarily as a way to incentivise innovation. I argue that price is an important way 
to affect demand and a tax is an effective and fair way to address the issue of price 
in the international aviation emissions case. A fuel tax could additionally provide an 
incentive for innovation and could be especially useful in respect of low cost air 
carriers. It cannot however be a stand-alone solution to curbing the growth of 
international aviation emissions, partly because such a tax cannot provide certainty 
of the desired reduction in aviation emissions. The inadequacy of any single 
regulatory tool to solve the complex aviation emissions problem is a subject to 
which I will return in Chapter 7. 
In section 3 of this chapter, I examine the legality of a fuel tax on aviation 
from three perspectives: Article 24 of the Chicago Convention;2 Article 15 of the 
Chicago Convention and related cases; and the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation’s (ICAO) policy against taxation.3 I argue that a domestic fuel tax on 
international flights is lawful under the Convention. However, ICAO’s policy 
against aviation fuel taxes results in governments reducing or eliminating taxes 
related to the sale or use of international air transport to the fullest practicable extent. 
I then explore the practical barriers to introducing a fuel tax on international aviation 
from three perspectives: “tanking” fuel under Article 24 of the Chicago Convention; 
price inelastlicity for some flights; and the airline industry’s opposition.  
Finally, I argue that the policy and practical barriers to an aviation fuel tax can 
be overcome. I suggest starting from introducing a domestic aviation fuel tax on 
short haul international flights. This suggestion is presented with the specific 
purpose of reducing the artificially increased demand by low cost airlines. It will 
also incentivise some innovation to change low cost airlines into low carbon airlines. 
In this way, whilst a fuel tax cannot be a stand-alone solution to reduce aviation 
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emissions, it might play an important role in the multi-scalar regulatory architecture 
which will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
2. Contributions from a Fuel Tax 
 
This section discusses some positive arguments on the idea of a fuel tax as a 
price-based market-based instrument (MBI) in environmental law. There are 
different ways to tax aviation, e.g., having a tax on the ticket, the journey or the fuel. 
I prefer a fuel tax because it is practically close to taxing the carbon (and equivalent) 
cost of flying and so will best incentivise carbon efficiency in the airline industry.4 I 
will examine the purposes of fuel taxes, explain the reasons supporting an aviation 
fuel tax and identify the limitations of taxing aviation fuel as well. I argue that a fuel 
tax on aviation should be introduced, although it cannot be a stand-alone solution to 
curb the growth of international aviation emissions. 
Currently, international aviation fuel is not taxed. Before discussing the legal 
and practical barriers to taxing aviation fuel, it is necessary at this stage to examine 
the purposes of fuel taxes. In general, taxing fuel has varying but compatible 
purposes, including internalizing environmental externalities,5 producing correct 
price signals which may provide an incentive for consumers to change their 
behaviour, and also providing a source of governmental revenues.6 A basic rationale 
for the use of taxes in environmental policy is provided by the existence of 
                                                        
4 For literature on environmental tax, see Christina K. Harper, ‘Climate Change and Tax Policy’ (2007) 
30 B.C.Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 411; Michael J. Zimmer, ‘Carbon Tax: Ready for Prime Time?’ 
(2007-2008) 8 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 67; Richard A. Westin, ‘Understanding Environmental 
Taxes’ (1993) 46 Tax Law. 327. 
5 From economists’ perspective, carbon tax is a Pigouvian tax. For the theory on Pigouvian tax, see 
Arthur Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare (4th ed., Macmillan and Co., Ltd., London 1932). 
6 See David G. Duff, ‘Tax Policy and Global Warming’ (2003) 51 Can. Tax. J. 2063; William Nordhaus, 
‘To Tax or Not to Tax: Alternative Approaches to Slowing Global Warming’ (2007) 1 Rev. Envtl. Econ. 
& Pol’y 26; Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, ‘The Design of a Carbon Tax’ (2009) 33 Harv. Envtl. 
L. Rev. 499; Charles D. Patterson, ‘Environmental Taxes and Subsidies: What is the Appropriate Fiscal 
Policy for Dealing with Modern Environmental Problems?’ (2000) 24 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y 
Rev. 121; Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle, Catherine Redgwell, International Law & the Environment (3rd 
ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009), Chapter 14 section 8 ‘Environmental Taxes’ pp. 796-800. 
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environmental externalities: impacts on the environment are side-effects of 
processes of production and consumption and which do not enter into the 
calculations of those responsible for the processes.7 A fuel tax provides a way to 
internalize environmental externalities, negative external costs or hidden costs are 
paid for by the polluters in a way that conforms to the “polluter pays” principle.8 
Another rationale for the use of fuel taxes is that, with a fuel tax, “fair and efficient” 
prices9 provides an incentive for consumers to use less of the taxed product and 
encourages producers to find more environmentally-friendly alternatives.10 In this 
case, provided the tax is levied on the fuel in such a way that a reduction in the use 
of fuel reduces the tax liability, then there will be an incentive for the use of fuel to 
be reduced. An airline facing a fuel tax will seek to reduce the use of fuel or change 
to alternative fuels. “Such a tax as is paid will increase the price of the relevant 
product, giving consumers the incentive to switch away from it.” 11  Another 
rationale of fuel tax is that the revenues raised can be used to improve 
environmental quality or to reduce other economic distortions, which is known as 
the “double dividend.” 12  Not surprisingly, many economists suggest that 
environmental regulations should use taxes as a tool to induce reduction in 
environmental harm.13 However, my concern is primarily the use of price-based 
MBIs to influence consumer demand for flights and incentivise innovation by 
airlines. 
                                                        
7 Paul Ekins, ‘European environmental taxes and charges: recent experience, issues and trends’ (1999) 
31 Ecological Economics 39; David G. Duff, ibid. 
8 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Economic Instruments for 
Environmental Protection (OECD, Paris 1989); OECD, Environmentally Related Taxes in OECD 
Countries: Issues and Strategies (OECD, Paris 2001). 
9 European Environmental Agency, Environmental Issues Series No. 1, Environmental Taxes: 
Implementation and Effectiveness, online available at 
<http://org.eea.eu.int:80/documents/Issuerep/EnvTaxes/default.htm> last accessed 24/10/09. 
10 European Environment Agency, Environmental Taxes: Recent Developments in Tools for Integration 
(EEA, Copenhagen 2000). It said that environmental taxes “provide ‘soft signals’ that increase 
attention, awareness and concern about the environmental issues to which they relate”), p. 9. 
11 Paul Ekins, (n. 7), p. 42. 
12 See Jonathan B. Wiener, (n. 1); Ian W.H. Parry et al., ‘When Can Carbon Abatment Policies Increase 
Welfare? The Fundamental Role of Distorted Factor Markets’, (1997) National Bureau of Econ. 
Research Working Paper 5967; A. Lans Bovenberg & Ruud A. de Mooij, ‘Environmental levies and 
Distortionary Taxation’ (1994) 94 Am. Econ. Rev. 1085; Lawrence H. Goulder, ‘Environmental 
Taxation and the ‘Double dividend’: A Reader’s Guide’ (1995) 2 Int’l Tax’n & Pub. Fin. 157. 
13 See, Arthur Cecil Pigou, (n. 5); William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Theory of 
Environmental Policy (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988). 
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The value of a fuel tax, in the case of reducing international aviation emissions, 
is primarily as a way of changing consumer behaviour and secondarily as a way to 
incentivise innovation. First of all, price is an important way to affect demand and 
tax is an efficient and fair way to address the issue of price in the aviation emissions 
case. Many economists tend to favour taxes as an efficient method of reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions.14 The existing experience from a few countries is too 
limited to provide any meaningful conclusions from a cost-benefit analysis of 
introducing carbon taxes.15 However, it has been argued that a tax could provide 
cost certainty because “the precise amount of the tax is set in advance” and thus it 
would be able to provide the needed “Benefit Certainty” (a certain environmental 
outcome) because the tax rate would be adjustable.16 Theoretically, economists have 
also argued that “a reasonable carbon tax would never impose unreasonable costs on 
the reduction of carbon emissions” and the tax should never be set at a rate that 
greatly exceed the benefits. 17  The cost certainty of tax is attractive for both 
regulators and industries. When regulators levy a tax on fossil fuels at the point 
where these fuels enter the market, the price of CO2 emissions would be clear to 
regulators, industry and the public.18 Setting a clearing price to capture the carbon 
(and equivalent) cost of the use of fossil fuels “that can be periodically evaluated for 
its effectiveness in achieving public policy and market performance” is claimed to 
be “a simpler and more economically efficient approach.”19 From the regulator’s 
perspective, the cost of a fuel tax is relatively lower than the cost of traditional 
regulation or emissions trading. This is because fuel taxes require a relatively 
                                                        
14 N. Gregory Mankiw, ‘One Answer to Global Warming: A New Tax’ (September 16, 2007) The New 
York Times, online < http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/business/16view.html> last accessed 
03/11/09; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, ‘Combating Global Climate Change: Why a 
Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming Than Cap and Trade’ (2009) 28 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 
3. 
15 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, ibid.; Daniel Pruzin, ‘Swiss Parliament OKs Carbon 
Tax but Delays Effective Date until 2009’ (December 20, 2006) Daily Tax Report (BNA), G-4; 
Christina K. Harper, (n. 4). 
16 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, ibid. 
17 Martin A. Sullivan, ‘Economic Analysis: The Carbon Tax Name Game’ (2006) 113 Tax Notes 537. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Michael J. Zimmer, (n.4). 
 156 
limited bureaucracy 20  which means it has “few technical problems for 
documentation or measurement,” 21  and it is simpler to implement. From the 
industries’ perspective, the price certainty of carbon helps the industries to predict 
energy prices and make business decisions.22 As such, with a predictable and 
adjustable tax rate, a fuel tax is an efficient way to price the carbon (and equivalent) 
emitted in international air transport. 
Fairness is also a good reason for putting tax on aviation fuel. This includes a 
fairer choice for the public between transport modes and a fairer revenue 
distribution between the poor and the rich. Both economic theory and the polluter 
pays principle suggest that aviation should pay the same rates of tax as motor fuel 
because air passengers “should make a fair contribution to the cost of running the 
health, education and police services” and polluters should pay for their hidden costs 
(environmental externalities) of flying.23 The current situation of the exemption of 
aviation from fuel tax obviously contrasts with the position of the petrol used in 
other forms of public transportation, such as cars and trains.24 The airline industry 
enjoys “high subsidies” that harm the competitive ability of alternative forms of 
transportations.25 Thus, in the whole transportation system, introducing fuel tax on 
aviation would create a fairer situation between different transport modes.26 From a 
social policy perspective, a fuel tax on aviation may help the poor a lot more than 
offering cheap flights.27 “Subsidising aviation as a means to protect the interests of 
the poor or developing countries” has been described as “a waste of public 
money.”28 The fuel tax paid by air travellers would make a contribution to the cost 
of public services such as health, education or police. It might also generate 
                                                        
20 Gary E. Marchant, ‘Freezing Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An Offset Policy for Slowing Global 
Warming’ (1992) 22 Envtl. L. 623. 
21 Michael J. Zimmer, (n.4), p. 68. 
22 Christina K. Harper, (n.4); Michael J. Zimmer, ibid. 
23 Brendon Sewill, ‘The Hidden Cost of Flying’ (Aviation Environmental Federation, 2003) Online: 
<http://www.aef.org.uk/?p=169> last accessed 23/10/09. 
24 The current situation of aviation exempt from fuel duty is argued as “anomalous.” It is also argued 
that taxation “may be the most publicly acceptable ways to increase the cost of flying.” Sally Cairns & 
Carey Newson, Predict and decide: Aviation, climate change and UK policy (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2006), p. 76. 
25 ‘Taxing Times’ (2006) Airline Business, Online 
<http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2006/03/27/205595/taxing-times.html>. 
26 T&E, ‘Cleaning the Air: The Myth and Reality of Aviation and Climate Change’ (2006), online 
available at <www.transportenvironment.org/Articles201.html>, last accessed 03/11/09. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., p.29. 
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government revenues that could be used to reduce other taxes, like labour tax.29 
Considering that “the rich fly more than the poor,” putting tax on air travel is 
believed to be “socially inclusive.”30  
Given the values of a fuel tax discussed above, taxing aviation fuel is justified 
primarily as a way to influence demand by limiting the availability of cheap oil, and 
secondarily to incentivise fuel efficiency in the airline industry. That demand 
depends on price is a very basic lesson from economics. Since there is currently no 
viable energy substitute for commercial aviation, theoretically, increased fuel prices 
would have a negative effect on demand. A UK study concludes that a 10% increase 
in air fares would generate a 5% to 15% reduction in demand.31 However, it is 
worth noting that constraining demand for air travel by the use of tax may only work 
within a limited scope of price sensitive flights, including short-haul flights 
promoted by low-cost airlines, price sensitive leisure travel and parts of air cargo. In 
these cases, short-haul flights may turn to high-speed train or cars, some leisure 
travellers may choose domestic destinations, air cargo may switch to other transport 
modes. Some long-haul intercontinental flights (i.e. flights over 5,000 nautical 
miles)32 may not be affected by an increased air fare for two reasons. One of the 
reasons is that a fuel tax is assumed to “raise the cost of flying by only a limited 
amount.”33 Although a very high fuel tax would be possible in order to substantially 
reduce aviation emissions, such emissions reduction, it is argued “can be had 
                                                        
29 Lawrence H. Goulder, ‘Environmental Taxation and the “Double Dividend”: A Reader’s Guide’ 
(2004) 2 Int’l Tax & Pub. Fin. 157; David Pearce, ‘Role of Carbon Taxes in Adjusting to Global 
Warming’ (1991) 101 Econ. J. 938; Lawrence Goulder et al., ‘Revenue-raising versus other approaches 
to environmental protection: the critical significance of preexisting tax distortions’ (1997) 28 RAND 
Journal of Economics 708, Goulder et al. discussed a revenue-recycling effect, which means using the 
revenues from the environmental regulations to reduce the distortionary taxes. Accordingly, the 
revenue from fuel taxes can be used to cut other distorting taxes, such as labour taxes and corporate 
income taxes. 
30 Brendon Sewill, (n. 23). 
31 Sally Cairns & Carey Newson, (n. 24), section 11.9, p. 96. 
32 According to UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution’s report, the most fuel-efficient 
flight distance is around 2,300 nautical miles (4,300 km or 2,700 miles). In this thesis, short haul flight 
means flights are less than 1,000 nautical miles, long distance flights are more than 5,000 nautical 
miles, the distances in between are treated as medium distances. See UK Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution, ‘The Environmental Effects of Civil Aircraft in Flight’ (November 2002) 
online available at <http://www.rcep.org.uk/reports/index.htm>. 
33 Richard S. J. Tol, ‘The Impact of a Carbon Tax on International Tourism’ (2007) Social Science 
Research Network Electronic Paper Collection, online <www.ssrn.com/abstract=979917>. 
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elsewhere for much less money.”34 Another reason is that there is no alternative 
transport mode available when people have to travel very far. Some long-haul flights 
represent a market segment where demand is not sensitive to price, as “aviation has 
limited competition from other transport modes and only some competition from 
communication substitutes.”35 Only when the tax is not low compared to the air fare, 
and the price elasticity is not small, would a fuel tax would affect demand on price 
sensitive flights. 
Another objective of a fuel tax is to incentivise innovation in the airline 
industry. Taxing aviation fuel would encourage air carriers to innovate in reducing 
energy intensity or they could have to pass on the cost to consumers. To avoid effect 
on demand, air carriers could increase fuel efficiency though introducing new 
aircraft, improving air traffic management or introducing cleaner burning fuels as 
technical measures discussed in Chapter 2.36 In this respect, a fuel tax is secondarily 
as a way to incentivise innovation. This innovation argument applies generally, but 
is especially useful for low cost air carriers (or the so-called budget airlines). For 
low cost airlines, fuel represents up to 25 percent of operating expenses.37 If air 
carriers pass on the cost to consumers, the low-cost airlines lose their price 
advantage in the market. Alternatively, an increased fuel price would encourage low 
cost carriers to innovate in reducing energy intensity and turn into “ultra fuel 
efficient carriers.”38 Low cost flying may have the potential to be reshaped into low 
carbon flying, discussed further in section 5 of this chapter. 
A fuel tax is an efficient and fair way to address the price of international 
aviation fuel, in order to affect demand and to incentivise innovation. It cannot 
however be a stand-alone solution to curb the growth of aviation emissions. This is 
mainly because a fuel tax cannot ensure the desired reduction in aviation emissions. 
                                                        
34 Ibid. 
35 Brendon Sewill, (n. 23). 
36 See also Paul Ekins, (n. 7); 
37 Anthony Perl & Judith Patterson, ‘Will Oil Depletion Determine Aviation’s Response to 
Environmental Challenges?’ (2004) 29 Ann. Of Air & Sp. L. 259. Regarding traditional airlines, 
according to EC working paper, on average fuel only constitutes 15% of the operating costs of intra-EU 
flights. CEC, ‘New sources of financing for development: a review of options’ Commission of the 
European Communities Staff Working paper, (2005) 467, 5/4/05, Brussels, p. 25. 
38 Ibid., p. 272. 
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According to “the instrumental approach”,39 tax may be only an instrument that can 
be used “to achieve environmental objectives set according to other criteria.”40 With 
a given tax rate, the tax itself cannot ensure a desired reduction in carbon emissions. 
Even if the tax rate is adjustable, rate rises will face political opposition in practice.41 
The revenue raised by a fuel tax need not necessarily be used for environmental 
purposes.42 Because of the uncertainty of environmental outcome, a fuel tax cannot 
be a stand-alone solution to curb the growth of international aviation emission. 
From the above discussion of the contributions of fuel taxes to reducing 
international aviation emissions, I argue that a fuel tax on aviation should be 
introduced primarily as a way of influencing demand in terms of reducing flying on 
price sensitive flights, and secondarily as a way to incentivise innovation in the 
airline industry. A fuel tax is one of the multiple instruments that should be involved 
in the multi-scalar regulatory architecture for international aviation emissions. This 
is a subject to which I return in Chapter 7. The next sections will examine the legal 
and practical barriers to introducing fuel taxes on international aviation. 
 
3. Legality of Taxing Aviation Fuel  
 
In this section, I argue that there is no legal barrier derived directly from the 
Chicago Convention to introducing a domestic fuel tax on international flights. I 
examine the legality of a fuel tax on aviation from three perspectives:43 Article 24 
                                                        
39 William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, (n. 13). 
40 Paul Ekins, (n. 7), p. 43. 
41 Benjamin J. Richardson, ‘The UK’s climate change levy: is it working?’ (2003) 15/1 JEL 39; 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, (n. 14); Sally Cairns & Carey Newson, (n. 24), section 6.2 
‘Why pricing mechanisms are seen as potentially ineffective.’ 
42 The first goal of tax is ordinarily to “raise revenues to pay for government services.” Whether 
environmental tax revenues should be used for environmental purpose is a debatable issue. See Richard 
A. Westin, (n. 4). 
43 The limited literature indicates that whilst the situation is extremely uncertain, WTO rules are not a 
primary concern in respect of aviation tax. The WTO rules applicable to aviation are found in the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which even applies to charges on emissions (Eckhard 
Pache, ‘On the compatibility with international legal provisions of including greenhouse gas emissions 
from international aviation in the EU emission allowance trading scheme as a result of the proposed 
changes to the EU emission allowance trading directive’ (15.04.2008) Legal opinion commissioned by 
 160 
of the Chicago Convention; Article 15 of the Chicago Convention and related cases; 
and ICAO’s policy against taxation. 
Article 24 of the Chicago Convention regulates customs duty. However, I 
argue that this article does not form a legal barrier to introducing any national fuel 
taxes on international flights. Article 24 of the Chicago Convention states that: 
“….fuel, lubricating oils and spare parts which are retained on 
board…shall be exempt from custom duties, inspection fees or similar 
national or local duties and charges.”44 
 
This article exempts “on board” aviation fuel only, and dates from a time when 
many governments were looking to develop the fledgling international aviation 
industry after the Second World War.45 In other words, this article prohibits the 
taxation of aviation fuel which is on board an aircraft on arrival in the territory of a 
contracting state and retained on board on leaving. It does not actually prohibit the 
taxation of aviation fuel. ICAO’s accompanying policy guidance recommended the 
reciprocal exemption of aviation from all taxes levied on fuels taken on board 
aircraft in connection with international air services, a policy which was 
implemented in practice through bilateral air services agreements. The principle of 
tax exemption has been enshrined in a huge number of bilateral agreements between 
member states.46  ICAO also called on governments to reduce or eliminate taxes 
                                                                                                                                                               
the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, pp. 60-61, online 
available at <http://www.bmu.de/english/emissions_trading/doc/42364.php>) But GATS only applies 
to services listed in an Annex and coverage of aviation is very limited, covering only “aircraft repair 
and maintenance, selling and marketing of air transport, and computer reservation systems.” The actual 
transport service is not mentioned in the Annex. If, which is likely to be argued very strongly given the 
clearly limited extent of agreement to subject aviation to WTO disciplines, GATS applies, WTO rules 
are of limited impact on this area. If, however, which is also arguable, the tax on fuel is addressed as a 
tax on goods under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the tax will be analysed in the 
normal way under Articles III (national treatment) and Article XX (environmental objectives). The 
limited scholarly work on climate tax and the WTO suggests that the WTO rules are not an 
insurmountable obstacle to introducing aviation fuel tax. See for example: Francesco Sindico, ‘Climate 
Taxes and the WTO: Is the Multilateral Trade Regime a Further Obstacle for Efficient Domestic 
Climate Policies?’ (2006) 3/8 Journal of Trade and Environment Studies 1; Christopher Tran, ‘Using 
GATT, Art XX to justify climate change measures in claims under the WTO Agreements’ (2010) 27 
EPLJ 346. See general on WTO law, Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade 
Organization (2nd ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008). 
44 Chicago Convention, (n, 2), art. 24, emphasis added. 
45 See general, I. H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, An Introduction to Air Law, (8th ed., Kluwer Law 
International, Alphen aan den Rijn 2006). 
46 UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, ‘The Environmental Effects of Civil Aircraft in 
Flight’ Special Report (November 2002), online available at 
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related to the sale or use of international air transport to the fullest practicable 
extent.47 As a result, international aviation industry benefits from a wide range of 
tax exemptions, including fuel tax. 48  Although bilateral agreements are legal 
barriers to introducing aviation fuel taxes, and they should be renegotiated in order 
to introduce fuel taxes; they are not a substantial problem. Renegotiating bilateral 
agreements is less problematic than amending the Chicago Convention. In sum, 
from the development of fuel tax exemption in the aviation sector, it is clear that 
Article 24 of the Chicago Convention itself does not form a legal barrier. 
Another related provision is the last sentence of Article 15 of the Chicago 
Convention, which provides that: 
“No fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any contracting 
States in respect solely of the right of transit over or entry into or exit from 
its territory of any aircraft of a contracting State or persons or property 
thereon.”49  
 
This article relates to the legality of fuel taxes because fuel tax might be 
imposed by a contracting state as a condition for another contracting state’s aircraft 
to transit over or entry into or exit from its territory. However, this article 
emphasises on the purpose of the levy which may imposed on air travel. An 
environmentally directed fuel tax levied by nation states on international aviation 
does not violate this article. Two recent cases concern the legal understanding of 
Article 15 in domestic laws. They both concern ticket tax but the judgments 
contribute to my argument on the legality of fuel tax because they focused on the 
purpose of tax rather than the form of it.  
One of the cases is R (on the application of the Federation of Tour Operators 
and others) v. Her Majesty’s Treasury,50 in which the English High Court held that 
the Air Passenger Duty imposed by the UK Government is consistent with the 
meaning of Article 15 of the Chicago Convention. Air Passenger Duty (APD) has 
                                                                                                                                                               
<http://www.rcep.org.uk/reports/sr-2002-aircraft/documents/aviation-report.pdf>. 
47 ICAO’s Policies on Taxation in the Field of International Air Transport, Doc 8632. 
48 Although the aviation sector has become a popular mode of transport, the industry still benefits from 
a wide range of tax exemptions, including fuel tax. For discussions on the absence of fuel tax and 
exempt international tickets from VAT, see T&E, (n. 26). Aviation also benefits from duty free 
shopping, low landing fees, airport charges, and air passenger duty. See Brendon Sewill, (n. 23). 
49 Chicago Convention, (n. 44), art. 15. 
50 R (on the application of the Federation of Tour Operators and others) v. Her Majesty’s Treasury, 
[2007] EWHC 2062 (Admin). 
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been imposed, since 1994, on the operator of an aircraft in respect of the number of 
passengers carried by it when the aircraft first takes off from an airport in the UK.51 
The amount of APD was doubled in 2007, which triggered the case.52 It indicates 
that APD is an efficient way to capture the carbon emitted from the aviation industry. 
More importantly, since 2008, APD has been restructured as an aviation duty to 
“ensure that the aviation industry makes a contribution towards its environmental 
impacts and to ensure that the aviation sector continues to contribute fairly and 
equitably towards the funding of public services.”53 Looking at the judgment, the 
findings were made in respect of the applicable principles of interpretation of the 
Chicago Convention, the meaning of the last sentence of Article 15 and the 
consistency with it of a tax which was in the nature of an air passenger duty. The 
judge addressed the principles of interpretation which are applicable to the Chicago 
Convention according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,54 which 
said that a treaty shall be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose”55 and that there shall be taken into account “ any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation…”56 The judge concluded that Article 15 does 
not concern taxes, as the phrase in that article is that it is “in respect solely of the 
right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory.” This is to say, a duty 
imposed for something other than the transit or exit or entry of any aircraft, like the 
one for environmental purposes, is not a due imposed solely in respect of the 
specified right. APD falls into this category and it is thus not prohibited by Article 
15.57 The judge’s conclusion was supported by a “substantial evidence of State 
practice” – which “establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation.”58 The “substantial evidence” was explained as in three fold: 
“(1) Returns made to the ICAO Resolution, which indicated that 
                                                        
51 The Finance Act 1994, section 28.  
52 Robert Lawson, ‘UK Air Passenger Duty held to be Consistent with the Chicago Convention’ (2008) 
33/1 Air & Sp. L. 3. 
53 UK HM Treasury, ‘Aviation Duty: response to consultation’ (November 2008) online available at 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr08_aviationduty_395.pdf > last accessed 10.12.09. 
54 23 May 1969: TS No. 58 (1980); Cmnd 7964. 
55 Article 31(1), ibid. 
56 Article 31(3)(b), ibid. 
57 Robert Lawson, (n. 52), p. 6. 
58 Ibid., p. 7. 
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some 9 other States have imposed taxes of a similar nature59 and, he held, 
there was an ‘absence of any suggestion that their doing so constituted a 
breach of Article 15’. 
(2) The introduction to ICAO’s Policies on Taxation in the Field of 
International Air Transport60 does not refer to Article 15 and, he held, 
suggests that Article 24 is the only provision of the Chicago Convention 
which deals with taxation. Furthermore, the ICAO Resolution refers to 
‘taxes on the sale and use of international air transport’ but does not 
suggest that they have been imposed in breach of Article 15 or that their 
abolition is required by it. 
(3) A large number of States support the imposition of the so-called 
‘Chirac tax’ 61  and, he held, it is evident that none of those States 
considered the proposal to be unlawful under public international law, 
notwithstanding that it is inconceivable they would have overlooked the 
Chicago Convention or that ‘no other State, or the ICAO, would have 
raised the question of the breach of Article 15 if it thought that there had 
been one or that one was proposed’.”62 
 
Although the judge’s findings focus on ticket taxes, this case may provide an 
example for other states seeking to impose similar taxes, or any environmentally 
oriented tax, since he concludes that Article 15 does not concern taxes at all. 
The Dutch Supreme Court, in the case Board of Airline Representatives in the 
Netherlands v. The State of The Netherlands (Ministry of Finance), confirmed the 
above interpretation of the final part of Article 15.63 The court affirmed that this 
provision deals with charges for which a certain exchange of services is being 
offered and it does not prevent taxation for which no counter-service is provided. At 
the same time, with an environmental purpose, the Dutch ticket tax was not required 
to allocate its revenues specifically to fund particular environmental measures, but 
simply “for the benefit of the Dutch national exchequer.”64 This ruling by the Dutch 
Supreme Court is described on as “a landmark decision” in which, for the first time, 
a national supreme court decides “the extent to which States are at liberty to secure 
funds for their national budgets through taxation of the aviation industry without the 
                                                        
59 Namely Australia, Barbados, Hong Kong, Ecuador, India, Pakistan, Peru, Austria, Ireland and 
Norway. 
60 Third edition, 2000, Doc 8632. 
61 The Declaration on Innovative Sources of Financing for Development signed in New York on 14 
September 2005 by the Presidents of Chile, France and Brazil, which seeks the introduction of a levy 
on plane tickets to be used for humanitarian purposes. 
62 Robert Lawson, (n. 52), p. 7. 
63 Brian F. Havel & Niels van Antwerpen, ‘The Dutch Ticket Tax and Article 15 of the Chicago 
Convention’ (2009) 34/2 Air & Sp. L. 141; Brian F. Havel & Niels van Antwerpen, ‘Dutch Ticket Tax 
and Article 15 of the Chicago Convention (Continued)’ (2009) 34/6 Air & Sp. L. 447. 
64 Ibid., p. 141. 
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obligation to offer any services to the industry in return.” 65  Therefore, an 
environmentally oriented tax levied by the Government of the Netherlands on 
aviation does not violate Article 15 of the Chicago Convention. The Dutch ticket tax 
was however reduced to zero in the economic downturn in 2009.66 
The above two cases indicate that taxes with an environmental objective could 
be levied by nation states on international aviation, although they both concern on 
ticket taxes. Given that article 15 of the Chicago Convention is considered as not 
related to environmental taxes, this article is certainly not a legal barrier to 
introducing national fuel taxes on international aviation. 
Although neither article 24 nor article 15 of the Chicago Convention prohibits 
an environmentally directed aviation fuel tax, international aviation has been 
exempted from fuel tax since the 1940s. It is ICAO’s opposition to taxation which 
confused the understanding of the legality of fuel tax in the aviation sector. I argue 
that ICAO’s position can only be treated as a political barrier rather than a legal 
obstacle. ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations. Its role in regulating 
aviation emissions has been discussed in Chapter 4. ICAO takes a strong position in 
opposing an incentivising tax. It recommends inter alia the reciprocal exemption 
from all taxes levied on fuel taken on board by aircraft in connection with 
international air services, a policy implemented in practice through bilateral air 
services agreements, and also calls on contracting states to the fullest practicable 
extent to reduce or eliminate taxes related to the sale or use of international air 
transport.67 ICAO’s position was widely accepted along with the idea that such a tax 
was “an old-fashioned blunt instrument.”68 This is mainly because ICAO has 
defined a tax as “a levy to raise general national and local governmental revenues 
that are applied for non-aviation purposes.”69 This definition treats a tax as a 
revenue raising tool which is different from my argument for fuel tax as an incentive 
                                                        
65 Ibid., p. 146. 
66 Ibid. 
67 ICAO’s Policies on Taxation in the Field of International Air Transport, Doc 8632, approved by the 
Council on 24 February 1999, published by direction of the Council. 
68 Timesonline, ‘Should aviation fuel be taxed?’ (October 24, 2005); T&E, (n. 26), environmental taxes 
imposed on aviation industry have been criticized as “a blunt and ineffective way to achieve emission 
reduction goals.” 
69 ICAO, Policies on Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services, Doc 9082/7. 
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tool to affect on demand and encourage innovation. In this circumstance, ICAO’s 
policy against tax should not be a legal obstacle to introducing fuel taxes. What is 
more, ICAO supports a cost-related levy, known as emissions charge, which is 
designed and applied specifically to defray the costs of providing facilities and 
services for civil aviation.70 Emission charges are acceptable to ICAO, but there are 
difficulties with using charges. One of the difficulties rests on the nature of charge as 
being to compensate the cost of pollution damage. An emissions charge provides 
“ex-post control” on environmental recovery as it is a strictly compensation-related 
characteristic; while, a tax provides “ex-ante prohibition”, which combats pollution 
behaviour rather than the damage caused.71 The key point is that a charge is a direct 
instrument that is used to compensate the cost of pollution damage; while, a tax is an 
indirect instrument to reduce pollution, through its impact on the polluters’ action by 
setting a certain tax rate. Another difficulty with using charges rests in calculation in 
terms of monetary value. As ICAO defined, the charge should be “based on the costs 
of mitigating this impact, to the extent that such costs can be properly identified and 
directly attributed to air transport.”72 ICAO has developed two types of emissions 
charges—en-route emissions charges and revenue-neutral aircraft efficiency 
charges.73 An en-route emissions charge is charge “with revenues recycled to the 
aviation sector (e.g. to defray the costs of the harmful effects of emissions and to 
support air traffic modernisation, early retirement of aircraft, and research and 
development activities).”74 A revenue-neutral charge is the one “based on aircraft 
                                                        
70 ICAO WP/283 (2001) the 33rd General Assembly of the ICAO; Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, (n. 1). 
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<http://www.icao.int/icao/en/env/caep.htm> last accessed 27/10/09. 
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efficiency, with higher charges on less fuel-efficient aircraft offset by lower charges 
on more fuel-efficient ones.”75 Yet, neither of them has become an effective tool for 
reducing aviation emissions; at least because of the difficulties of calculating 
environmental cost in terms of monetary value.76 As such, ICAO’s emissions charge 
is unlikely to replace a fuel tax in terms of curbing the growth of aviation emissions. 
Even so, ICAO “strongly recommended that environmental levies that States may 
introduce should be in the form of charges rather than taxes and that funds collected 
should be applied in the first instance to mitigating the environment impact of 
aircraft engine emissions.”77 
This section has argued that there is no legal barrier to introducing aviation 
fuel taxes. It is ICAO’s policy of opposition to a fuel tax that results in governments 
reducing or eliminating taxes related to the sale or use of international air transport 
to the fullest practicable extent. ICAO’s position can only be treated as political 
barrier rather than legal obstacle. A fuel tax on international aviation has also 
encountered practical barriers which are discussed in the next section. 
 
4. Practical Obstacles  
 
In this section, I explore the practical barriers to introducing domestic fuel 
taxes on the international aviation from three perspectives: “tanking” fuel under 
Article 24 of the Chicago Convention; taxation’s limited effect on demand; and the 
airline industry’s opposition. 
First of all, Article 24 of the Chicago Convention implies that there is a risk 
underlying a non-universal fuel tax – that airlines may simply fill up with cheaper 
                                                                                                                                                               
of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), Bonn, 25 October – 
5 November 1999, online available at < http://www.icao.int/env/sbsta-11.pdf> last accessed 27.12.09. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Andrea Ricci, ‘Rainer Friedrich and others, Calculating Transport Environmental Costs—Final 
Report of the Expert Advisors to the High Level Group on Infrastructure Charging’ (1999) online 
available at <www.ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/doc/env-cost.pdf> last accessed 26/10/09; 
Frank Ackerman, Lisa Heinzerling & Rachel Massey, ‘Applying Cost-benefit to Past Decisions: Was 
Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?’ (2005) 57 Admin. L. Rev. 155. 
77 ICAO website online at < http://www.icao.int/icao/en/env/aee.htm> last accessed 27.12.09. 
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untaxed fuel in other countries given that fuel on-board cannot be taxed under the 
Convention. This is practically described as “tankering.” 78  Recent research 
considers that the occurrence of tankering fuel “is likely to depend on the level of 
tax and the proximity of cheaper fuel.”79 Tankering fuel is very likely to happen if 
aviation fuel tax would not be applied universally, because of the international 
nature of the aviation industry. Given the international nature of air transport and its 
emissions, in theory, a set of harmonized domestic fuel taxes could provide an 
alternative to an international fuel tax.80 It requires that domestic fuel taxes are 
harmonized across countries based on an international climate agreement. Since 
there is no international law which can force countries to participate in such an 
agreement, every country may become a free rider that enjoys the same benefits of 
reduced emissions with no cost.81 The free rider incentive implies that each country 
may have little or no levy on its own carbon emissions in the interest of that country. 
Even if there is no free rider problem, the associated distribution of costs between 
countries is problematic. A harmonized domestic fuel tax requires setting equalized 
marginal costs across countries, but the total costs of reducing emissions would not 
be the same across countries. 82  In this circumstance, such a tax would “be 
unacceptable to a large group of countries, and will therefore in practice be 
infeasible unless it is supplemented with some kind of side payments between 
countries.”83 The EU’s failed attempts to introduce an aviation fuel tax in the 1990s 
have partly proved this point.84 Clearly, the problem is that this optimal tax structure 
for aviation is difficult to achieve through an international agreement specifying a 
                                                        
78 “Tankering” could be understood as a kind of legal evasion in this context. See Sally Cairns & Carey 
Newson, (n. 24), p. 79. 
79 Ibid., p. 80. 
80 Robert N. Stavins, ‘A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change’ (2008) 
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83 Michael Hoel, (n. 81), pp. 222-223. 
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harmonized fuel tax for all countries. In the absence of an international approach, 
tanking fuel is a practical barrier to the introduction of domestic aviation fuel taxes. 
A second practical barrier to introducing aviation fuel taxes is that a fuel tax 
may have a limited effect on demand. In theory, a fuel tax could simply raise the 
cost of aviation, which could have an effect on consumers’ choice and may result in 
a significant decrease in air travel and GHG emissions.85 Given the fact that most of 
the cost would be passed on to consumers, the main question is whether the tax 
would be set high enough for it to impact on customers’ behaviour, and whether air 
travellers can switch to other transport modes. If the idea is that passengers should 
be “nudged”86 in the desired direction by the price signal from taxed aviation fuel, 
for example, the effectiveness of the incentive is a major concern. In other words, 
the tax rate should be set high enough for it to impact on the individuals’ choice. 
Given the social and economic benefits of air travel, and the future uncertainties 
around the price of carbon, it is extremely difficult to achieve optimal tax rate on 
domestic aviation fuel taxes. Research on the impact of a tax on aviation fuel shows 
that the tax would have little effect on emissions, partly because the imposed tax 
was assumed to be small relative to the air fare, and also because the price elasticity 
is low on many flights87. It is worth noting that, in some circumstance, there is no 
alternative transport mode, for example, “transatlantic travellers can’t row from 
London to New York.”88 In short, an aviation fuel tax’s function of changing 
consumers’ behaviour and reducing flying is a contentious issue, partly because 
demand for some flights is not highly sensitive to price and many air travellers 
cannot easily switch.89 
A third practical barrier is the aviation industry’s opposition to a fuel tax. The 
imposition of a fuel tax has been strongly resisted by the industry.90 Representing 
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86 See Anthony Ogus, (n. 71). 
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the airline industry, IATA likes to point out that “the demand for air travel is 
powered by economic growth and especially by increasing wealth”; and aviation’s 
“economic contribution is much greater than its share of carbon emissions.”91 This 
shows the industry’s opposition to reducing demand. In fact, the idea of a fuel tax is 
criticised for being “counterproductive” for the aviation industry, because “it takes 
money away from airlines and hampers investment in environmentally friendly 
technologies.”92 This may happen when demand is reduced or when the fuel price 
increase is not fully passed on to customers and parts of it would have to be borne 
by the airlines. Such an increased cost, for airlines, may “[affect] their profitability, 
cash flow, and retained earnings - which, in turn, could affect the ability of airlines 
to purchase more environmentally beneficial equipment.”93 It has also been noted 
that fuel prices have already risen without tax, and this is already putting pressure on 
the aviation industry to improve fuel efficiency and to reduce emissions. In this case, 
the imposition of a fuel tax is very likely to further limit the growth of the airline 
industry and has been strongly resisted by the industry.94  
 We can conclude that a domestic fuel tax on international aviation encounters 
practical barriers from the risk of “tanking fuels,” the uncertain and/or limited effect 
on demand, and the aviation industry’s opposition. As such, taxing on aviation fuel 
is legal, but it has encountered political and practical barriers. To overcome these 
barriers, I will suggest in the next section that introducing aviation fuel taxes may 
start from short haul international flights. 
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5. Aviation Fuel Tax on Short haul Flights 
 
In this section, I argue that the political and practical barriers to an aviation 
fuel tax can be addressed. I suggest the need to apply this price-based mechanism on 
aviation emissions in a new form. The value of a fuel tax, as discussed in section 2, 
is primarily as a way of influcing demand and secondarily as a way to incentivise 
innovation. This argument applies generally, but is especially useful for short haul 
flight. This section argues that domestic aviation fuel taxes should be imposed on 
short haul flights with the specific purpose of reducing the artificially increased 
demand brought about by low cost airlines. It will also provide an incentive for 
innovation, especially incentivising innovation to change low cost airlines into low 
carbon airlines. Although such a fuel tax cannot be a stand-alone solution to 
reducing aviation emissions, it might play an important role in the multi-scalar 
regulatory architecture which is a subject I will return in Chapter 7. 
I suggest that fuel taxes should be charged on short haul international flights, 
which means that domestic fuel taxes should be imposed on the international flights 
from a domestic airport to the destination within 1000 nautical miles.95 The tax is 
proposed to be levied on fuel which would increase the operation cost of airlines but 
very likely to be passed on to the consumers in the form of increased ticket prices.96 
The primary aim of such fuel taxes is to incentivise airlines to discourage final 
consumers’ choice of flying on short distance routes. These fuel taxes could also 
incentivise innovation in airlines. The prioritisation of domestic fuel taxes on short 
haul international flights can be explained from three perspectives. 
The first reason is that short haul flights are relatively easier to switch into 
other transportation modes, like high speed trains. I suggested in Chapter 2 that 
although it is not a key part of this thesis, part of the solution to aviation emissions 
                                                        
95 On the classification of short and long distance flights, see footnote (n. 32). 
96 “Very likely” is according to the UK experience on Air Passenger Duty. Most airlines have been 
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See HM Revenue&Custons, 2008 Pre-Budget Report, PBRN 20, 24 November 2008, online available 
at < http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/pbr2008/pbrn20.pdf > last accessed 20.07.10. 
 171 
may need to be reduced demand. But it is hard to say which kinds of flights are 
unnecessary, and so should be reduced. According to a Canadian report, increased 
costs of air travel for Canadian families and businesses through fuel taxes would 
have a negative impact on visiting families, winter vacations, and on opening new 
markets and exporting Canadian products and services.97 None of them can be 
easily condemned as unnecessary flights. Thus, the question has changed to which 
kinds of flight can be reduced, with least negative impacts. Both short haul flights 
and long distance flights are less energy efficient than medium distance flights. But 
long distance flights are difficult to change to alternative forms of transport. Most 
short haul flights can more easily be switched to alternative transport modes. In 
particular, the development of high speed trains and highways provide alternative 
forms of transportation for the consumers who used to take flights on short distance 
routes. Reduced flying on these routes would not reduce the benefits of 
globalization which we enjoy when the world is getting smaller. The infrastructure 
costs of high speed trains might be high, but is being supported by governments 
including some developing countries.98  
A second but most important reason for reducing flying on short distance 
routes is that demand for short haul flights has been artificially increased due to the 
development of low cost airlines. Artificial increased demand means that the 
demand is promoted by low price. The low price, in general, means the price lower 
than the true cost of flying. As I discussed earlier in this chapter, international 
aviation is the only form of transportation that does not pay tax on fuel. In fact, the 
aviation sector benefits from a wide range of tax exemptions, although it has 
become a popular mode of transport.99 Externalising environmental costs means 
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that the industry enjoys lower costs in running the business, in turn promoting 
demand. This explanation of artificial increased demand applies to international 
aviation generally. Low cost airlines or so called budget airlines are the fastest 
growing segment of civil aviation.100 They emerged at the end of last century and 
led to a large extension in the number of air passengers, while the passenger number 
of traditional airlines did not decrease.101 Since fuel represents up to 25 percent of 
the operating expenses for low-cost airlines, 102  a fuel tax is likely to reduce 
emissions by “stemming” this fastest growing segment of civil aviation.103 So, fuel 
taxes on short haul flights are expected to raise the cost of low cost airlines, making 
them less attractive to customers relative to alternative modes of travel and the 
alternative of not travelling. 
Third, although the main aim is to change passengers’ behaviour, fuel taxes 
could also incentivise fuel efficiency by airlines. Most short haul flights have the 
potential to be managed more efficiently, under price-based incentives. Short 
distance routes are “on average operated by less efficient aircraft and the capacity 
load is also not too high;” while the long distance routes “are operated by highly 
efficient aircraft with usually good capacity load.” 104 Taxing short haul flights 
provides an incentive for the adoption of cleaner aircraft and also for improved 
management, e.g. encouraging “the industry to fill their planes instead of flying 
half-empty jet liners around the world.”105 
A further question is whether a fuel tax on short haul flights may incentivise a 
shift from short haul to long distance travel. The extent to which such a risk may 
happen depends on how cheap the long distance flight and the alternative transport 
mode would be. In other words, to avoid that risk, the key is to set a proper price on 
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high speed rail transport as an alternative to short-haul flights. It is beyond the remit 
of this thesis, but shows the importance of policymakers considering the aviation 
sector together with other transport modes. It is worth repeating that the proposed 
fuel tax on short haul flights is a limited instrument which cannot solve the whole 
problem and can only become part of the regulatory architecture on aviation 
emissions. 
The next step in regulatory design should be to decide how to impose a tax on 
aviation fuel, including the tax authority, tax rate, point of application and a formula 
for allocating the tax revenues. Although the fuel tax on short haul flights is 
suggested as a domestic tax which should be introduced by nation states, ICAO 
could play an important role in administering the setting up of fuel taxes by its 
member states. 106  ICAO’s member states include almost all of the countries 
contributing to the growth of aviation emissions. The participation of these countries 
in reducing greenhouse gas emissions for short haul flights would ideally be based 
on an international agreement. Under this agreement, these states should agree on 
the use of fuel tax as a way to adjust the total cost of short haul flights in order to 
ensure that short distance flying is not cheaper than alternative forms of transport. 
They should also agree on a uniform point of application, e.g. the countries of 
departure or destination of the air passengers/cargo transported. The tax could be set 
on the country of either departure or destination of the passengers or cargo; or 
shared by the country of departure and the country of arrival. Such an agreement 
should be easier to be achieved than negotiating an international fuel tax or a 
harmonised domestic tax. This is because the participating countries would not need 
to agree on a uniform tax rate for short haul flights; they would set their own rates. 
The role of ICAO in performance monitoring, reporting methods and auditing 
processes has been discussed in Chapter 4 section 5. Assisting its member states’ in 
the administration of domestic fuel taxes could be treated as an example of how 
ICAO may play this role. 
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Once this tax system is in place, the choice of domestic fuel tax policies could 
be left to the individual countries. Each country will be able to, in this case, consider 
the tax policy on short haul air transport together with the policies on all the other 
transport sectors. It can be broadly applauded that the whole transport sector should 
be covered by the same regulatory system, because treating different modes of 
transportation differently may affect the competitiveness between the modes.107 In 
addition, intuitively, we might expect that other price and policy instruments which 
have a significant impact on a country’s CO2 emissions would affect aviation 
emissions from short haul flight in a very similar way to taxes on automobiles or 
road pricing.108 If this is the case, the absolute differences between tax rates in 
different countries will not be an obstacle to reducing the targeted short haul flights’ 
emissions. While an international tax is “more of an ‘all or nothing’ option”;109 
under domestic climate change duties, the countries can themselves decide how they 
want to tax short haul flights. At the same time, compared to an international tax, the 
necessary institutional arrangements for such a domestic fuel tax are simpler. 
Regarding the formula for allocating the tax revenues, under a domestic fuel 
tax system, revenues would go to each government’s tax funds that are used for 
public purposes. It is simpler than one under an international tax system that needs 
to “specify shares of the total international tax revenues that go to participating 
countries.” 110  The tax revenues should not refund to the aviation industry. 
Otherwise, the incentive by increasing the operation cost of low cost airlines via fuel 
tax would be reduced by the funding. Then, the objectives of domestic fuel taxes as 
discussed above would be impossible. 
The above analysis outlines a possible way to impose a fuel tax on short haul 
flights by domestic governments in order to reduce artificial increased demand for 
flying and also incentivise fuel efficiency, especially by low-cost airlines. I argue 
that such fuel taxes on short haul flights can overcome the barriers to introducing an 
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aviation fuel tax as discussed above. The first reason is the political advantages of a 
domestic fuel tax. For the above elements of domestic fuel tax, countries are given 
an incentive, but not a rigid instruction, to reduce their short haul flights. In this case 
it would be up to each individual country to decide by how much it should tax short 
haul flights, and to choose appropriate allocation of the tax revenues. In particular, 
designing such a tax in a regulatory system for the whole transport sector gives the 
individual government flexibility and a chance to restructure the industries for 
sustainable development in the long term. Given the flexibility that individual 
countries would have in allocating the tax and the contribution of the revenue to 
national budgets discussed above, one should not underestimate these political 
advantages of a domestic fuel tax system on international short haul flights. Second, 
considering the potential competition distortion, all countries should be encouraged 
to adopt such a fuel tax. The need of an international agreement on domestic fuel tax 
and the role of ICAO in administering its member states’ setting up of such a 
domestic fuel tax on aviation have been discussed above. The proposed fuel tax is 
suggested as being a very practical mechanism to provide an incentive for global 
actions in avoiding the risk of tanking fuels. Third, the primary purpose of the 
proposed fuel tax in reducing artificial increased demand by low cost airlines has 
made it clear that the tax’s limited effect on demand for long distance flights does 
not condemn the role of taxation altogether. Importantly, limited use of fuel tax on 
aviation provides a good chance to educate the public about the environmental 
purpose behind the taxes, and provide a measure to get public support for 
regulations on aviation emissions.111 Four, from the industry perspective, there 
would be no enthusiasm for adopting a fuel tax which may reduce its profits in the 
short term. But their views should not block the introduction of a fuel tax,112 as a 
restructuring of the whole transport sector is expected in the long term and the 
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important environmental contribution that would come along with this. Although the 
fuel tax proposed here cannot be a stand-alone solution to reducing aviation 
emissions, it might play an important role in the multi-scalar regulatory architecture 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I argue that a fuel tax could play an important role in reducing 
aviation emissions. A fuel tax is an effective and fair price-based market-based 
instrument which could have an effect on demand and incentivise innovation. A fuel 
tax alone cannot ensure the desired reduction in aviation emissions, but must be 
combined with other approaches. More certain environmental outcomes can be 
achieved by emissions trading, another market-based instrument which will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
While a fuel tax may be readily applied to domestic flights, it has been 
excluded from international air services. I argue in this chapter that there is no legal 
barrier derived directly from the Chicago Convention to introducing a domestic fuel 
tax on international flights. Article 24 of the Convention only exempted “on board” 
aviation fuel from taxation. Two case studies of the UK Air Passenger Duty and the 
Dutch ticket tax suggest that Article 15 of the Convention does not prohibit any tax 
when it is imposed for environmental purposes. It is ICAO’s policy of opposition to 
a fuel tax that results in governments reducing or eliminating taxes related to the 
sale or use of international air transport to the fullest practicable extent. What is 
more, Article 24 of the Convention implies a practical barrier to introducing an 
aviation fuel tax, since fuel on-board cannot be taxed, airlines may simply fill up 
with cheaper untaxed fuel in other countries, known as “tankering.” Another 
practical barrier is that a fuel tax has a limited effect on demand when the tax rate is 
not high enough to have an impact on the demand or the demand for many flights is 
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not sensitive to the price. A third practical barrier is the aviation industry’s 
opposition to a fuel tax. As such, a fuel tax on international flights is legal, but it has 
encountered policy and practical barriers. To overcome these barriers, I suggest that 
introducing aviation fuel tax may start from short haul international flights. This 
may influence artificially increased demand from low-cost airlines, and provide an 
incentive for energy efficiency. To conclude whilst a fuel tax has a contribution to 
make, no single regulatory tool is adequate. Tax is simply one component of the 
necessary multi-instrument approach for the multi-scalar regulatory architecture 
discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 6. Emissions Trading 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the role of emissions trading in reducing international 
aviation emissions, exploring both regional schemes (especially the EU emissions 
trading scheme) and a possible global scheme. A key element of my thesis is that we 
need to move beyond total reliance on conventional international treaty making in 
our response to aviation’s greenhouse gas emissions. Both legal scholarship and 
policy making relies heavily (not entirely) on this conventional “top-down” 
approach. The development of multiple regional emissions trading systems provides 
an element of a multi-level approach to curbing the growth of international aviation 
emissions, the idea being that regulation should be adopted at multiple levels as an 
alternative to the traditional top-down global negotiations on national emissions 
targets. This would be especially valuable if the sectoral target on international 
aviation emissions discussed in Chapter 3 cannot be agreed, but would contribute to 
implementation and improved norms in any event. However, multiple regional 
emission trading cannot be a stand-alone solution. We need multiple instruments, as 
will be discussed in Chapter 7. This chapter also explores the potential of a global 
emissions trading scheme as an alternative form for the allocation of mitigation 
responsibilities within a sectoral target agreed at a global level, if a comprehensive 
burden sharing system, as discussed in Chapter 3, is difficult achieve in practice. 
The proposed global emissions trading system also constitutes a mitigation tool for 
incentivising the airline industry to improve energy intensity. 
This chapter begins by examining the pros and cons of emissions trading in 
general. It discusses the advantages of emissions trading from three perspectives: the 
certainty of the environmental outcome compared to other market-based instruments; 
its efficiency compared to command and control regulation; and its political 
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advantages. It also examines the limitations of emissions trading from two 
perspectives: first, emissions trading may not reduce emissions from targeted 
sources because of the purchase of additional credits from other sources; and 
secondly, emissions trading may not provide sufficient incentives for innovation. As 
such, I argue that emissions trading could play an important role in curbing the 
growth of aviation emissions but that it cannot be the whole solution.  
In section 3, I explore the role of regional emissions trading. Given that the EU 
ETS is by far the largest emissions trading scheme in the world and it will include 
emissions from foreign airlines in 2012, I begin with a legal analysis of the 
application of the EU ETS to aviation. I explore the legality of the application of the 
EU ETS to international aviation under the relevant international agreements, EU 
law and bilateral agreements. I argue that the EU’s inclusion of foreign airlines in 
the EU ETS is lawful. I analyse the effectiveness of the application of the EU ETS 
to aviation from four perspectives: the greenhouse gases covered in the emissions 
trading; trading with other sectors; the allocation methods; and the restrictions on 
carbon offsetting. I argue that the EU ETS provides a good model for regional 
efforts to achieve regional emissions targets on international aviation. Then, I 
discuss the potential for developing multiple regional emissions trading schemes. 
Multiple regional emissions trading schemes contribute a multi-level approach, 
moving beyond a complete reliance on international treaty making to regulating 
aviation emissions. But it would be weaker than a global emissions trading scheme 
because of the possible carbon leakage and the complexity of monitoring. 
In the final section, I propose a global emissions trading scheme for 
international aviation. Under the scheme, all of the airlines would be participants; 
IATA would be in charge of the initial allocation of emissions allowances; and the 
verification and compliance would be through ICAO. It would be a sectoral only 
emissions trading scheme unless and until a more comprehensive global scheme can 
be agreed. But airlines would be allowed to buy credits from carbon offsetting 
projects within a quantitative limit. There is also the option of negotiating a linking 
mechanism with regional schemes such as the EU ETS. I argue that a global 
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emissions trading scheme may serve as an alternative form of allocation under a 
sectoral approach to aviation in the UNFCCC system if the comprehensive 
multi-level burden sharing discussed in Chapter 3 cannot be realized. The proposed 
global emissions trading scheme is also a mitigation tool, for incentivising the 
airline industry to improve energy intensity. 
 
2. Emissions Trading 
 
This section examines the main claims made for emissions trading as a 
quantity-based market-based instrument (MBI) in environmental law. It identifies its 
pros and cons and argues that emissions trading could play an important role in 
curbing the growth of international aviation emissions, but that it cannot be the 
whole solution. The roles of emission trading will further be discussed in sections 3 
and 4 at two levels: the role of regional emissions trading schemes and the role of a 
proposed global emissions trading scheme. 
The essence of emissions trading is that a central authority (a government or 
international body) may regulate the overall quantity of access to the shared natural 
resource.1 Under an emissions trading system, the total amount of a pollutant is 
decided and allowances in the form of permits to emit pollutants are allocated to 
operators. By contrast with an ordinary permitting scheme, these permits can be 
bought and sold on the market by the companies. Therefore the market establishes 
the price of the emissions certificates as those companies or industries that are able 
to reduce their emissions would sell their emission permits to other companies and 
industries that would prefer to buy these permits rather than reduce their emissions.2 
                                                        
1 A booklet by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), ‘A Guide To Emissions Trading’, 
gives a useful introduction to the subject. Online available at 
<http://www.unep.fr/energy/publications/files/emissiontrading.htm.>. 
2 For the literature on emissions trading, see generally: Tom Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: Principles 
and Practice (2nd ed., Resources For the Future, Washington DC 2006); IATA, ‘What You Need to 
Know About Emissions Trading’, online available at 
<http://www.iata.org/NR/rdonlyres/95D34D98-7906-4A23-8884-1FA561709037/53257/EmissionsTra
ding.pdf>; Michael A. Mehling, ‘Emissions Trading and National Allocation in the Member States – 
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Emissions trading comes in two major varieties, called “cap and trade” and 
“baseline and credit”.3 The former is an absolute regime, which creates a fixed 
number of permits and allocates or auctions these permits to firms which are able to 
trade them on the open market. As a relative regime, a baseline and credit regime 
often sets performance targets for companies as “baselines” and the companies may 
generate credits when they perform better than their baselines. These credits can be 
sold on the open market. These regimes are attractive to different interest groups. 
With a certainty of the environmental outcome, cap and trade is usually more 
attractive to policymakers and it is used in their domestic or regional trading 
regimes while baseline and credit is welcomed by industries.4 Emissions trading in 
this thesis means cap and trade, because it is a better tool concerning its 
environmental effectiveness, which is a subject I will discuss further in the 
following sub-sections. 
 
2.1. Advantages of Emissions Trading 
 
Emissions trading is attractive in the control of greenhouse gas emissions for 
several reasons. The first one is the certainty of the environmental outcome. A cap 
and trade system is more reliable as a way to predict the environmental outcome 
than other economic instruments, such as a taxation regime.5 Under a cap and trade 
system, the overall quantity of emissions is fixed; the market determines where the 
necessary reduction will take place. This certainty is of value in reducing GHGs to a 
                                                                                                                                                               
An Achilles’ Heel of European Climate Policy?’ (2005) 5 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 
113; David Driesen, David Driesen, ‘Economic Instruments for Sustainable Development’ in Benjamin 
Richardson and Stepan Wood (eds.), Environmental Law for Sustainability (Oxford, Hart Publishing 
2006); Denny Ellerman, ‘Are Cap-and-Trade Programs More Environmentally Effective than 
Conventional Regulation?’ in Jody Freeman & Charles Kolstad (eds.), Moving to Markets in 
Environmental Regulation: Lessons from Twenty Years of Experience (Oxford University Press, New 
York 2007); Tom Tietenberg, ‘Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice’, in Moving to Markets in 
Environmental Regulation, in Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad (eds.); Robert Baldwin, ‘Regulation 
Lite: The Rise of Emissions Trading’ (2008) 2/2 Regulation & Governance 193. 
3 Robert Baldwin, ibid.; Jürgen Lefevere, ‘Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading in the EU: A 
Background’ 3 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 149. 
4 Jürgen Lefevere, ibid. 
5 There is a large literature on comparing emissions trade and emissions tax. See generally, John M. 
Volkman, ‘Making Change in a New Currency: Incentives and the Carbon Economy’ (2008) 29 Pub. 
Land & Resources L. Rev. 1; David Driesen, (n. 2). 
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predicted point. 
The second key value of emissions trading is its efficiency compared to 
command and control regulations.6 As IPCC has stated, “an emissions trading 
regime would be likely to meet environmental objectives at the lowest cost.”7 This 
is because the trading of permits to pollute offers incentives for low cost companies 
to reduce emissions and sell permits to higher cost companies. When the trading 
programme includes enough buyers and sellers to create an international competitive 
market, the emissions can be controlled in the most cost-effective location.8 
A third merit of emissions trading is its political advantages. A cap and trade 
system reduces the information burden on regulators, since the polluters themselves 
determine where the mitigation efforts are most cost-effective. The information 
needed for burden sharing is transmitted through the market for emission permits, so 
that trading “employs fixed quantity targets coupled with a financial reward for 
participation.”9 With such a financial reward, companies which reduce emissions 
are no longer pure losers, compared to those under direct regulations.10 It has no 
legislator to decide the costs; the prices of emissions permits are determined by the 
markets. The ones who play well in these markets would not be losers, but might 
even be winners.11 As such, emissions trading is popular partly due to its political 
advantages. 
According to the general value of emissions trading considered from the above 
three perspectives, I argue that emission trading could play an important role in 
curbing the growth of international aviation emissions. The roles of regional 
emission trading and global emissions trading will be further discussed in sections 3 
                                                        
6 There is a large literature on comparing direct regulation and economic incentive based regulation. 
See general: Jonathan B. Wiener, ibid; Richard B. Stewart, ‘Models for environmental regulation: 
Central planning versus market based approaches’ (1992) Boston College Environmental Affairs 
Review 547; Denny Ellerman, (n. 2). 
7 Annie Petsonk et al., Market Mechanisms & Global Climate Change: An Analysis of Policy 
Instruments, (Environmental Defense Fund in cooperation with the Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change, Washington D.C. 1998), p. 347. 
8 Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change (H M Treasury, London 2006), p. 321. 
9 Jonathan B. Wiener, ‘Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context’ 
(1998-1999) 108 Yale L. J. 677, 764. 
10 Literature on comparing direct regulation and economic incentive based regulation, (n. 6). 
11 John M. Volkman, (n. 5). 
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and 4. 
 
2.2. Limitations of Emissions Trading 
 
Although it has the above discussed values, emissions trading is a debatable 
mechanism.12 This section examines the major limitations of emissions trading. I 
argue that emissions trading could play an important role but that it cannot be the 
whole solution to curbing the growth of aviation emissions, because of two 
limitations: emissions trading may not reduce emissions from targeted sources and 
may not provide an incentive for innovation. 
One issue with emissions trading concerns its environmental effectiveness. In 
particular it may not reduce emissions from targeted sources. In a cap and trade 
system, it is a properly designed cap that will provide the opportunity for limiting 
emissions from a group of polluters to a level that is lower than current emissions.13 
A trading device only provides the means to reach whatever targets are decided upon 
at the lowest cost.14 It is believed, in environmental terms, that the “cap” on 
pollution up to which permits will be allocated is more important than the allocation 
of allowances.15 If the cap is set too high, it will be no challenge to meet the cap 
and it will result in no improvement in environmental quality.16 On the other hand, 
if the cap is set too stringently, there may not be sufficient reduction options 
available to trade.17 The importance of the cap was illustrated in the EU ETS’s pilot 
stage, where the cap was set at a level such that carbon allowances were 
insufficiently scarce to drive the market.18 The subject of the EU ETS will receive 
closer attention in section 3. 
The nature of emissions trading means that emissions trading itself does not 
                                                        
12 See Robert Baldwin, (n. 2). 
13 Stephanie L. Wilson, ‘Dog Days of Climate Change: Heating the Debate for Federal Cap-and-Trade’ 
(2008) 28 J. Land Resources & Envtl. L. 163. 
14 Robert Baldwin, (n. 2). 
15 Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005), p. 201. 
16 Ibid. 
17 JÜrgen Lefevere, (n. 3). 
18 John M. Volkman, (n. 5). 
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reduce emissions from any targeted polluter.19 For example, there is a concern that 
airlines would be pure buyers in emissions trading schemes instead of cutting their 
own emissions.20 This may happen when the cost of purchasing allowances from 
other industries or credits from offsetting projects to comply with the cap is cheaper 
than investing in new technology which leads to more efficient operations or in the 
use of fuel which produces fewer harmful emissions.21 
Similarly, emissions trading may not provide an adequate incentive for 
innovation. Proponents of emissions trading claim that such instruments can 
encourage some of the polluters to reduce their emissions by adopting cleaner 
technology in order to receive allowances for trade.22 However, sceptics argue that, 
under certain circumstances, emissions trading may not encourage participants to 
adopt new technology.23 This is because that innovation will depend on the relative 
cost of buying credits from offsetting projects and innovation. Driesen has also 
challenged the claim that emissions trading may foster technological innovation and 
has argued that this claim is based on mistaken economic theory. He has argued that 
emissions trading may only provide incentives for cheap innovations and it 
“discourages innovation by lowering the price at which innovation will become 
economically viable.”24 It has also been argued that the incentives for adopting new 
technology “may increase or decrease, depending on the firm’s position in the 
                                                        
19 ALDE, ‘Extension of emissions trading to aviation: “More PR than practical”’ (20/11/2006) online 
available at 
<http://www.alde.eu/index.php?id=42&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=8293&tx_ttnews[backPid]=1&cHash=851f
d13206> last accessed 02.10.09. 
20 Energy Intensive Industries Coalition (Eurofer, Cembureau and others), ‘Energy Intensive Industries 
reject the inclusion of aviation in the Emission Trading Scheme’ (Oct. 2005) online available 
at<http://www.cembureau.be/Cem_warehouse/AVIATION%20-%20FINAL%20POSITION%20PAPE
R%20-%20EII.PDF> last accessed 02/10/09. 
21 Danielle Goodwin, ‘Aviation, climate change and the European Union’s emissions trading scheme’ 
(2008) 6 J.P.L. 742. 
22 Bruce Ackerman & Richard Stewart, ‘Reforming Environmental Law’ (1985) 37 Stanford Law 
Review 1333; Robert Stavins, ‘Policy Instruments for Climate Change’ (1997) U Chicago Legal F. 293; 
Nathaniel Keohane, Richard Revesz & Robert Stavins, ‘The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in 
Environmental Policy’ (1998) 22 Harv. Env. L. Rev. 313. 
23 David A. Malueg, ‘Emission Credit Trading and the Incentive to Adopt New Pollution Abatment 
Technology’ (1989) 16 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 52, 56; David Driesen, ‘Does Emissions Trading 
Encourage Innovation?’ (2003) 32 Environmental Law Reporter, available at SSRN 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=336661> last accessed 29.07.10. 
24 David Driesen, ibid. 
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emission credit market before and after the adoption of the new technology.”25 For 
example, if a firm is a buyer of emission credits both before and after investing in 
the new technology, or it buys relatively many credits under the old technology but 
sells only a few after the adoption of the new technology, the incentive to innovate 
would not be increased when trading is introduced.26 As such, the introduction of 
emissions trading does not necessarily increase a firm’s incentive to adopt new 
emissions mitigation technology. 
From the above, it is clear that emissions trading cannot be a stand-alone 
solution to curbing the growth of aviation emissions, because it does not ensure that 
emissions will be reduced from the airlines themselves and it does not necessarily 
provide adequate incentives for innovation. This argument may partly explain the 
need for the multiple instruments which will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
3. Regional Emissions Trading 
 
The Kyoto Protocol established emissions trading as a key mechanism in 
combating climate change. 27  Since then, as “the method of choice to price 
carbon,”28 emissions trading markets have emerged around the world. Because of 
the scope of the European Union’s emissions trading scheme (EU ETS), which has 
been extended to the aviation industry,29 discussions are becoming more frequent 
on how regional emissions trading will impact on the international aviation industry 
                                                        
25 David A. Malueg, (n. 23), p. 56. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 11 December 
1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) UN Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. (Kyoto Protocol). 
28 Robert Baldwin, (n. 2), p. 3. 
29 Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 2008 
amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community. The full text is online available at 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32008L0101:EN:NOT> last 
accessed 07/10/09. See also T&E, ‘Including Aviation in the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS): Background Briefing’ (2008) online available at 
<www.transportenvironment.org/Publications/prep_hand.../lid:480> last accessed 08.10.09. 
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and on reducing aircraft engine emissions.30 
This section explores the roles of regional emissions trading in curbing the 
growth of international aviation emissions. It begins by providing a legal analysis of 
the application of the EU ETS to international aviation. First of all, it addresses the 
legality of the application of the EU ETS to international aviation under the relevant 
international agreements, EU law and bilateral agreements. It also provides an 
analysis of the effectiveness of the EU ETS from four perspectives: the greenhouse 
gases covered in the emissions trading; trading with other sectors; the allocation 
methods; and allowing and restricting carbon offsetting. I argue that the EU ETS is a 
lawful mitigation tool which may contribute to emission reductions in the 
international aviation sector. Then, I examine the development of multiple regional 
emissions trading. Multiple regional emissions trading schemes would be weaker 
than a global emissions trading scheme, because of the possible carbon leakage and 
the complexity of monitoring. But regional emissions trading has two potential 
important roles: regional emissions trading acts as a mitigation tool within the global 
sectoral target; and it also provides an example of multiple levels approach in 
regulating international aviation emissions to move beyond a complete reliance on 
international treaty making. It is especially valuable if the sectoral target on 
international aviation emissions discussed in Chapter 3 cannot be achieved.  
 
3.1. Legal Analysis of the Application of the EU ETS to Aviation 
 
This section seeks to analyse the functioning of the EU ETS from a legal 
                                                        
30 Danielle Goodwin, ‘Aviation, climate change and the European Union’s emissions trading scheme’ 
(2008) 6 J.P.L. 742; Malte Petersen, ‘The Legality of the EU’s Stand-Alone Approach to the Climate 
Impact of Aviation: The Express Role Given to the ICAO by the Kyoto Protocol’ (2008) 17/2 RECIEL 
196; Janina D. Scheelhaase & Wolfgang G. Grimme, ‘Emissions trading for international aviation – an 
estimation of the economic impact on selected European airlines’ (2007) 13 Journal of Air Transport 
Management 253; Steven Truxal, ‘Competitive distortions, carbon emissions efficiencies, or the green 
ultimatum?’ (2008) 14/4 Int. T.L.R. 77; Steven Truxal, ‘EU transport emissions compliance catch-up’ 
(2008) 14/6 Int. T.L.R. 117; M.G.J. den Elzen, J. G. J. Olivier, M.M. Berk, ‘An analysis of options for 
including international aviation and marine emissions in a post-2012 climate mitigation regime’ 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP) Report 500114007/2007, online available at 
<http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/2007/analysing_options_including_international_transport_emissio
ns_in_climate_regime.html > last accessed 29/09/09. 
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perspective and to explore how capable the scheme is of dealing with the climate 
change associated with international civil aviation. To this end, it examines the 
legality of the application of the EU ETS to international aviation and the 
effectiveness of the EU ETS. I argue that the EU ETS is a lawful mitigation tool 
which may contribute to emission reductions in the international aviation sector. In 
section 3.2, I will explore the future of the EU ETS in terms of becoming a blueprint 
for a global carbon market or leading a development of multiple regional emissions 
trading schemes. 
 
3.1.1 The Legality of the Application of the EU ETS to International Aviation 
 
The EU ETS was launched in 2005 and it is by far the largest emissions 
trading scheme in the world.31 More importantly for current purposes, the EU ETS 
is scheduled to be extended to the international aviation industry in 2012.32 This 
section examines the legality of the application of the EU ETS to international 
aviation from the relevant international agreements (the UNFCCC, the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Chicago Convention), EU law, and bilateral air services 
agreements.33 I argue that the application of the EU ETS to international aviation is 
lawful. 
First, there are no legal restrictions on the introducing of a regional emissions 
trading system in the UNFCCC system. The UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)34 “does not contain explicit restrictions that require the EU to 
                                                        
31 Cinnamon Carlarne, ‘Climate Change Policies and Ocean Apart: United States and European Union 
Climate Change Policies Compared’ (2006) 14 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 435; Susan J. Kurkowski, Note, 
‘Distributing the Right to Pollute in the European Union: Efficiency, Equity, and the Environment’ 
(2006).14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 698. 
32 Directive 2008/101/EC, (n. 29). 
33 On legality within the WTO regime, see Eckhard Pache, ‘On the compatibility with international 
legal provisions of including greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation in the EU emission 
allowance trading scheme as a result of the proposed changes to the EU emission allowance trading 
directive’ (15.04.2008) Legal opinion commissioned by the Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, pp. 60-61, online available at 
<http://www.bmu.de/english/emissions_trading/doc/42364.php>, section E. 
34 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 may 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 
(entered into force 21 March 1994), (UNFCCC). 
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refrain from including aviation within the EU ETS.”35 Among its major provisions 
is Article 4(2)(b) which requires developed countries to “adopt national policies and 
take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change” to “demonstrate 
that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends,” 
explicitly recognising that “these Parties may implement such policies and measures 
jointly with other Parties.”36 This article together with Article 3(3)37 and Article 
4(1)38, require that the parties can act individually or jointly when implementing 
measures to mitigate the climate change caused by the transport sector. Accordingly, 
the member states of the EU not only have a legal obligation under the UNFCCC to 
combat climate change, but also are permitted to do this jointly, acting as the EU. 
Then, the Kyoto Protocol requires that developed countries “shall …. 
implement and/or further elaborate polices and measures …. such as (vii) measures 
to limit/or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases…. in the transport sector.”39 It also 
requires cooperation with other countries in Article 2(1)(b), so as “to enhance the 
combined effectiveness of their policies and measures adopted under this Article.”40 
More importantly, Article 2(2) of the Protocol takes a step further than the UNFCCC, 
which states that “[t]he Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or 
reduction of greenhouse gases ….from aviation….working through the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)….”41 This article requires ICAO to work on 
the task of reducing aviation emissions, but it by no means authorizes ICAO to be 
the only delegated authority or excludes the EU from tackling the climate impact of 
the aviation sector.42 So far, there are no legal restrictions on the introducing of a 
regional emissions trading system in the climate change regime. 
                                                        
35 Malte Petersen, (n. 30), p. 199. 
36 UNFCCC, (n. 34), art. 4 (2)(b). 
37 Article 3(3) states: “The parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or 
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects…” UNFCCC, ibid. 
38 Article 4(1) states they should: “… promote the cooperate in the development, application and 
diffusion, including transfer of technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in all relevant 
sectors, including the energy, transport…sectors.” UNFCCC, ibid. 
39 Kyoto Protocol, (n. 27), art. 2 (1)(a). 
40 Ibid., art. 2(1)(b). 
41 Ibid., art. 2(2). 
42 Malte Petersen, (n. 30). 
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Although the Chicago Convention 43  does not directly address emissions 
trading, it is relevant for the legality of the application of the EU ETS to foreign 
airlines because of the sovereignty principle addressed in Article 1 and the 
non-discrimination principle addressed in Article 11 of the Convention.44 Article 1 
of the Convention stipulates that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty 
over the airspace above its territory.45 Given that all of the EU member states are 
parties to the Convention, according to the above article, they are free to regulate 
their own airspace. Article 11 states that: 
“…. subject to provisions of the Convention, the laws and 
regulations of contracting States relating to the admission to or departure 
from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to 
the operation and navigation of such aircraft while within its territory 
airspace, shall be applied to aircraft of all contracting States without 
distinction as to nationality, and shall be complied with by such aircraft 
upon entering or departing from or while within the territory of that 
State.”46 
 
Accordingly, the inclusion of international aviation within the EU ETS has to 
be non-discriminatory. In other words, the EU ETS must treat foreign aircraft as 
national aircraft. These provisions show that the Chicago Convention does not 
contain explicit restrictions that require the EU to refrain from including aviation 
within the EU ETS.47 
Second, EU law establishes the legal basis for including aviation within the 
EU ETS. Articles 192 and 193 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union48 refer to Union policy and measures regarding environmental protection. 
                                                        
43 Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, art. 37 (entered into 
force 4 April 1947) [Chicago Convention]. 
44 Malte Petersen, (n. 30); R.C.N. Wit et al., ‘Giving Wings to Emissions Trading’, (2005), Delft, 
Report for the European Commission, DG Environment No. ENV.C.2/ETU/2004/0074r, online 
available at <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/pdf/aviation_et_study.pdf> last accessesd 
07.06.10. 
45 Chicago Convention, (n. 43), art. 1. 
46 Ibid., art. 11. 
47 Article 15 “Airport and similar charges” and Article 24 “Customs duty” relates to economic 
instruments on aviation, but it not considered as relevant to provisions on emissions trading. See my 
discussions of these two articles in chapter 5, see also R.C.N. Wit et al., (n. 44); Malte Petersen, (n. 30). 
48 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union sets out the specific objectives of the EU’s 
various policies and the specific rules governing the EU’s external actions. It is part of the Lisbon 
Treaty which was signed on 13 December 2007, online available at 
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Then, Directive 2003/87/EC established the EU emissions trading system to tackle 
climate change.49 It was amended as Directive 2008/101/EC50 to include aviation 
activities in the EU ETS, which provides a direct legal basis for the application of 
the EU ETS to aviation. Many of the issues relating to the application of the EU 
ETS to aviation are identical or similar to those relating to its application to other 
activities, which will receive closer attention in the next section. 
Third, as the emissions trading scheme is a new instrument, the bilateral 
agreements signed by the EU member states with other countries do not address it. 
Yet, some of the provisions of such bilateral agreements can be considered to be 
relevant. For example, in the case of the US airlines’ opposition to including foreign 
airlines in the EU ETS in 2012,51 the US airlines argue that the EU’s extending of 
ETS on US air carriers violates the Open Skies Agreement, which is a bilateral 
agreement which came into force in late March of 2008.52 It provides that “any 
airlines registered in the EU or US may fly to any airport within the other’s borders, 
subject to the availability of takeoff and landing slots on both ends of the proposed 
route.”53 The EU’s imposition of the ETS on US carriers will limit these open 
flights.54 However, this provision, in fact, confirms Article 11 of the Chicago 
                                                                                                                                                               
<http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty.html>; The Treaty establishing the European 
Community, as amended, provides the objectives of the European Community and the legal basis for it 
to take legislative action. See Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon 2005). 
49 Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 
establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and 
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC. 
50 Directive 2008/101/EC, (n. 29). 
51 Case C-366/10 The Air Transport Authority of America, American Airlines, Inc., Continental 
Airlines, Inc., United Airlines, Inc. v. The Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Reference 
for a preliminary ruling from High Court of Justice Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court) 
(United Kingdom) made on 22 July 2010. IATA believed that the EU’s including of non-EU airlines in 
its emissions trading scheme contravened the Chicago Convention. It has filed an amicus brief in 
London ahead of the hearing into the case brought by the Air Transport Association of America (ATA) 
and three major US airlines – American, Continental and United – over the Aviation EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme. This case has been sent to the ECJ in May 2010. See also ‘US airline EU ETS case 
against the UK to be referred to European court as NGO coalition joins action’ (28 May 2010) online 
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online available at <http://www.greenaironline.com/news.php?viewStory=410> last accessed 08.10.09. 
52 Steven Truxal, ‘Competitive distortions, carbon emissions efficiencies, or the green ultimatum?’ (n. 
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53 Ibid., p.1. 
54 Ibid. 
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Convention, which requires that operators of aircraft must comply with domestic 
regulations regarding the admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft 
engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such 
aircraft while within their territory.55 To enforce this provision, if the EU could 
make its ETS applicable to the US airlines, and if the US airlines did not comply 
with the scheme, a member state could ultimately refuse the non-compliant airline 
access into its airspace.56 As such, such a bilateral agreement should not be treated 
as a legal barrier to the application of the EU ETS to foreign airlines. 
From the above discussions on the relevant international agreements, the EU 
law and bilateral agreements, it seems that the application of the EU ETS to 
international aviation is lawful. The next section will provide an analysis of the 
effectiveness of the EU ETS. 
 
3.1.2. The Effectiveness of the EU ETS 
 
This section examines the effectiveness of the EU ETS from four perspectives: 
the greenhouse gases covered in the emissions trading; trading with other sectors; 
the allocation methods; and allowing and restricting carbon offsetting. I argue that 
the EU ETS is a good model for regional efforts to regulate international aviation 
emissions. The role of regional emissions trading in curbing the growth of 
international aviation emissions will further be discussed in section 3.3. 
 
(a). Greenhouse Gases Covered in the EU ETS 
 
One issue relating to the environmental effectiveness of the EU ETS in terms 
of curbing the growth of international aviation emissions is the gases that are 
covered by the scheme. I argue that the coverage of the EU ETS suits the 
                                                        
55 Chicago Convention, (n. 43), art. 11. See also R.C.N. Wit et al., (n. 47). 
56 R.C.N. Wit et al, ibid. 
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requirements of controlling emissions from the international aviation sector because 
it covers mainly CO2 emissions but is not limited to them.57 
Although aviation is a CO2 intensive mode of transport, IPCC estimates the 
non-CO2 effects as being about 2 to 4 times greater than those of CO2 alone.58 NOx 
and H2O are the most significant non-CO2 emissions from air transport.59 An 
efficient regulatory mechanism on aviation emissions should include at least both 
CO2 and NOx, as they are the main emissions from aircraft and have offsetting 
effects in between which have been discussed in Chapter 2. The current EU ETS 
only includes CO2 from aircraft but it may be extended to NOx.60 This is because 
the measurability of the emissions decides the choice of the coverage of gases by a 
trading regime.61  However, given the current measurement uncertainty attached to 
H2O and the problems arising in determining the liability for its effects, bringing 
H2O into the emissions trading regime is still not possible and may only “complicate 
the trading system, and undermine its practical feasibility and political 
acceptability.”62 As such, the EU ETS is potentially effective in controlling the 
aviation emissions, as it could include both CO2 and NOx from aircraft, although 
certain problems have not yet been solved. 
 
(b). Trading with Other Sectors 
 
The scope of the EU ETS is of importance for assessing the effectiveness of 
                                                        
57 See Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 as 
amendment to Directive 2003/97/EC, Annex I and II. 
58 Joyce E. Penner et al. (eds.), Aviation and the Global Atmosphere: Special Report of the 
International Panel on Climate Change, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999).  
59 Lucas M Z Mendes & Georgina Santos, ‘Using economic instruments to address emissions from air 
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<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/796&format=HTML&aged=0&l
anguage=EN&guiLanguage=en> last accessed 07.07.10. 
61 Jürgen Lefevere, (n. 3). 
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the scheme in curbing the growth of aviation emissions, as a broader scope implies 
additional options for low-cost emission reductions. The EU ETS covers certain 
sectors and economic activities within those sectors.63 By allowing airlines to trade 
with other sectors, the EU ETS acts as an efficient tool to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions64 but mitigation may not necessarily occur in the aviation sector. 
There is a possibility that airlines may become buyers in the EU ETS. 
However, the aim of expanding the coverage of the EU ETS by including more 
sectors is to increase its efficiency65 rather than reduce its effectiveness in any 
single sector. Because greenhouse gases mix uniformly in the atmosphere, emissions 
reductions taken in any sector have much the same value. Large cost differences in 
different sectors increase trading opportunities. Increased trading opportunities 
imply that participants in the scheme may have more options for lower price 
allowances. 
In fact, the scope of the EU ETS is limited, as is listed in Annex I of the 
revised Directive. 66  It implies some criteria for expanding the scope of the 
scheme.67 Including new sectors should consider their abatement potential because 
a sector with relatively low abatement potential would be at risk of losing its 
competitiveness in the trading market.68 There are also some other considerations in 
including new sectors, including practical feasibility, data availability, 
competitiveness effects and the existence of other policy instruments.69  More 
importantly, it has been identified that the rationale of including new sectors in the 
EU ETS is “mainly on the share of greenhouse gas emissions.”70 This means that 
including new sectors (e.g. aviation) must consider the actual reduction of emissions 
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in those sectors. The EU ETS should be an effective mitigation tool for such sectors, 
rather than only an efficient tool to provide incentives for airlines to buy 
allowances.71 
In sum, by allowing airlines to trade with other sectors, the EU ETS provides 
flexibility for airlines to choose low-cost emissions reduction rather than cut 
emissions by themselves. Although there is a possibility that airlines may largely 
become buyers in the EU ETS, the aim of including more sectors is to increase the 
economic efficiency of the scheme rather than reduce its effectiveness in any single 
sector. 
 
(c). Allocation Methods 
 
The initial allocation of allowances is an important topic, since it “makes a big 
difference in terms of equity and the cost of reducing emissions, and the process is 
politically fraught.”72 The following paragraphs examine allocation methods under 
the EU ETS. The current EU ETS combines both grandfathering and auctioning for 
the initial allocation on aviation, which seems like a good compromise. I argue that 
it is a good first step to allocate allowances on aviation; however, the existence of 
free allocation risks the effectiveness of emissions trading. Through identifying the 
trend of the increased use of auctioning in the EU ETS in general, I argue that it is 
possible to move away from free allocation to the aviation sector in the future and 
that the EU ETS is potentially an effective tool in regulating aviation emissions on 
regional level. 
Before discussing the allocation in the EU ETS, it is necessary to examine the 
types of allocation methods. Free allocation (grandfathering) and auctioning are 
generally agreed to be the two primary allocation methods. Considering “the 
                                                        
71 A. Endres & C. Ohl, ‘Kyoto, Europe? – An economic evaluation of the European emission trading 
directive’ (2005) 19 European Journal of Law and Economics 17. They have identified that the limited 
scope of the EU ETS brings about a lower economic efficiency of the system. 
72 John M. Volkman, (n. 5), p. 12. 
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political hurdles,”73 grandfathering was preferred in the trial phase of the European 
emissions trading market.74 Such free allocation is normally favoured by existing 
polluters in the markets.75 But it may result in windfall profits for some companies, 
for example when energy producers partly pass on the market value of freely 
obtained emission rights to energy consumers.76 In auction systems, everyone bids 
to purchase allowances. This requires new and existing entities to compete for 
allowances, avoids the risk of windfall profits, and generates revenue that can be 
used to “mitigate impacts on industry sectors that actually merit compensation, 
reduce other taxes, fund research and development of low-emissions technology, 
and [for] other purposes.”77 Auctioning is favoured by those incumbent polluters 
who have the existing resources at the cost of the environment to make successful 
bids. 78  Either of the two allocation methods may bring about unfairness in 
competition.79 
The EU ETS, in bringing aviation into the trading scheme in two stages, 
suggested a combined measure: 82% of the cap (97% of the 2004 level of aviation 
emissions80) will be allocated for free on the basis of historical aviation emissions; 
15% will be subject to auction; and 3% of allowances will be reserved for new 
entrants and for those experiencing rapid growth.81 Allocation of allowances by 
grandfathering has a political advantage and has been accepted by most airlines.82 
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74 John M. Volkman, (n. 5). 
75 Nicholas Stern, (n. 8) p. 333. 
76 Edwin Woerdman, Oscar Couwenberg & Andries Nentjes, ‘Energy Prices and Emissions Trading: 
Windfall Profits from Grandfathering?’ (2009) 28/2 E.J.L &E. 185; Institute for Public Policy Research, 
‘Airlines stand to make £2.7 billion profit from EU climate scheme’ (18 December 2006) online 
available at <http://www.ippr.org.uk/pressreleases/?id=2488> last accessed 01.10.09. 
77 John M. Volkman, (n. 5), p. 13. 
78 Jürgen Lefevere, (n. 3); Robert Baldwin, (n. 28). 
79 Michael A. Mehling, (n. 2); Stefan Weishaar, ‘The European emissions trading system and state aid: 
an assessment of the grandfathering allocation method and the performance standard rate system’ (2007) 
28/6 E.C.L.R. 371; Edwin Woerdman, Alessandra Arcuri, Stefano Clò, ‘Emissions Trading and the 
Polluter-Pays Principle: Do Polluters Pay under Grandfathering?’ (2008) 4/2 Review of Law and 
Economics 565. 
80 Directive 2008/101/EC, (n. 29), article 3c. 
81 Ibid.;see also, Ulrich Steppler & Angela Klingmüller, ‘EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Aviation: 
Quo Vadis?’ (2009) 34 4/5 Air & Sp. L. 253. 
82 British Airways, ‘Evidence from British Airways for the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change’, (2005), HM Treasury, London, online available at 
<http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/FC6/16/climatechange_air.pdf>; EC, ‘Reducing the climate 
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Requiring some of the permits to be auctioned implies bigger incentives for the 
adoption of new and cleaner technology compared to a pure grandfathering 
system. 83  This combined measure reduces the entry barrier problem of 
grandfathering as well. So far, an initial allocation which combines both 
grandfathering and auctioning seems like a good first step. 
However, an initial allocation which combines both grandfathering and 
auctioning is not perfect for curbing the growth of aviation emissions. It has been 
argued that airlines may gain many benefits from such an emissions trading system 
but not actually reduce their emissions. 84 The system may result in advantage for 
industry but not necessarily environmental effectiveness. This is because airlines are 
still likely to receive most of the allowances they will need for free; and they “would 
be fully able to pass on the cost of allowances to customers without creating 
significant negative impacts on demand.”85 Then, in the event, like the economic 
crisis which started in 2008, of a big drop in the level of activity of the aviation 
sector, airlines may sell their unused allowances to other sectors. Since most of these 
allowances were received at no cost, airlines’ participation in emissions trading has 
been criticised as “a form of insurance”86 with no environmental benefit. 
What is more, the non-aviation sectors prefer to see a full auctioning system in 
aviation. 87  Mendes and Santos have discussed other energy-intensive sectors’ 
objections to the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS. They found that the other 
sectors believed that airlines would be “a net purchaser of allowances” that this may 
“accelerate the increase in allowance price and reduce the amount of allowances 
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available to other sectors, impairing their competitiveness.”88 In theory, after the 
initial allocation of permits, when the market is operating, the distribution of permits 
would be determined by the polluters trading in the market.89 When trade between 
sectors is allowed, it is assumed that aviation would buy additional emissions 
permits from other sectors if aviation were to incur high abatement costs. Although 
Wit et al showed the possibility of there being no impact on the price of allowances 
even if airlines were not to abate at all90, it is not safe to predict what will happen in 
practice. 
Although the existence of free allocation risks the effectiveness of the EU ETS 
in curbing the growth of aviation emissions, I argue that by providing allocation 
allowances on the aviation sector it is possible to move away from free allocation in 
the future and that the EU ETS is potentially an effective tool in regulating aviation 
emissions on regional level. This is mainly because there is a trend of increased use 
of auctioning in the development of the EU ETS in general, which can provide a 
remedy for some of the main problems posed by free allocation in the EU ETS.91 
Because of the opposition from both the member states and industry to the idea of 
auctioning allowances, free allocation was the standard approach to allocating 
allowances for the first two phases of the EU ETS (the first phase from 2005 to 2007 
and the second phase from 2008 to 2012), and the states were allocated accordingly. 
Governments were allowed to auction 5% of their allowances in the first phase and 
10% in the second.92 In ex post analyses of the first and second phases, Böhringer 
and Lange have observed that free allocation has trade-off impacts on the efficiency 
of the scheme.93 It has also been argued that “the prospect of future allowance 
distribution being contingent upon recent emissions gives a direct incentive to 
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industries to inflate actual emissions.”94 Then, in the 2009 revised Directive on the 
EU ETS, the way that emission allowances are allocated has been drastically altered. 
It requires for the emissions trading from 2013, a full auctioning for the power 
sector and a gradual shift to auctioning for the other sectors, except for the 
sub-sectors that are deemed to be at “significant risk of carbon leakage” which will 
be eligible for 100% free allocation for the period 2013-2020.95  The revised 
Directive does not provide important detailed rules about auctioning and free 
allocation through the use of benchmarks. The details of the auctioning process was 
arranged to be included in a separate regulation according to the 2009 revised 
Directive.96 Its article 10.4 lists the requirements of such a regulation,97 but the 
Directive does not foresee the end of free allocation. While it is still too early to give 
a definitive answer to the question when and how the EU ETS will move away from 
free allocation, the revised Directive does imply the trend of an increased use of 
auctioning. It therefore seems sensible to expect fully auctioning allowances on 
aviation in the EU ETS in the future.  
From the above discussion, choosing the initial allocation method is a difficult 
topic. It is a difficult issue to decide how to allocate initially the permits among the 
airlines. I argue that the EU ETS’s approach of combining grandfathering and 
auctioning is a good first step, because it has political advantage, it implies 
incentives for innovation and reduces the entry barrier. However, because of the 
existence of free allowances, airlines may not actually reduce their emissions. Even 
so, I identified the trend of the increased use of auctioning in the development of the 
EU ETS. I argue that the initial allocation of allowances on airlines is possible to 
move away from free allocation in the future and the EU ETS is potentially effective 
in regulating aviation emissions. 
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(d). Allowing and Restricting Offsetting 
 
The effectiveness of emissions trading in an international market also relates to 
the use of credits from the Kyoto Protocol’s project-based flexible mechanisms –the 
joint implementation (JI) and more importantly for current purposes the clean 
development mechanism (CDM), which are also known as carbon offsetting 
projects.98 The EU ETS provides that “[a]ircraft operators shall be able to use 
credits up to an amount corresponding to a percentage, which shall not be set below 
15%, of their verified emissions during the period from 2013 to 2020.”99 It allows 
the airlines to use credits from offsetting projects and puts a ceiling on the quantity 
of such credits. I argue that the EU ETS’s approach to the carbon offsetting provides 
a good model of guidance for airlines on the rules allowing and restricting access to 
CDM and JI. 
In the early stages of the EU ETS, the member states diverged in the 
implementation of the Linking Directive,100 which enables the use of credits from 
the CDM (CERs) and JI (ERUs). Since then, there have been various arguments for 
and against the use of carbon offsetting. Some of them treat the Linking Directive 
and offsetting projects as opportunities to increase the range of reduction 
possibilities for their industries. The industries that cannot or do not want to reduce 
their own emissions could import cheap credits from CDM projects in developing 
countries or JI projects in developed countries. Offsetting programmes are optimised 
as cost-effectiveness instrument because they provide cheaper options to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.101 The options of importing credits through CDM and JI 
may also “increase the liquidity of the carbon market.”102 It has been argued that 
“ultimately carbon prices would converge” through “increased access to CDM and 
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JI” which “would lead to downward EUA prices.”103 CDM has also been argued as 
being “an innovative mechanism that builds a bridge over the ‘North/South’ gap in 
the Kyoto Scheme”104 
There are also arguments criticising the use of carbon offsetting.105 One 
argument is that using credits from offsetting programmes may reduce the incentives 
for domestic action and result in less technological innovation.106 It arguably allows 
the industrialized countries (Annex I Parties to the Kyoto Protocol) to increase their 
accumulated emissions by obtaining emissions credits generated by investments in 
CDM projects in a developing country (non-Annex I Parties).107 This means that 
developed countries fail to take responsibilities for their own environmentally 
damaging behaviour. Some others have warned of the risk of using cheaper credits 
which would put a downward pressure on the market, “leading to little reductions 
made within the EU and the bulk of those reductions purchased from the Kyoto 
mechanisms.”108 There is also a question concerning the quality of the projects 
invested in through the project-based mechanisms, especially with respect to 
CDM.109 Many commentators have questioned the extent to which CDM projects 
actually reduce emissions because the majority of CDM projects have been found to 
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be “non-additional”. 110  “Additionality” means that a project activity should 
demonstrate that its investments generate fewer emissions than would have been the 
case according to business as usual and that the project activity is being 
implemented because of the financial support provided by the project mechanism.111 
Additionality addresses a challenge to the design of CDM which has to prevent 
projects that lead to a net increase in emissions in any sector or any country.112 
What is more, CDM projects were required to contribute to sustainable development 
in the host developing countries according to the Kyoto Protocol.113 However, it has 
been argued that “initial assessments of the mechanism show that the most 
cost-effective projects have the least benefits in terms of sustainable development, 
whereas projects that potentially hold the largest sustainability promise still face 
difficulties in being approved, pointing to a general tension between the 
mechanism’s two objectives.”114 
Notwithstanding these various arguments for and against the use of carbon 
offsetting, the EU ETS has allowed aircraft operators to use credits from offsetting 
projects but only “up to an amount corresponding to a percentage, which shall not 
be set below 1,5%, of their verified emissions during the period from 2013 to 
2020.”115 The EU ETS provides a good model of guidance for airlines on the rules 
allowing and restricting access to CDM and JI, because it includes quantitative 
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limits on the access to CDM and JI which contribute to ensuring the effectiveness of 
emissions trading. 116  Fundamentally, carbon offsetting is built on the idea of 
neutralising the emissions caused by consumption in one sector through 
compensation in another sector. Airlines’ access to carbon offsetting is built on a 
continuous process of reducing emissions in the non-transport sector (e.g. 
afforestation, renewable energy), implying two limitations. One is that there is no 
real reduction from aviation emissions, instead, allowing the flights to continue 
polluting at previous levels or higher.117 For airlines, carbon offsets become an 
excuse for business as usual with regard to pollution. Another limitation is that 
spatial constraints, or physical or economic constraints will ultimately present 
barriers to the availability of off-setting.118 What is more, there is a tension between 
the use of low-cost carbon offset projects and efforts to develop and deploy new 
technologies to reduce aviation emissions. 119  Offset projects may reduce the 
incentives on airlines to increase their fuel efficiency or invest in research and 
development in alternative energy. Therefore, it is necessary to put a ceiling on the 
quantity of credits from offsetting projects that the aviation sector is allowed to 
access. This ceiling may ensure that airlines enjoy only limited flexibility in using 
cheap credits from offsetting and the cap on the aviation emissions means real 
reductions from this sector. 
 
3.2. Potential of Developing Multiple Regional Emissions Trading 
 
Through the above analysis of the application of the EU ETS to aviation, it is 
clear that the EU ETS provides a good model for regional efforts to curb the growth 
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of aviation emissions on a regional level. The following paragraphs examine the 
effects of the EU ETS on other countries in developing multiple regional emissions 
trading. Multiple regional emissions trading schemes are weaker than a global 
emissions trading scheme, and they cannot provide a stand-alone solution to curbing 
the growth of international aviation emissions. But multiple regional emissions 
trading schemes may contribute to a multi-level approach to regulating aviation 
emissions, a subject to which I return in section 3.3. I will also suggest a global 
emissions trading system in section 4. 
Before exploring on the effects of the EU ETS on developing regional 
emission trading in other countries, it is necessary to discuss the possibility for the 
EU ETS to become a unified emissions trading system. Its further development will 
certainly not all be controlled by the EU, but will depend on many factors.120 For 
example, the existence of a cap is the main precondition for emissions trading to 
function as a mitigation tool. It has been argued that “[i]n a world where all 
countries take on emission reduction targets and search for cost-effective solutions 
to the climate problem, the European Commission’s ideal of a global carbon market 
might materialise.”121 Also, international coordination is of importance for either 
integrating the EU ETS in an international trading scheme or linking emissions 
trading schemes through an international agreement. An international emissions 
trading scheme would entail at least that all the major emitters of greenhouse gases 
are included, allocation methods are determined at the international level and 
emissions reductions are comparable. 122  Given the political and institutional 
uncertainties, it is too early to give a definitive answer to whether the EU ETS can 
become a blueprint for a global carbon market. 
 Although there is a relatively low availability of literature on the medium- or 
long-term development of the EU ETS as a blueprint for a global carbon market, the 
EU ETS has been leading the development of multiple regional emissions trading 
schemes. Interest in emissions trading has spread in many other countries. For 
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example, major developments for new emissions trading markets can be found in 
the U.S. and Australia.123 The U.S. launched the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) 
system in 2003 as the first voluntary U.S. cap-and-trade system and the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) as the first mandatory U.S. cap-and-trade system 
for reducing emissions from power plants.124 In 2008, the Australian Government 
issued a Green Paper on the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme and confirmed its 
intention to introduce an Australian Emissions Trading Scheme (AETS) to 
commence in 2010.125 Yet, following the failure of Copenhagen, the Australian 
government has put plans for a flagship emissions trading scheme on hold until 
2013 at the earliest.126 But there is no doubt that interest in emissions trading has 
spread, leading to the design and implementation of several programmes for 
greenhouse gases and conventional pollutants. As such, expecting the development 
of multiple regional emissions trading schemes is sensible. 
I argue that multiple regional emissions trading systems cannot provide a 
stand-alone solution to curbing the growth of international aviation emissions. Apart 
from the limitations of emissions trading discussed in section 2.2, multiple regional 
emissions trading is weaker than a global emissions trading, because of the possible 
carbon leakage (the increase of emissions outside those areas covered by regional 
emissions trading schemes) and the complexity of monitoring. For ground based 
sectors, the concept of carbon leakage has been explained in two types of situation 
of the EU ETS: “either the EU manufacturer moves its activities outside the EU to 
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avoid EU ETS costs (supply driven carbon leakage) or it loses its market 
share/competitiveness due to high EU ETS costs and demand then shifts to a 
non-EU manufacturer (demand driven carbon leakage).” 127  In both cases, 
greenhouse gases will continue to be emitted into the atmosphere by operators not 
covered by the EU ETS. Although aviation is different from the ground based 
sectors in terms of its international nature, the produce offered by airlines (a seat 
offered on a given flight) cannot be stocked and EU carriers cannot realistically 
switch their activities away from the EU and move their fleet outside of the EU; 
although there is nothing that can stop passengers from shifting to non-EU carriers 
or using alternative routes if that is realistic.128 Carbon leakage for airlines can 
always happen in the transferring of activities to routes not covered by the EU ETS. 
In fact, a shift to less carbon intensive forms of transport, such as high speed trains, 
would be desirable, as discussed in Chapter 5. The multiple emissions trading 
schemes will face the same risk given that there are only fragmented emissions 
trading markets rather than a unified international system which covers the whole 
world. What is more, multiple emissions trading schemes would face the challenge 
of the complexity of monitoring. Given that aviation is an international activity, the 
more states that participate in the trading system the less carbon leakage may 
happen and the smaller possibility there is of competition distortion.129 However, 
the larger the market is “the greater the complexity, problems of transparency, and 
[the] likelihood of political resistance.”130 This issue needs to be managed by 
“carefully choosing the point at which emissions allowances are distributed,” 
because there is a trade-off between the number of entities that are involved in the 
system and the complexity of monitoring.131 However, from a purely practical 
perspective, the aviation community must act as a whole to the greatest extent 
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possible and must choose global measures to protect the world’s environment.132 
Thus, the current regional approach to emissions trading represents a contentious 
issue, as the imposition of the scheme on aviation includes an emissions trading 
scheme by one region over the rest of the world. 
 
3.3. The Role of Regional Emissions Trading 
 
In the previous sections, I have argued that the application of the EU ETS to 
international aviation is lawful. It provides a good model for regional efforts to curb 
the growth of international aviation emissions and may lead to the development of 
multiple regional emissions trading schemes. I have also argued that multiple 
regional emissions trading schemes cannot provide a stand-alone solution to curbing 
the growth of international aviation emissions because of the possible carbon 
leakage and the complexity of monitoring. In this section, I further identify two 
roles of regional emissions trading in regulating international aviation emissions in a 
multi-scalar regulatory architecture, which will receive close attention in Chapter 7. 
If sectoral mitigation targets can be allocated to states and regions under the 
proposals in Chapter 3 (which suggests a comprehensive multi-level burden sharing 
system under a sectoral approach led by the UNFCCC), the EU ETS provides one 
mechanism by which those mitigation targets might be achieved on a regional level. 
In the absence of any global sectoral mitigation target, the multiple regional 
emissions trading schemes contributes to a multi-level approach to regulating 
international aviation emissions, moving beyond a complete reliance on 
international treaty making. 
As mitigation tools within the global sectoral target under the UNFCCC 
system discussed in Chapter 3, the cap on emissions provides some certainty as to 
the environmental outcome, as discussed in section 2.1. If sectoral mitigation targets 
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on international aviation can be allocated to states and regions under the proposals 
discussed in Chapter 3, regional emissions trading may provide the regional targets 
and then ensure that the mitigation targets could be achieved on a regional level. 
However, mitigation does not necessarily occur in the aviation sector, and emissions 
trading may not provide sufficient incentive for innovation. It therefore seems a 
sensible strategy not to pin all our hopes on the functioning of this particular 
regulatory instrument alone, but to pursue a complementary mix of multiple 
instruments that address the international aviation emissions issue, including fuel 
taxes and technology-based standards on aircraft. 
Second, in the absence of any global sectoral mitigation targets, I argue that 
multiple regional emissions trading systems provide contribution to the multi-level 
approach to regulating aviation emissions.133 The basic idea is that regulations on 
multiple levels should be adopted as an alternative to the traditional top-down global 
negotiations on national emission targets. We need to move beyond a complete 
reliance on international treaty making for the regulation of international aviation 
emissions. In the case of international aviation emissions, a sectoral approach under 
the UNFCCC system would be the best way to curb the growth of aviation 
emissions as discussed in Chapter 3. However, the results of international 
negotiations on climate change are still pending. If a sectoral approach on 
international aviation emissions cannot be agreed, an alternative multiple levels 
approach through multiple regional emissions trading systems may still contribute to 
the mitigation of aviation emissions. This multiple level approach to regulating 
aviation emissions contributes to breaking the deadlock in international negotiation 
and avoids complete reliance on international treaty making. It is worth noting that 
the approach provided by regional emissions trading schemes is prepared for the 
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worst-case outcome, i.e. that climate negotiations on a sectoral approach break down. 
The caps of regional emissions trading schemes collectively may not be as 
demanding as the proposed sectoral target. To some extent, current policy already 
approves for this, e.g. by differentiating the EU’s mid-term targets in cases with and 
without a new international agreement.134 It therefore seems sensible to pursue a 
complementary mix of multiple instruments at multiple levels, including domestic 
fuel taxes. 
 
4. Proposing a Global Emissions Trading System 
 
In this section, I propose a global emissions trading scheme for international 
aviation. Before discussing its role, it is necessary at this stage to outline my 
proposal. A global emissions trading scheme for aviation should be a sectoral only 
emissions trading scheme unless and until a more comprehensive global scheme can 
be agreed. But airlines will be allowed to buy credits from carbon offsetting projects 
within a quantitative limit. There is also the option of negotiating a linking 
mechanism with regional schemes such as the EU ETS. Under the scheme, the cap 
equals the sectoral target on aviation emissions agreed through international 
negotiations led by the UNFCCC; all of the airlines would be participants; IATA 
would be in charge of the initial allocation of emissions allowances; and the 
verification and compliance would be through ICAO. The following paragraphs will 
further explain this proposed global emissions trading scheme. 
First of all, the absolute cap equals the sectoral target on aviation emissions 
agreed through international negotiation as proposed in Chapter 3. Rather than 
allocating allowances within the cap to states, regions and cities, they would go to 
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airlines on the basis of auctioning. The purpose of suggesting that all of the airlines 
would be participants in the emissions trading is to cover all the emissions resulting 
from flights between two nations or more in the trading system. Broad participation 
would avoid possible carbon leakage and would build a healthy market in ensuring 
the effectiveness of the emissions trading, as has been discussed above. In designing 
a cap-and-trade system for aviation, it would be important to ensure 
non-discrimination between airlines,135 and to ensure that the policy does not 
produce competition distortion.136 It is also important to reduce “the likelihood that 
carriers would simply reflag or relocate as a means of avoiding regulation.”137 The 
proposal is designed so that the airlines would become participants in the trading 
system and the allowances would be allocated directly to airlines. Allocating 
emissions limits to air carriers is “a logical way to apply an aviation emissions 
limitation policy,” because carriers have the greatest ability to respond to incentives 
to reduce emissions and such responses can be measured readily by means of 
information about their fuel consumption.138 Additionally, broad participation by 
airlines is practical, because the concept of emissions trading, as the “least of the 
possible evils,” receives support from the industry.139 More importantly, a global 
emissions cap and trade scheme was broadly suggested as applying initially to the 
transport sector, although the application of regional emissions trading schemes such 
as the EU ETS to international aviation was not supported by the industry.140 IATA 
(International Air Transportation Association) Director General and CEO Giovanni 
Bisignani, at the 3rd Aviation and Environment Summit in 2008, said “IATA is not 
opposed to emissions trading provided that it is fair, global and effective….[but] 
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Europe’s unilateral approach will only lead to legal battles and trade wars.”141 
Given that airlines have accepted the concept of emissions trading and they support 
the creation of a global cap and trade system including aviation, I suggest that all of 
the airlines rather than nation states should be the participants in emissions trading. 
Regarding the allocation method, all permits should be allocated through 
auctioning. Although the EU ETS has adopted both grandfathering and auctioning 
for now, this is not a perfect choice, partly because the existence of free allowances 
enables airlines to play emissions trading as a game to make profits without truly 
achieving any GHGs reductions. For example, “airlines could sell all their 
allowances at the start of the year and, if the cost of allowances drops, purchase the 
necessary amount of allowances at the end of the year for less money, making a 
profit without making any changes to their business.”142 Some scholars argue that a 
fully auctioned scheme “would not be optimal,” if the revenues from the auction are 
refunded to the airlines. 143  However, even this is surely more acceptable to 
stakeholders and the public than grandfathering, if the revenue is treated as a 
funding for environmental protection that should be invested in new and cleaner 
technologies. The revenue refunded to the airlines may however also have a 
counterproductive impact on demand control, which is a necessary part of reducing 
aviation emissions. In any event, it is worth noting that refunding to the airlines is 
not the only positive option for using the revenue. The revenue may also be used in 
funding new entrants to reduce the entry barriers problem and to reduce the 
distortion of competition. In these circumstances, the initial allocation of allowances 
becomes simpler and a fully auctioned system might be optimal. 
The next step is to identify the authority that may be put in charge of the initial 
allocation. I suggest that IATA is best equipped to manage the auctioning process 
with airlines. Although the UNFCCC Parties have committed themselves to limiting 
                                                        
141 ‘Remarks of Giovanni Bisignani at Aviation and the Environment Summit’ IATA Press, 22 April 
2008, online <www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/2008-04-21-01.htm>. See also IATA, ‘IATA Blasts 
European Union ETS Decision’ (24 October 2008) online available at 
<http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/2008-10-24-02.htm> last accessed 02.10.09. 
142 Danielle Goodwin, (n. 30), p. 4. 
143 Fredrik Carlsson & Henrik Hammar, ‘Incentive-based regulation of CO2 emissions from 
international aviation’ (2002) 8 Journal of Air Transport Management 365, 368. 
 211 
aviation emissions through ICAO, IATA has committed itself to cooperate with 
ICAO.144 More importantly, IATA is preferred because of its relationship with the 
airlines. IATA enjoys an exceptionally broad membership, with some 230 airlines 
carrying 93% of the world’s international scheduled traffic belonging to it.145 These 
airlines operate over 120 countries from around the globe that include both 
developed and developing countries. IATA’s membership truly covers the whole 
aviation sector. The mission of IATA is “to represent and serve the airline 
industry.”146 IATA is not only an industry association but also “the most significant 
private international economic regulator the world has seen.”147 IATA and ICAO 
(discussed in Chapter 4), together led the development of civil aviation after the 
Second World War. Two functions of the post-war IATA have been identified, which 
are: 
 
“First, it was the industry association for airlines that represented 
their interests at ICAO as ICAO began globalizing flight standards and 
airworthiness regulations for aircraft. Second, IATA became a kind of 
global economic regulator after the war.”148 
 
While ICAO has been responsible for technical regulation, IATA was 
responsible for regulating economic issues. For example, it “coordinated the setting 
of mutually acceptable prices for the same traffic corridors, in effect coordinating a 
series of geographic cartels.”149 Although this sort of cartel is no longer in place, 
IATA system of economic regulation once had widespread support from sovereign 
nations as well as the industry. IATA’s power at its height, in terms of economic 
regulation, “reached extraordinary levels” when it “had a Compliance Office to 
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check for ‘malpractices’ such as illegal discounting and to levy heavy fines.”150 As 
such, representing the airline industry, IATA has experience of performing a rigorous 
regulatory role in the economic field. It seems a sensible strategy to suggest that 
IATA should extend its power to distributing emissions allowances to airlines. 
IATA’s involvement in what was essentially pricing fixing in its early days 
provides some insight into IATA’s capacity to contribute to the emissions trading 
system. But IATA represents the airline industry, and there must be some concerns 
that its heavy involvement in regulation will undermine the environmental 
objectives of the regulation in the interests of the industry. It is important to note that 
the overall cap in the emissions trading system would be set by international 
negotiations through the UNFCCC-led sectoral approach on aviation as discussed in 
Chapter 3, rather than IATA. This means that the central environmental objective of 
the emissions trading mechanism is not decided by IATA and could not be 
undermined by the industry body. Emissions above the total cap will be subject to 
scrutiny decided by the UNFCCC. This ongoing scrutiny is crucial and could not be 
reduced for the interests of the industry. Furthermore, the public pressure on the 
airline industry to take further action in reducing emissions means that IATA has 
incentives to participate fully in environmental programmes.151 Public pressure has 
meant that IATA was in turn pushed by its member airlines and managed to bring 
about at least some positive words on the climate problem.152 
But most importantly, the proposed global emissions trading for aviation must 
consider verification and compliance.153 An essential verification and compliance 
component of the trading system would be a proper authority to ensure its proper 
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enforcement with low administrative, monitoring and transaction costs 154  and 
participants’ “agreement on standards for monitoring, reporting and verification of 
emissions.”155 Gander and Helme have proposed a carrier-based system which was 
criticised as not workable in practice, because of the absence of monitoring and 
enforcement provisions.156 The role of ICAO in performance monitoring, reporting 
methods and auditing processes on its member states’ mitigation actions was 
discussed in Chapter 4; this organisation would also be suitable to take on the 
monitoring role in carrier-based emissions trading.157 Under Article 12 of the 
Chicago Convention, every ICAO member state is the enforcement authority over 
“every aircraft flying over or maneuvering within its territory and every aircraft 
carrying its nationality mark.”158 They may require sufficient allowances for all 
anticipated emissions to be carried by aircraft landing in or taking off from their 
territories, registered in their territories, or operating aircraft flying their flags.159 
Although it cannot avoid the possibility that “some carriers might relocate, reregister, 
or re-flag,” 160  airlines cannot escape coverage by the proposed cap-and-trade 
system as long as it covers the whole of the international aviation sector. As such, 
ICAO is best equipped to take the role of verification and monitoring. 
Whilst protections against the undermining of the environmental objectives of 
emissions trading by the industry are not perfect, any risks are outweighed by the 
benefits of involving IATA in the system, in particular its expertise and experience 
of air transport management. Furthermore, given the close relationship between 
IATA and ICAO, which have been working together to develop international civil 
aviation since their inception, conceived simultaneously at the Chicago Conference 
in 1944, both of them need to provide a consistent position on aviation emission 
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mitigation. As such, the cooperation between ICAO and IATA would contribute an 
effective allocation of allowances in the implications for climate governance. 
Apart from the key elements which have been explained in the foregoing 
analysis, I also suggest that airlines be permitted to buy credits from carbon 
offsetting projects up to a maximum quantitative limitation. There is also the option 
of negotiating a linking mechanism with regional schemes such as the EU ETS. In 
this way, airlines may have some cheaper options to reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions, which will increase the efficiency of the scheme. 
Having outlined my proposal, the remaining question is to identify the role of 
the global emissions trading scheme in curbing the growth of international aviation 
emissions. The proposed global emissions trading scheme is partly a tool for the 
allocation of mitigation responsibilities to airlines, in the absence of agreed 
allocation of sectoral mitigation targets under the proposed comprehensive 
multi-level burden sharing system proposed in Chapter 3. As discussed above, the 
cap on emissions within the trading scheme is equal to the sectoral target under the 
UNFCCC system. Rather than allocating allowances within the cap to states, regions 
and cities, they would be auctioned to airlines. These allowances could be bought 
and sold. The market would establish the price of the emissions permits as those 
airlines that are able to reduce their emissions would sell their emission allowances 
to other airlines that would prefer to buy these allowances rather than reduce their 
emissions. As discussed in section 2.1, a trading system reduces the information 
burden on regulators, since the polluters themselves determine where the mitigation 
efforts are most cost-effective. The information needed for burden sharing is 
transmitted through the market for emission permits. As such, the proposed scheme 
acts as an alternative form of allocation of sectoral mitigation targets if the 
comprehensive multi-level burden sharing system proposed in Chapter 3 is difficult 
to realize in practice. 
The proposed global scheme is also a mitigation tool for incentivising the 
airline industry to improve energy intensity. As discussed in section 2.1, emissions 
trading offers incentives for low cost companies to reduce their emissions and sell 
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permits to higher cost companies. With a financial reward for participation, airlines 
who reduce emissions are no longer pure losers, compared to those under direct 
regulations. The prices of emissions permits are determined by the markets. The 
ones who play well in these markets would not be losers, but might even be winners. 
The scheme therefore may incentivise some airlines to improve their fuel efficiency 
and invest in cleaner technologies in order to trade additional allowances on the 
market. As it is a sectoral only trading scheme, the reductions taken by any airline 
would always count as reducing emissions from targeted international aviation, 
subject to limited access to carbon offsetting projects to provide some flexibility to 
airlines. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  
This chapter explores the role of emissions trading in curbing the growth of 
international aviation emissions. First of all, it examines the pros and cons of 
emissions trading in general. The advantages of emissions trading include the 
certainty of the environmental outcome; its efficiency compared to command and 
control regulation; and its political advantages. Its limitations include the fact that it 
does not ensure that emissions will be reduced from targeted sources and it does not 
necessarily provide adequate incentives for innovation. From a preliminary analysis, 
I argue that emissions trading could play an important role in curbing the growth of 
international aviation emissions, but it cannot provide a stand-alone solution. The 
role of multiple regulatory instruments is a subject to which I return in Chapter 7.  
After an analysis of emissions trading in general, I explore the role of emission 
trading at two levels: the role of regional emissions trading and the role of a 
proposed global emissions trading scheme. I start from a legal analysis of the EU 
ETS, as it is by far the largest emissions trading scheme in the world. More 
importantly for current purposes, the EU ETS will include emissions from foreign 
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airlines in 2012. Examining the relevant international agreements, EU law and 
bilateral agreements, I argue that the EU ETS’s inclusion of international aviation is 
lawful. I also argue that the EU ETS provides a good model for regional efforts to 
curb the growth of aviation emissions. The EU ETS covers mainly CO2 emissions 
but it is not limited to them. It allows airlines to trade with other sectors, but the aim 
of expanding the coverage of the EU ETS by including more sectors is to increase 
its efficiency rather than reduce its effectiveness in any single sector. It has used 
both grandfathering and auctioning as allocation methods for now, but by using 
allocation allowances on airlines it is possible to move away from free allocation in 
the future. It also recognised the significance of putting a ceiling on the quantity of 
credits from offsetting projects when allowing the aviation sector to access CDM 
and JI. The EU ETS is thus potentially an effective mitigation tool to regulate 
international aviation emissions on a regional level. 
I also explore the potential of multiple regional emissions trading if the EU 
takes on a leadership role in developing regional emissions trading schemes. Interest 
in emissions trading has spread in many other countries, including the U.S. and 
Australia. Regional emissions trading can make two potential contributions to the 
regulation of emissions from international aviation. If sectoral mitigation targets can 
be allocated under the proposals in Chapter 3, they provide one mechanism by 
which those mitigation targets might be achieved on a regional level. In the absence 
of any global sectoral mitigation target, the multiple regional emissions trading 
schemes provide a contribution to a multi-level approach to regulating international 
aviation emissions. However, multiple regional emissions trading is weaker than a 
global emission trading system in terms of curbing the growth of international 
aviation emissions, because of the possible carbon leakage and the complexity of 
monitoring. It cannot provide a stand-alone solution to reducing aviation emissions. 
Finally, I suggest developing a global emissions trading system for aviation. 
This is partly a tool for the allocation of mitigation responsibilities to airlines in the 
absence of international agreement on allocation as discussed in Chapter 3. It is also 
a mitigation tool for incentivising the airline industry to improve energy intensity. 
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Chapter 7. Multi-scalar Regulatory Architecture 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Familiar legal approaches to regulating international aviation emissions have 
failed, both in the international climate change law regime under the UNFCCC and in 
ICAO, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. A key conclusion of this thesis is that curbing 
the growth of aviation emissions will not result from a focus only on traditional 
international-level approaches grounded in international organisations and treaty 
making. This chapter explores alternatives that take seriously the multi-scalar nature 
of the aviation emissions problem, leading to an innovative way of developing legal 
regulation to curb the growth of aviation emissions. This chapter places aviation in the 
context of the burgeoning new governance literature that has engaged with the 
complexities of regulatory scale and the appropriate role of different approaches. By 
contrast with much of the legal literature, I argue that legal regulation of international 
aviation emissions in the future should be in the form of a multi-scalar regulatory 
architecture, which would simultaneously engage multiple parties, multiple 
instruments and multiple levels of governance. 
New governance provides the theoretical foundation upon which the failure of 
traditional regulatory approaches will be identified and the future of regulating 
aviation emissions will be explored. In addition, aviation emissions provide a “test” of 
new governance theory’s application to an actual regulatory dilemma. As such, the 
function of this chapter is two fold. First, it challenges the existing paradigm that 
focuses almost exclusively on a global solution to aviation’s greenhouse gas 
emissions. Secondly, it contributes to the solution identified in this thesis, a 
multi-level approach involving multiple parties and multiple regulatory tools. 
This chapter begins by examining multi-scalar problems, and I explain the 
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regulatory difficulties of aviation emissions by looking at the problem through a 
scalar lens. I argue that the impact of aviation emissions on climate change is not 
solely an international problem, but rather it is a multi-scalar one that deserves a 
multi-scalar regulatory architecture. 
Then, drawing on the scholarly literature on new governance theory, I explore 
the theoretical foundations of a multi-scalar regulatory approach to climate change 
associated with aviation before applying the theory on regulating aviation emissions 
in section 4. Given the failure of traditional international regulation of aviation 
emissions problem, regulatory design needs to break the barriers of traditional 
international approaches and introduce innovative ideas. The “governance turn”1 of 
new governance theory, as discussed in Chapter 1, takes us beyond traditional forms 
of law making,2 sharing power between many actors, public and private, at different 
levels of governance.3  
Drawing on the key values of new governance theory – its emphasis on the 
participation of multiple public and private parties, on the use of a range of 
instruments, on multiple levels of governance, and on the non-hierarchical forms of 
decision making, the last section provides an exploration of the bearing of 
multi-scalar governance on international air transport emissions. Applying new 
governance theory, this section identifies the three pillars of a multi-scalar regulatory 
architecture for aviation emissions, including the need for a range of parties to be 
involved, the use of multiple instruments and the need for parties on different scales 
to be involved. In addition, a move away from hierarchy in decision-making may 
allow for gaps left by more traditional approaches to be filled. 
 
                                                        
1 Beate Kohler-Koch & Berthold Rittberger, ‘Review Article: The ‘Governance Turn’ in EU Studies’ 
(2006) 44 J. Common Mkt. Stud. 27. 
2 Kenneth Armstrong & Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Law, Governance, or New Governance? The Changing 
Open Method of Coordination’ (2006-2007) 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 649, p. 651. 
3 Joanne Scott (ed.), Environmental Protection: European Law and Governance, (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2009); the special issue of the European Law Journal (Volume 8, 2002) on “law and new 
approaches to EU governance”, pp. vii. 
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2. The Need for a Multi-scalar Climate Regulatory Architecture 
 
Chapter 2 explores the complexity of climate change and aviation emissions. I 
am not going to repeat that discussion, but rather I will approach the problem 
through a scalar lens and explore the possibilities for the next generation of climate 
governance. This view of future climate governance expresses the hope that it may 
be possible to move past some of the current battles by treating international 
aviation emissions as a multi-scalar problem needing multi-scalar regulations. In 
presenting this argument, this section explores the following questions: the nature of 
multi-scalar problems; the reasons why multi-scalar problems need multi-scalar 
regulations; and how aviation emissions relate to these sorts of problems. 
The essence of multi-scalar problems is that the regulations that are currently 
in place are limited and the problems have dimensions far beyond the capacity of 
any single agency on any particular scale to manage effectively. They also appear 
“massive” for policymakers when seen from a distance.4 It requires a proper 
understanding of “not only who and what are causing them, but which policy 
responses will prove most effective.”5 Understanding the nature of multi-scalar 
problems must also address two possible mistakes: “scaling up” the problems as 
“larger-scale versions of small-scale problems” or “scaling down” the problems as 
an aggregation of smaller-scale problems.6  
Multi-scalar problems should not be upscaled.7 For problems which can be 
upscaled, “policy models that work well at small scales and can be confidently 
‘upscaled’ without loss of reliability in guiding policy design.”8 The “scaling up” 
approach to climate regulation emphasises the necessity of a top-down conventional 
approach and focuses on the mitigation efforts on the international level with no 
                                                        
4 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, ‘Massive Problems in the Administrative State: Strategies for Whittling 
Away’ (2009) Draft copy available online at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1280896> last accessed 
07.06.10. In their article, climate change was taken as an example of “massive problems” that “have 
dimensions far beyond the capacity of any single agency to manage effectively,” and “are as much a 
challenge for legislatures as for agencies.” p. 9. 
5 Ibid., p. 14. 
6 Ibid., p. 14; Hari M. Osofsky, ‘Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory 
Role’ (2009) 49/3 Va. J. Int’l L. 585, 603. 
7 Ibid. 
8 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, (n.4), p. 14. 
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room left for state or local level actions.9 However, for multi-scalar problems, if 
regulatory strategies focus only on top-down, international-level approaches 
grounded in nation-state consent, the global/international nature of the problem 
constitutes an impediment to the “cross-cutting” efforts that are required in solving 
the problems.10 The conventional top-down approaches, which were examined in 
Chapters 3 and 4, when used to guide the design of regulatory institutions and 
instruments have proven deeply inadequate when confronted by the complexities of 
international aviation emissions. 
Another mistake is to scale down the multi-scalar problems and treat them as 
simple aggregation phenomena. Regulators who treat massive problems as if they 
are simple aggregation phenomena will “have only limited success, potentially 
causing more problems than they solve.”11 This is because the response of massive 
problems to different regulatory approaches might differ substantially, but “with the 
increases in scale also come increases in complexity of behaviour.”12 In the case of 
massive problems, Ruhl and Salzman have argued that “policy models proven useful 
at smaller scales may be less effective, useless, or even counterproductive.”13 
Given that such massive problems are “deeply embedded in our economy and 
way of life at multiple levels,”14 neither a “scaling up” nor a “scaling down” 
approach to regulating multi-scalar problems would seem adequate. Administrative 
law scholars have been struggling with the appropriate multi-scalar legal approaches 
to such massive problems.15 It has been argued that regulating these massive 
problems deserves multi-scalar, multi-agency coordination networks to address them 
effectively.16 Climate change has been treated as a massive problem, as it is not only 
a global issue, but also an individual, local, national and regional problem.17 
Vandenbergh and Cohen supported multiple strategies in the climate change context 
and they said that: 
“No single strategy will be adequate on its own, and some may fail 
altogether, but if a sufficient number create incentives for emissions 
reductions there is reason for optimism. Some strategies will have direct 
                                                        
9 Ibid.; Hari M. Osofsky, (n. 6). 
10 Hari M. Osofsky, ibid. 
11 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, (n.4), p. 37. 
12 Ibid., p. 14. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Hari M. Osofsky, (n. 6), p. 587. 
15 Ibid.; J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, (n.4). 
16 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, ibid. 
17 Hari M. Osofsky, (n. 6). 
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effects on national incentives, and some will create indirect, hydraulic 
pressure [for joining the complying with legal regulations on climate 
change in the post-2012 era].”18 
 
Osofsky, together with Ruhl and Salzman, has also argued that the scale of 
climate regulation must fit the scale of the problem.19 It seems simple to fit the 
“matching principle” from administrative law, which claims that a regulatory 
authority should “go to the political jurisdiction that comes closest to matching the 
geographic area affected by a particular externality.”20 But the difficulty is that the 
climate change problem is “a contested topic with vigorous arguments made for 
matching climate change to regional, state, and local government scales, as well.”21 
Osofsky has claimed that because greenhouse gas emissions and impacts are 
multi-scalar – “individual, local, state, national, regional, and international” – 
focusing predominantly on any one level of governance limits solutions. He has 
argued for exploring “diagonal” approaches in the context of climate litigation, 
which means cross-cutting approaches, including both vertical (multiple levels of 
government) and horizontal (branches of government or other entities functioning at 
the same level) divisions of governance.22 It is not clear what would satisfy the 
cross-cutting quality of governance and comprise diagonal interactions in regulation, 
but Osofsky has provided a creative approach to climate change regulation and a 
useful way of thinking about regulatory design on international aviation emissions. 
New ideas in designing a legal regulation for aviation emissions may be grounded in 
opportunities for much needed innovation and emissions reductions arising from 
multi-track coordination. 
The impact of international aviation emissions on climate change is not solely 
                                                        
18 Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. Cohen, ‘Climate Change Governance: Boundaries and Leakage’ 
(November 24, 2009) NYU Environmental Law Journal, Forthcoming, Vanderbilt Law and Ecomonics 
Research Paper No. 09-25; Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 09-31, p. 2. Online available at 
SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1511797> last accessed 07.06.10. 
19 Hari M. Osofsky, (n. 6); J.B. Ruhl and James Salzman, (n. 4). 
20 Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, ‘Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for 
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority’ (1996) 14 Yale L. & Poly Rev 23, 25. See also 
Daniel C. Esty, ‘Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law’ (2006) 
115 Yale L. J. 1490, 1493. 
21 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, (n. 4), pp. 10-11. 
22 Hari M. Osofsky, (n. 6). In the context of climate change, Osofsky considered with different sources 
in explaining how climate change challenge should subject to different level of governance. His 
arguments apply especially to one single source, e.g. road transportation. (see pp. 592-595 of Osofsky’s 
article). He has argued that, for a broad range of single emissions sources, “current and future 
emissions are shaped through multiscalar regulatory dynamics.” See also his discussions focused on 
engery industry, Hari M. Osofsky, ‘The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for 
Transnational Regulatory Governance’ (2005) 83 Wash. U. L. Q. 1789. 
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an international problem, but rather it is a multi-scalar one that deserves multi-scalar 
regulations because of the following three considerations. First of all, the impact of 
international aviation emissions on climate change is a highly complex issue. 
Treating it solely as an international problem, with a top-down regulatory approach 
“fails to capture its complexity and the way in which it interacts with all different 
levels of governance.”23 The current regulatory strategy of “being seen to do 
something” by the UNFCCC and then “passing on the tough choices” to ICAO, as 
has been discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, is “an all-too-common strategy in the face 
of policy problems of massive dimensions.”24 It is becoming clear that the current 
dilemmas over climate regulation of aviation emissions reflect the limited capacity 
of the conventional international strategy. The problem with climate regulation of 
aviation emissions is therefore how to overcome deadlock and how to ensure 
effective solutions. Professor Mayntz has argued that there are several conditions for 
collaborative problem-solving. One of his most valuable messages is that “the level 
at which a problem manifests itself is not necessarily the level at which it can most 
effectively be solved.”25 Curbing the growth of international aviation emissions is a 
global problem, but one that conventional top-down international regulations cannot 
effectively solve. In these circumstances, the potentials of national and regional 
level regulations on international aviation emissions imply the nuanced scale of the 
problem, which should not be ignored. For example, national fuel taxes on short 
haul international flights can reduce artificially increased demand for flying and can 
also provide incentives for innovation, as discussed in Chapter 5. Regional 
emissions trading is a tool for mitigation within the global sectoral target and also 
provides an example of multiple levels approach to the climate problem, as 
discussed in Chapter 6. And the international level has potentially crucial 
contributions to make, in setting global targets, but more modestly in, for example, 
                                                        
23 Ibid., p. 632. 
24 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, (n. 4), p. 9. See also Robert L. Glicksman, ‘Balancing Mandate and 
Discretion in the Institutional Design of Federal Climate Change Policy’ (2008) 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
Colloquy 196, 197. From a U.S. federal litigation perspective, it was argued that “[c]ongress should 
vest more discretion in agencies to decide how to address climate change than it does on the question 
of whether to do so.” 
25 Renate Mayntz, ‘From Government to Governance: Political Steering in Modern Societies’, Speech 
on International Summer Academy, (September 7-11, 2003), p. 7, Wuerzburg, Germany, Organised by 
the Institute for Ecological Economy Research (IOEW), Akademie Frankenwarte and the Federal 
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, online available at: 
<http://www.ceses.cuni.cz/CESES-136-version1-1A_governance_government_mayntz_2003.pdf>last 
accessed 15.04.10. 
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providing environmental auditing as discussed in Chapter 4. While the local or city 
scale is not a focus of this thesis, intervention at that level can be envisaged. For 
example, the expansion of airports is governed by local governments and may 
increase demand for flying. Regulating international aviation emissions is not only 
an international problem, but also a national, regional and local problem. Although 
there is no guarantee of success in the multi-scalar initiatives, Osofsky has argued 
that “the nuanced scales of the problem and the regulatory issues they pose suggest 
the value of openness towards strategies that treat the problem as multi-scalar rather 
than simple large scale.”26 
Second, curbing the growth of aviation emissions needs not only large-scale 
efforts but also smaller-scale ones. Even if an ideal treaty regime on aviation 
emissions with accompanying rigorous national polices is achievable, for the long 
term, “a predominantly larger-scale approach may not be able to address the details 
effectively and provide the innovativeness of these smaller-scale efforts.”27 For 
example, the expansion of international aviation results from individual, local, 
national, regional and international decisions. At an individual level, each person 
makes choices to take a plane or travel by Eurostar from London to Paris. Cities are 
often more competent than larger-scale governments at deciding whether expansions 
of local airports are necessary and they are more aware of the nuances of the local 
environment. Although each individual’s choices or each city’s impacts have only a 
minor impact on total aviation emissions, trends in smaller-scale decisions add up, 
even at the global scale.28 If the regulatory architecture does not incorporate these 
kinds of efforts, it will be less effective in reducing emissions.  
Third, a rigid “scaling up” approach to climate change emphasises the 
necessity of top-down conventional approach which may also block creative 
solutions from non-governmental entities. Legal regulations should incentivise 
research and the use of technical measures by policymakers and industry. The 
impact of aviation on climate change is an issue where stakeholders “have the 
requisite knowledge to design an appropriate solution” in which “increased 
                                                        
26 Hari M. Osofsky, (n. 6), p. 632. 
27 Ibid., p. 633. 
28 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, (n.4); Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin & Joseph B. Frueh, ‘Ratifying 
Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government 
Actors (TOGAS)’ (2008) 50 Arizona Law Review 709. 
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participation becomes not only desirable, but also necessary.”29 Law must find a 
way of flexibly moving among the governance of multiple agencies, including both 
public and private entities. Aviation emissions regulation may help to motivate that 
kind of innovation on the part of multiple agencies and to create emissions 
reductions and responses to impacts that might not have occurred otherwise. But if 
these regulations are created according to a “scaling up” model, they may become a 
way of blocking private agencies and putting all the regulatory efforts into a less 
effective approach to solving the problem. 
In the light of the above discussions, when seen through a scalar lens, the 
impact of aviation emissions on climate change is simultaneously individual, local, 
national, regional and international, and legal regulation must find a way of flexibly 
moving among those levels of governance. The design of coordinated multi-scalar 
policy responses to aviation emissions may help to motivate innovation from both 
the public and the private sides and to create emissions reduction efforts from 
multiple levels of governance. The scale of the problem has much to say about 
which regulatory entities and methods of reduction are best to choose in the case of 
the aviation industry. The above discussions suggest the importance of exploring 
what effective multi-scalar governance might look like in more depth. To be sure, 
this is not the first example of the need to recognise multi-scalar problems as targets 
for law and regulation. The next section will examine the role of new governance 
theory as the theoretical foundations of multi-scalar governance and explore the 
potential of diagonal approaches to assist in the creation of more effective 
multi-scalar regulation architecture for international aviation emissions. 
 
3. The Role of New Governance Theory 
 
New governance theory is one of the approaches in the recent scholarship which 
has engaged with the complexities of regulatory scale and the appropriate role of 
traditional top-down approach and multiple levels approach in struggling with the 
                                                        
29 David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, ‘New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, 
Rivalry, and Transformation’ (2007) 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 539, 542. 
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appropriate design of cross-cutting efforts to solve global problems30 – which sets out 
some promising strategies to consider.31 Chapter 1 drew a brief picture of the nature 
of new governance theory and how it emerged. Although there is no specific 
definition, new governance theory is generally accepted as “a new model of 
collaborative, multi-party, multi-level adaptive, problem-solving.”32 The emergence 
of new governance with its many motivations may be attributed to very complex 
problems which are hard to solve and about which we have limited experience.33 
Some scholars have also argued that new governance theory has arisen 
“spontaneously, largely to fill the vacuum” left by the persistent failures of traditional 
legal approaches.34 As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, it is worth noting 
that new governance theory is used in this thesis to shed theoretical light on the 
conclusions arrived at in Chapters 1 to 6; in addition the contribution of new 
governance theory to the regulation of aviation emissions provides a means of testing 
its ability to account for the real-life failure of traditional, top-down regulation. The 
function of introducing new governance in this thesis is two-fold, both to challenge 
existing paradigms of global solution and to provide an alternative solution. 
Before discussing the specific values of new governance for regulating aviation 
emissions, it is necessary at this stage to understand to what extent new governance 
contributes a theoretical perspective on the failure of traditional regulatory approaches 
and a solution for the failure of traditional regulation. This requires a brief 
examination of the relationship between new governance and law. 
In examining the relationship between new governance and law, I need to start 
with a specific conception of law in mind. This may require no less than the writing of 
an entire book.35 Given the preliminary understanding of new governance that I 
                                                        
30 Hari M. Osofsky, (n. 6). 
31 New governance has been used as a theoretical foundation for multi-scalar problem solving, see 
Hari M. Osofsky, ibid.; J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, (n.4). 
32 Bradley C. Karkkainen, ‘ “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as 
Antidote to Overzealous Lumpting’ (2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 471, p. 473. 
33 David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, (n. 29), p. 542. 
34 Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, ‘Strengthening International Regulation Through 
“Transnational New Governance”’ (2008) online available at: 
<http://works.bepress.com/kenneth_abbott/1>, p.1. 
35 There are many different concepts of law, see general Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Belknap 
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arrived at in Chapter 1, the concept of law which will be discussed here will be 
approached in terms of its different values or functions from those of the new 
governance – being harder, more coercive, more hierarchical, less flexible, etc. This 
dichotomy may be too sharp, but it helps us to distinguish new governance from 
conventional legal regulations. It follows that I need to think about the softness of 
new governance. 
A first point that I need to make is simply to underline that there are many 
controversial answers to the question of the relationship between law and new 
governance, because both law and new governance are contested concepts.36 Some 
initial sense of what the relationship might look like may be found by comparing the 
different approaches to law and new governance. The first approach emphasises the 
difference or “gap” between them. Examining the possible relationship between law 
and new governance, Walker and de Búrca have argued that law and new governance 
are different species of normative ordering, each of which achieves some kind of 
overarching balance between universalizability and reflexivity; but the tendency of 
law is to give priority to the meta-value of social regularity and that of new 
governance is to give priority to the meta-value of social responsiveness.37 The “gap” 
thesis takes two standard forms: “law resists the new governance phenomenon” and 
“law is confronted with a reduction in its capacity.”38 Following this thesis, Tamara 
Hervey has argued that there is a significant gap in practice between constitutional 
law and emerging new governance processes in the health care field in the EU.39 The 
existence of such a gap is embedded in the lack of constitutional visibility.40 Many 
examples in health care, safety regulation and employment policy, even in race and 
                                                                                                                                                               
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.; London 2006). 
36 See generally, Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, ‘Introduction: 
New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’ in Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott (eds.), Law and 
New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart, Oxford 2006). 
37 Neil Walker & Grainne de Búrca, ‘Reconceiving Law and New Governance’, (2006-2007) 13 
Colum. J. Eur. L. 519. 
38 Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, (n. 36), p. 4; Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: 
Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union’ (2002) 8/1 Eur. L.J. 1. 
39 Tamara K Hervey, ‘The European Union and the Governance of Health Care’ in Grainne de Búrca & 
Joanne Scott, (n. 36), p. 178. 
40 Joanne Scott & Jane Holder, ‘Law and New Environmental Governance in the European Union’ in 
Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, ibid., pp. 211, 235. 
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gender issues, have shown that law may impede the emergence and functioning of 
new governance.41 None of these issues can compare with climate change “either in 
terms of the acuteness of the problem or the political salience of the policy 
response.”42 New governance provides an opportunity to address climate change 
when international laws fail. 
A second approach to the relationship between law and new governance argues 
that they can co-exist in a variety of ways, including complementing each other, 
rivalling each other, or acting in a transformative way which leads to a shift from 
law to regulation and then to governance.43 These different forms of co-existence 
can directly be approached through the “hybridity thesis.”44 This acknowledges the 
interaction between law and new governance. In this context, new governance is not 
totally outside old style legal instruments.45 Looking at the legal history, Neil 
Gunningham has claimed that “if one looks at either the Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions 
or the Directives of the EU, there is evidence that substantial pockets of command 
and control regulation are alive and well, and that even neo-liberal governments 
continue to favour this approach in some areas.”46 According to Gunningham’s 
argument on transformation, new governance may involve “a shift from regulation 
to governance” and may “overstate the significance of” the changed roles of private 
actors.47 However, in another dimension of the transformation, it happens in “a less 
thorough-going and more gradual or piecemeal fashion.”48 
Both of these approaches to the relationship between law and new governance 
point to the softness of the new governance in terms of involving multiple parties in 
decision-making, but provide no specific understanding of what kind of softness is 
appropriate in new governance and why. This is important because it may not only 
help us to better understand the relationship between new governance and law but 
                                                        
41 Louise G Trubek, ‘New Governance Practices in US Health Care’ in Grainne de Búrca & Joanne 
Scott, ibid., p. 245; in the same book, Orly Lobel, ‘Governing Occupational Safety in the United States’ 
p. 269; Claire Kilpatrick, ‘New EU Employment Governance and Constitutionalism’, p. 121; Susan 
Sturm, ‘Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of Learning’, p. 323. 
42 Joanne Scott, ‘The Multi-level Governance of Climate Change’, in Paul Craig & Gráinne de Burca 
(eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010). 
43 See generally, David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, (n. 29). 
44 Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, (n. 36), pp. 6-9. 
45 Charles Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the EU’ (2008) 14 Eur. L. J. 271. 
46 Neil Gunningham, ‘Environmental Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures’ (2009) 
21/2 JEL 179, p. 207. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Grainne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, (n. 36), p. 10. 
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also to identify the role of public and private actors and the impact and effectiveness 
of a range of different institutional designs for problem solving. Questioning the 
softness of new governance is actually a way of asking what kind and degree of soft 
mechanisms may be preferable to hard regulation and to what extent the soft 
mechanisms may contribute to regulatory design on aviation emissions. 
New governance scholars have written many works which have contributed to 
our understanding of the softness of new governance, but sometimes they make it 
even more confused. Attempts to characterize the softness of new governance may 
deliver only a more “muddled identity” of the softness in new governance.49 For 
example, Lobel has explained the softness in new governance in terms of various 
criteria, including flexibility, non-coerciveness, informalism, less rigid procedural 
requirements and nonenforcement or nonenforceability.50 Apart from this long list 
of soft legal forms, she summarizes key differences between the “New Governance 
Model” and the “Traditional Regulatory Model” and she characterizes the “power of 
law” under the New Governance Model as “soft”, “aspirational”, providing 
“guidance”, being “voluntary” and “structured but unsanctioned,” whereas law in 
the Traditional Regulatory Model was said to be “hard”, “coercive”, consisting of 
“rules”, being “mandatory” and “sanctioned.”51 Yet, her contribution was criticised 
by Karkkainen for being only “collectively desperate to latch onto some, perhaps 
any form of ‘softness’, without being able to articulate a coherent rationale for doing 
so or to agree upon what form such ‘softness’ should take.”52  What’s more, 
Karkkainen examined the complex interactions between hard and soft measures in 
the area of environmental law,53 and warned of the risk of misunderstanding 
                                                        
49 Kenneth Armstrong & Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Law, Governance, or New Governance? The Changing 
Open Method of Coordination’ (2006-2007) 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 649, p. 660. 
50 Orly Lobel, ‘The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary 
Legal Thought’ (2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342, pp. 388-89. 
51 Ibid., pp. 405-06 table 2; Borrás and Jacobsson also produced a work that identified the OMC is 
based on “voluntarism, subsidiarity, flexibility, participation, policy integration, and multi-level 
integration.” Susanna Borrás & Kerstin Jacobsson, ‘The Open Method of Coordination and New 
Governance Patterns in the EU’ (2004) 11 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 185. 
52 Bradley C. Karkkainen , ‘ “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as 
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flexibility as voluntarism, which may equate governance approaches with merely 
voluntary guidance and provide less than conventional legal approaches. 54  In 
replying to Karkkainen, Lobel has emphasised that “what is new in the governance 
model is not the existence of soft aspects of law, but rather their recognition. 
Governance cannot and should not replace conventional, sanctioned approaches in 
all contexts.”55 Indeed, an easy characterization of new governance as implying a 
move from hard to soft was rejected by many other scholars as well. Schelkle has 
examined how hard law can operate “in the shadow” of soft law, and has argued for 
a hybridity of soft law and hard law moving in non-parallel tracks as soft law 
obligations may serve to reinforce the acceptance and enforcement of hard law.56 
Tamara Hervey and Louise Trubek have supported the theme of hybridity and they 
have argued for the need to combine traditional law-based regulation with more 
experimentalist institutions and processes of implementation.57 Sabel and Zeitlin 
have clearly argued that “the new architecture of EU governance is not ‘soft law’, 
but neither is it traditional ‘hard law’ of a form that grows out of and is reducible to 
principle-agent rule making.”58 Therefore, to distinguish between different forms of 
soft law may result in “conflated” categories of soft law and new governance,59 that 
which may become an obstacle to identifying the softness of new governance. At a 
certain extreme, it may lead to a significant misconception that new governance is 
such that “it is wholly reliant on ‘soft law’ mechanisms, and therefore ultimately 
dependent on the good intentions and voluntary actions of parties who heretofore 
have shown little inclination toward acting in the desired directions.”60 
Nevertheless, new governance includes both soft and hard mechanisms. As it is 
in its early stages, new governance is not yet ready to provide a clear answer to the 
question how far the soft nature of new governance is appropriate and how far it may 
deliver effectiveness in problem-solving. There are many uncertainties hiding in the 
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“stakeholder label” of the new governance, the words borrowed from Karkkainen to 
describe the nature of the new governance.61 This label described the collaboration 
among a diverse group of stakeholders who are engaged in decision-making 
processes, but did not give answers to many significant questions, e.g., “how are the 
appropriate groups and their ‘representatives’ to be selected, and how do we ensure 
the quality and fairness of the representation that occurs?” 62  What blocks the 
answering of these questions is the unique situation of each case, which means that 
even the most successful policy experiment will be ambiguous and will be contested 
in a changed situation and this means that it cannot be replicated widely.63  The 
innovations in certain fields of new governance practice may become narrow and 
subject-specific experiences that may not fit into the broader sweep of the emerging 
new governance scholarship.64 Although there is a need to identify its various 
components within a general framework, the need to call more attention to the 
commonalities of the new governance scholarship is outside the concerns of this 
thesis. In order to be applied properly to the issue of climate change associated with 
aviation, I will explore the core values of new governance only for the current 
purposes in the next section. 
4. Applying the Theory to Explore a Multi-scalar Regulatory Architecture 
 
In the previous discussion, it has been clear that the impact of aviation 
emissions on climate change is a multi-scalar problem that is “far beyond the 
capacity of any single agency to manage effectively.”65 New governance theory 
provides “a new model of collaborative, multi-party, multi-level, adaptive, 
problem-solving.”66 I find the new governance theory to be a positive theoretical 
foundation to challenge the conventional search for a global response, and 
contribute to an innovative solution. This section applies the theory in exploring the 
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potential of the creation of a more effective multi-scalar regulatory architecture for 
international aviation emissions. It discusses the elements of new governance theory 
that are of most interest to my thesis: the participation of multiple public and private 
parties; the use of a range of instruments; the multiple levels of governance; and the 
non-hierarchical form of decision-making. I argue that the primary value of new 
governance in compensating for the failure of a traditional international legal 
approach on regulating international aviation emissions is the multi-party, 
multi-instrumental and multi-level approaches, and many of the solutions discussed 
in this thesis look relatively hierarchical. New governance’s emphasis on 
non-hierarchical solutions is of interest, however, especially if non-traditional 
approaches are able to fill gaps left by more traditional approaches. During my 
discussions on the value of new governance, this section also turns from each 
discussion to an exploration of the bearing of multi-scalar governance on 
international air transport emissions. It uses these four pillars of a multi-scalar 
regulatory architecture on aviation emissions, i.e. the need for a range of parties to 
be involved, the use of multiple instruments, the need for different scales to be 
involved, and the role of non-hierarchical solutions. 
 
4.1. The Participation of Multiple Public and Private Parties 
 
A core value of new governance is the involvement of multiple parties in 
decision-making. New governance has suggested “an approach based on ‘societal 
steering’ in its broadest sense with decision-making involving the totality of 
interactions between public and private actors, and the state no longer playing a 
central role in decision-making.”67 The coexistence of public and private actors in 
decision-making is necessary “to secure the on-going coordination and integration 
of responses among multiple parties,” because “what is required can never be fully 
specified in advance.”68  “Conventional inter-sovereign cooperative agreements” or 
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“rules of obligation” are not adequate to the task.69 New governance also provides 
private parties with a central role in problem solving through “operating singly and 
through novel collaborations,” while the role of the state becomes “correspondingly 
modest and largely indirect.”70  
I argue that regulating international aviation emissions should not rely 
exclusively on states or on international organisations like the UNFCCC or ICAO, 
but on multiple parties’ efforts towards a common but multifaceted goal. Both public 
and private parties should be involved in the decision-making on curbing the growth 
of aviation emissions. This argument includes two perspectives: involvement of a 
range of parties in any decision making procedure and involvement of private 
regulations. 
The private actors in this context include “(a) firms and industry groups whose 
own practices are the targets of regulation; (b) NGOs and other civil society groups, 
including labor unions and socially responsible investors; and (c) combinations of 
actors from these two categories.” 71  They represent different functional and 
socio-economic interests as Professor Mayntz has put it “organizations like labor 
unions, business associations, organizations of health care providers, of scientists 
and scientific research institutes, and organizations representing consumer interests 
or ecological values.”72 The involvement of multiple groups brings a range of 
information, knowledge and perspectives into decision making. For example, 
airlines have direct information and knowledge on the possible measures to improve 
fuel efficiency and reduce flying. Environmental NGOs contribute experience 
relating to the environmental effects of aviation; they may also contribute a 
perspective on the urgency of this problem. This will be counterbalanced by other 
NGOs and businesses that may be concerned by the social and economic impacts of 
reductions in flying. 
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The main concern about private actors is the role of industry groups and 
business associations, such as airlines and IATA, in the case of regulating aviation 
emissions. It was IATA suggested that be put in charge of the initial allocation in a 
global emissions trading scheme discussed in Chapter 6. The involvement of IATA 
in regulating aviation emissions would put airlines in the position of being one of 
the regulators while their own practices are the targets of regulation. The 
involvement of regulated parties in regulation would not be wholly innovative. It 
may be positive in some respect: “[l]aw can rarely hope to be meaningful and 
effective without the cooperation, indeed the normative accord, of the vast majority 
of the populations it hopes to control.” 73  Examining regulation and business 
behaviour, Gunningham and Kagan have emphasised that: 
“For while governments promulgate laws and regulations, it is 
business corporations that must test the safety of products and vehicles, 
devise ways of reducing workplace hazards, and institute accurate 
accounting systems. Environmental regulation depends almost entirely on 
business firms to develop, finance and install pollution measurement and 
prevention technologies. The day-to-day effectiveness of regulatory 
compliance measures depends on the training and diligence of the 
corporate employees assigned to maintain equipment, monitor 
quality-control systems, train operatives, and take appropriate action when 
problems occur.”74 
 
The involvement of industry groups and business associations in new 
governance is attractive, as it brings in “private regulations” as part of the solution 
to multi-scalar problem.75 Under private regulations, states or intergovernmental 
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organisations play only minor roles, although they may participate in some largely 
private governance. 76  The private parties may operate “largely free of state 
orchestration or support.”77  
 The role of NGOs is crucial. It has been argued that the participation of 
NGOs in law-making has “changed the face of international environmental law.”78 
This is because the development of international environmental law has been partly 
influenced by those NGOs which were established purely for the purpose of 
environmental protection. 79  Environmental NGOs have some advantages that 
formal regulators may lack.80 For example, NGOs are believed in some cases to 
have scientific expertise that governmental authorities may lack.81 NGOs have also 
been argued to play an important role in “monitoring negotiations, distributing 
negotiation-related materials, providing technical data, drafting proposed treaty 
language, lobbying negotiators, acting as observers at treaty-related meetings, and 
monitoring treaty compliance.”82 From a purely pragmatic point of view, NGOs 
may also help in the implementation of laws. 83   However, NGOs “cannot 
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themselves remedy the whole range of weaknesses” in regulatory systems, as “their 
activities are necessarily issue-oriented.”84 It has been argued that “[t]he extent to 
which NGOs can participate in and influence the work of international organizations 
depends on the constitution and practice of each organization, and varies 
considerably.” 85  The effectiveness of NGOs in terms of bringing more 
environmental interests to the decision-making procedure on regulating multi-scalar 
problems also depends on the nature of the NGOs (including “their seriousness of 
purpose, funding, depth of research, skills in political advocacy, means of exercising 
pressure, and narrowness of focus”86). Whilst NGOs cannot themselves remedy the 
regulatory weaknesses, they may bring more environmental interests in the decision 
making procedure. This will to some extent compensate for any self interest of the 
airline industry. It seems a sensible strategy to encourage NGOs’ participation in the 
UNFCCC, ICAO and other governmental authorities’ decision making procedure. 
The participation of private parties (airlines and NGOs) is necessary. However, 
as is common in new governance, notwithstanding the participation of a variety of 
stakeholders collaborating on multiple levels, the sovereign authorities, especially 
the state, retain certain important functions in the decision-making process. Jody 
Freeman has argued that  
 
“the goals of efficacy and legitimacy are better served by a model 
that views the administrative process as a problem-solving exercise in 
which parties share responsibility for all stages of the rule-making process, 
in which solutions are provisional, and in which the state plays an active, 
if varied, role.”87  
 
The question raised here is how the different parties share responsibility in 
decision-making or what role the sovereign authorities (including state and 
international governmental organisations representing groups of states) play. Of 
course, new governance does not mean just putting a diverse group of stakeholders 
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into a room and expecting that they will automatically achieve a “win-win” solution. 
Whatever the softness in new governance means, it is a very complex task to sort 
out what kinds and levels of participation, by what group of actors may be necessary. 
I believe that how different parties share the power in decision-making should vary 
in different cases, because the success of the way that any policy has been created 
“depends upon factors unique to their own time, place, and fortuitous 
circumstances.”88 In regulating aviation emissions, sharing responsibility among 
different parties should consider the difficulties of regulating aviation emissions as 
discussed in Chapter 2 and the capability of each party. 
However, in any case, the role of the sovereign authorities in new governance 
should not be understated. 89  There has been a preliminary agreement that 
non-hierarchy is a key feature of new governance. It means that the role of the states 
would no longer be that of the sole decision-makers, if they ever were, and their 
power might be weaker than it was in the old style environmental regulation. Under 
new governance, sovereign states and non-state parties would collaboratively 
operate as partners in dealing with highly complex problems that appear to be 
beyond the capacity of sovereign states alone to solve. Climate change is one of the 
examples that cannot be, or has not yet been, solved through straightforward 
exercises of conventional international agreements or national/regional legislation. 
The collaborative arrangement of multiple parties, in this context, is an exercise in 
“task-specific” rather than “general-purpose” governance.90 States have a number of 
crucial roles in my scheme of climate regulation, although the situation is 
complicated by the dominance of international regulatory arrangements. The states 
alone or through international cooperation within international governmental 
organisations, like the UNFCCC, have three key roles. First of all, “definitional 
guidance” refers to “the state describing and defining the nature of the collaborative 
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governance arrangement.”91 Although the definitional guidance role of the state can 
be interpreted widely, in the case of international aviation emissions, it includes 
what performance outcomes are expected (e.g. the sectoral mitigation target on 
aviation emissions and the cap for regional emissions trading) and what principle 
should be used to guide the regulations (focusing on improving energy intensity in 
the aviation sector although measures to encourage behaviour change may also be 
necessary, as discussed in Chapter 2). Second, the state in my scheme provides 
incentives for targeted actors (e.g. companies, communities, individuals or NGOs) 
to participate in the particular regime that is being established.92 The domestic fuel 
taxes proposed in Chapter 5, for example, demonstrate the potential of states to 
provide incentives both for individuals to change their behaviour and for airlines to 
innovate. Third, there is an important role for the state in enforcement.93 For 
example, the technological standards established by ICAO are enforced by its 
member states in terms of a formal performance evaluation of their airlines’ 
operations.  The essence of all of these three roles is in requiring governments to 
encourage “policy coordination” in “encouraging, facilitating, rewarding and 
shaping” the governance architecture.94 Nevertheless, “matters are almost always 
more complex than politicians and policy-makers would prefer them to be.”95 
It is now necessary to explore the role of the multiple parties engaged in 
climate change regulation in more detail. I argue in this thesis that regulating 
aviation emissions should involve a range of parties, including both public (formal 
regulators like the UNFCCC, ICAO and nation states) and private (airline industry 
and NGOs) actors. I now set out the five main actors in my scheme. The first one is 
the UNFCCC. As discussed above, new governance, in a domestic context, 
“requires significant state capacity” as it is “a tool deployed and orchestrated by 
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governments.”96 But, there is no global “state” to manage new governance on the 
international level. However, in the case of curbing the growth of international 
aviation emissions, the states acting together in the UNFCCC should take the role of 
providing “definitional guidance,”97  specifically to establish a sectoral climate 
change mitigation target for aviation, as discussed in Chapter 3. Individual states 
would agree to share that overall sectoral mitigation target on aviation, and make 
cooperative efforts to achieve it. 
Second, as discussed in Chapter 4, ICAO as a special agency of the UN 
certainly has a role to play in solving this industry specific problem. Although it is 
not suitable to be the sole delegated authority to regulate aviation emissions, ICAO 
has a technical role in setting emissions standards on aircraft. It could provide a 
global forum which would enable emissions reduction related actions to be 
transparent and trade-offs to be addressed, for example trade-off actions between 
CO2 emissions and non-CO2 emissions from aircraft engines, between reducing 
emissions and controlling aircraft noise and between reducing emissions and 
ensuring aviation safety. In ensuring a safe, efficient and environmentally friendly 
development of the industry, ICAO may also play an important role regarding 
appropriate metric, performance monitoring, reporting methods and auditing 
processes on member states’ reduction actions. To fulfil this role, I have advocated 
an environmental audit programme build by ICAO in Chapter 4. 
Third, nation states should continue to engage in “policy coordination” in 
“encouraging, facilitating, rewarding and shaping” the governance architecture.98 
They are the formal regulators and the parties most able to put the sectoral approach 
on aviation emissions into action, responsible for achieving mitigation action 
through domestic laws, including traditional command and control regulations and 
market-based instruments. National level fuel taxes as discussed in Chapter 5, would 
make an important contribution. 
Four, industry groups are important private actors in new governance theory, 
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acting as regulators while their own practices are the targets of regulation. In 
regulating aviation emissions, the principal subjects of regulation are the airlines. 
The participation of airlines may be represented by IATA, an industry association. In 
Chapter 6 above, I outline the ways in which a global emissions trading system 
could provide an alternative form of allocation of mitigation obligations, if burden 
sharing cannot be achieved more formally as described in Chapter 3. This global 
emissions trading needs IATA to lead the initial allocation of allowances and ICAO 
to monitor it. What is more, IATA’s role in representing the airline industry and in 
developing the industry’s vision of environmental policies may contribute 
non-traditional regulatory schemes in the absence of state action. IATA has 
undertaken many initiatives to minimize the impacts of aviation emissions on 
climate change. Representing the industry, in 2007, IATA laid out a vision to achieve 
carbon neutral growth in the mid-term (from 2020).99 This would be achieved 
through a four-pillar strategy to reduce emissions: investment in technology; 
effective operations; efficient infrastructure and positive economic instruments 
(including emissions trading and carbon offsetting).100 At its annual general meeting 
in June 2009, IATA launched a new and ambitious target for emissions reduction, as 
it committed itself to reduce the growth of aviation emissions from 2020 and to 
halve emissions by 2050 compared to 2005 levels.101 This target has been criticized, 
as it may not compensate for the growth angle because IATA ranks do not include 
the low cost carriers such as Ryanair, Easyjet or Southwest.102 A comprehensive 
climate change regime for aviation needs to go beyond IATA but IATA’s initiatives 
do suggest that there is some motivation for environmental improvements in the 
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airline industry. 
Five, environmental NGOs should be involved. They are expected to bring 
more environmental interests to the decision-making procedure on regulating 
aviation emissions. The participation of NGOs should be on multiple levels. For 
example, NGOs should participate in the international negotiations under the 
UNFCCC system and ICAO’s rule-making procedure. They may play an important 
role in lobbying local governments on airport expansion. They may also provide 
information and education to the public.  
The above discussions have identified the multiple parties that should be 
included in the multi-scalar regulation of aviation emissions, in the light of new 
governance theory. Drawing on new governance theory, both public and private 
parties, including formal regulators (the UNFCCC, ICAO and nation states) and the 
airline industry (represented by IATA), should have a role in regulating aviation 
emissions. The coexistence of public and private actors in decision-making is 
necessary “to secure the on-going coordination and integration of responses among 
multiple parties”103 in solving the aviation emissions problem. 
 
4.2. The Use of a Range of Instruments 
 
The use of a range of regulatory instruments is another value of new 
governance which may compensate for the failure of traditional international legal 
approaches on aviation emissions. New governance recognises the inherent 
limitations of conventional regulatory instruments, as well as the inadequacies of a 
legal regime based solely on market incentives. 104  As can be seen in the 
co-existence of new governance and law discussed above, traditional command and 
control regulations are alive in new governance, while soft mechanisms grow 
alongside them. Most new governance scholars acknowledge the necessity for both 
hard instruments and soft instruments in legal strategies, but they hold different 
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opinions on how the different instruments should be mixed. Some of them advocate 
that the incentive-based instruments should rely on “self-initiated improvements in 
environmental performance undertaken within an incentive system created by a 
mandatory legal framework.”105 Some others try to blend hard and soft instruments 
into different mixes.106 These different approaches to the way of choosing and 
mixing multiple instruments may lead to the simple explanation that there is no 
fixed role for any single instrument among a range of different institutional designs 
for problem-solving in different areas. I argue in this thesis not for “soft law” 
mechanisms – although methods such as information provision could play a role, 
that is beyond the scope of my thesis. However, I do argue that a range of regulatory 
instruments is required. 
Another theoretical term referring to a new form of regulation that “seeks to 
harness not just governments but also business and third parties to provide policy 
alternatives that include, but often go beyond, direct regulation” is “smart 
regulation” or “regulatory pluralism.”107 Apart from the introduction of a broader 
range of regulatory actors, the essence of smart regulation is that the use of multiple 
rather than single policy instruments should produce better regulation than single 
instrument approaches. 108  The implementation of tailor-made combinations of 
instruments would meet the imperatives of specific environmental issues. It 
represents a more flexible, efficient and effective approach to environmental 
regulations.109  
Regulatory design should ensure that multiple instruments are “mutually 
reinforcing, rather than being duplicative, or worse, conflicting.”110 The aim of 
using combinations of instruments in terms of achieving effectiveness and efficiency 
is to compensate for the weakness of stand-alone environmental policies. Given that 
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not all instrument combinations will automatically be complementary,111 the method 
of choosing multiple instruments is important. Gunningham et al. have argued that it 
is not practical to provide for the full implications of all instrument combinations, 
but they divided the plethora of potential instrument combinations into the following 
four categories: 
“(i) mixes that are inherently complementary; 
(ii) mixes that are inherently incompatible; 
(iii) mixes that are complementary if sequenced; and 
(iv) mixes the complementarily or otherwise of which is essentially 
context specific.”112 
 
Policymakers can be “confident” in choosing the first category of 
combinations over others. 113   This is because inherently complementary 
instruments include those used to target different aspects of a common 
environmental issue. The effectiveness and efficiency of certain inherently 
complementary instruments will be significantly enhanced by using them in 
combination, irrespective of the circumstances of the relevant environmental issues. 
To put the concept of using a range of instruments in the aviation context, I 
argue that the legal regulation of international aviation emissions should involve 
multiple instruments, including conventional regulatory mechanisms and multiple 
market-based instruments. Different instruments might contribute to regulating 
aviation emissions from different perspectives. First of all, traditional command and 
control type of regulations are still needed. For example, a sectoral target on 
international aviation emissions under the UNFCCC system is suggested in Chapter 
3. ICAO’s technology-based standards, as discussed in Chapter 4, might contribute 
to the balancing of potential trade-off effects with reducing emissions in ensuring a 
safe, efficient and environmentally friendly development of the industry. Second, I 
argue that fuel taxes should be introduced by nation states in Chapter 5. Although 
this cannot provide certainty in relation to the level of emission reduction, a fuel tax 
is an effective and fair way to address prices in the aviation case in order both to 
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affect demand and to provide incentives for innovation. Third, I argue that emissions 
trading should be used to curb the growth of international aviation emissions. 
Compared to command and control regulation, emissions trading is a more efficient 
way to encourage airlines to take mitigation actions. The cap of emissions trading 
provides certainty in environmental outcome, although in a scheme such as that 
provided by the EU ETS, initial reductions are not necessarily from the aviation 
sector. Regional emissions trading could be used as a tool for achieving regional 
mitigation targets within the global sectoral target under the UNFCCC system. The 
development of multiple regional emissions trading schemes may contribute an 
example of multiple levels response to the climate problem associated with aviation. 
This is especially valuable if the sectoral target on international aviation emissions 
discussed in Chapter 2 cannot be agreed. I also suggest a global emissions trading 
scheme for aviation in Chapter 6. This is partly a tool for the allocation of the 
mitigation responsibilities if a comprehensive multi-level allocation system under 
the UNFCCC cannot be achieved. It is also a tool for incentivising the airline 
industry to take mitigation actions. 
These instruments should be used in combination, because they “target 
different aspects of a common environmental issue.”114 The sectoral target leads 
cooperative efforts towards a clear environmental outcome in regulating aviation 
emissions. The ICAO standards contribute to the balancing of potential trade-off 
effects with reducing emissions in ensuring a safe, efficient and environmentally 
friendly development of the industry. A fuel tax is proposed to put a price on short 
haul flights that would lead them to become became more expensive in order to 
influence consumers’ behaviour, e.g. to provide incentives to take the train rather 
than to fly. Emissions trading aims to provide incentives for airlines to take 
mitigation action and to ensure that there is a cap on the total emissions. These 
different policy approaches complement each other since “by addressing different 
contributory aspects of the aviation emissions, they provide the market with 
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mutually supportive signals.”115 The effects will be complicated, but broadly, the 
technology based standard is directed at the aviation manufacturer, while the fuel tax 
is directed at the consumer and the global emissions trading system is directed at the 
airlines. To this extent, the multi-instrumental mixes in regulating aviation emissions 
are complementary. This may assist policymakers to achieve multi-scalar regulation 
in encouraging both technical measures to improve energy intensity in the aviation 
sector as well as some degree of demand management as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.3. Multiple Levels of Governance 
 
New governance is useful for solving multi-scalar problems also because of its 
emphasis on multiple levels of governance.116 As Scott and Trubek have explained, 
multi-level integration is one of the characteristics of new governance, which means 
that “new governance mechanisms may include machinery that brings actors from 
various levels of government (localities, subnational regions, national, European) 
together in ways that facilitate dialogue and coordination.”117 
The concept of multi-level governance emphasizes that different levels of 
governance (including the sub-national, national and supranational levels) are 
interconnected, “while national arenas remain important arenas for the formation of 
national government preferences, the multi-level governance model rejects the view 
that subnational actors are nested exclusively within them. Instead, subnational 
actors operate in both national and supranational arenas … National governments … 
share, rather than monopolize, control over many activities that take place in their 
respective territories.” 118  Thus, the essence of multi-level governance is “the 
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interdependence of actors operating at different territorial levels,”119 including local, 
national, regional, and international level.  
The collaboration of multiple levels of governance intervening in decision 
making on complex problems could avoid recourse to single levels of authority. It 
enables the new model of regulation to overcome the deadlocks of using traditional 
legal approaches. This is crucial because, whilst much of the existing scholarship 
focuses on the international level, the international aviation emissions issue cannot 
be addressed effectively through the UNFCCC alone. The failure of the UNFCCC to 
regulate international aviation emissions, given the overwhelming focus on that 
body until very recently, means that the problem has remained largely unaddressed. 
Effective regulation should avoid recourse to the UNFCCC alone. Furthermore, the 
simplistic and uncertain understandings of the burden sharing principle in the 
UNFCCC system and the inherent limitations of ICAO deny international 
organisations the chance to experiment with potentially more efficient and effective 
governance forms on aviation emissions. However, we see areas in which efforts by 
multiple actors may contribute to the mitigation of the aviation sector, e.g. the role 
of ICAO in terms of performance monitoring, reporting methods and auditing 
processes, the role of regional authorities like the EU in terms of putting regional 
emission targets into action through regional emissions trading, the role of states in 
terms of incentivising behaviour change and innovation through fuel taxes. We also 
see the use of overlapping powers in a range of instruments for curbing the growth 
of aviation emissions, e.g. the introduction of aviation fuel taxes by states, and their 
monitoring at the international level by ICAO as discussed in Chapter 5. Each of 
these roles and instruments raises important issues about the distribution of 
regulatory power in a system of multi-level governance and legal pluralism, a 
system which includes not only international treaties and international organisations 
but also EU and national laws. 
Although my preference is for a sectoral approach to aviation emissions within 
the UN system together with a multi-level burden sharing approach under that same 
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UN system, putting this into practice clearly requires multi-level governance. This 
includes ICAO’s technology-based standards and environmental audit programme, 
nation states’ efforts in allocating and implementing reduction targets on aircraft 
operators, nation states’ aviation fuel taxes and regional emissions trading schemes 
(e.g. EU ETS). And whilst it has not been a focus of this thesis, it should be noted 
that sub-state level governance in planning airport expansion and providing 
information and education to the public will also be significant. In the worst case 
where a sectoral approach cannot be achieved, market-based instruments (domestic 
fuel taxes and regional emissions trading) at different levels, together with the role 
of private actors such as IATA and NGOs will be even more important in the 
regulation of aviation emissions. 
Although I prefer a sectoral approach, and many of the other arguments in this 
thesis (e.g. burden sharing approach under the UNFCCC, and a global emission 
trading scheme) are based on the achievement of a sectoral target on aviation 
emissions, the legal regulation discussed in this thesis is not dependent on 
agreement. For example, without a sectoral approach, a domestic fuel tax on 
international flights and regional emissions trading may still contribute to examples 
of multiple levels approach to curb the growth of aviation emissions; ICAO’s 
technology-based standards and environmental auditing programme could also make 
a significant contribution even in the absence of the UNFCCC system. This is a 
crucial departure from the bulk of legal analysis of this problem. 
 
4.4. Non-hierarchical Form of Decision-making 
 
New governance also emphasizes a non-hierarchical form of decision-making.  
Although new governance refers to a broad family of innovative modes of governance, 
as described in the discussion of the characteristics of new governance in Chapter 1, it 
is generally moving away from the old model of hierarchical, fixed top-down 
regulations. It is argued by proponents of new governance that the old regulatory 
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model is less effective than new governance,120 partly because it “tended to produce 
an impossibly complex and tangled web of rigid, uniform one-size-fits-all rules that in 
truth did not quite fit anyone.”121 In contrast, new governance breaks with the 
hierarchical decision-making model and leads to a changed role for the state which 
has “moved substantially away from top-down command-and-control regulation to a 
much more decentralized and consensual approach which seeks to coordinate at 
multiple levels, and which is distinctively polycentric.”122 
The shift from hierarchical to heterarchical forms of decision-making enables 
more gains to be made through cooperation, dialogue and learning at 
non-international levels of governance. For example, the existence of local level 
governance may lead to responses which better take account of local circumstances, 
build on local knowledge and capacities, as it is thus “more likely to be sensitive to 
the complexities of an environmental problem and its local context than centralized 
regulatory decision-making.”123 In facing complex issues, it has been argued that 
“non-hierarchical forms of decision-making can produce more effective solutions…. 
to process more information and to take a greater variety of values into 
account ….make for higher flexibility and adaptability.”124 
Rather than requiring a completely separate analysis, the move away from 
hierarchy (particularly in the sense of top-down international law decision-making) 
necessary in a response to the climate change contribution of aviation is implicit in the 
discussion above. The proposals above are a mixture of the traditionally hierarchical 
(e.g. a sectoral approach within the UN system) and the less hierarchical (e.g. the role 
of IATA). Non-hierarchical methods will contribute to implementing the changes 
needed to respond to climate change mitigation: spontaneous improvement by airlines, 
different levels of governance operating together to put this into practice, rather than 
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responding to commitments from those ahead on the hierarchy. In addition, alternative 
methods fulfil the gaps when hierarchy fails. 
Given that “[t]he need for and extent of any shift from hierarchy to heterarchy 
may be directly related to the nature and complexity of the environmental 
challenge,”125 non-hierarchical forms of decision-making are clearly useful to climate 
change governance on aviation emissions. In particular, the hierarchical model of 
traditional top-down legal regulations, as led by the UNFCCC or ICAO, cannot be the 
whole answer to the current problem. But curbing the growth of international aviation 
emissions is so economically sensitive that some hierarchical models would be 
preferable in an ideal world. So, in Chapter 3, I argued for the need of a sectoral 
mitigation target on aviation emissions under the UNFCCC and then suggested a 
comprehensive multi-level burden sharing system or a global emissions trading 
system as possible ways of allocation. However, there are always practical difficulties 
in achieving a comprehensive global regulatory system. So if, for example, a sectoral 
mitigation target for the aviation sector or a global emissions trading system cannot be 
agreed, a non-hierarchical form of decision-making provides a chance to tackle the 
aviation emissions issue which needs to be tackled with widely dispersed resources of 
information or knowledge and of authority and legitimacy. Non-hierarchical form of 
decision-making enables multiple parties to be involved in the move away from a 
complete reliance on international treaty making in combating climate change 
associated with aviation. Cooperation through multi-regional emissions tradings or 
multiple national fuel taxes on aviation as discussed in Chapter 5 and 6 is different 
from an international treaty making approach, but is especially valuable when a 
sectoral approach on aviation emissions cannot be achieved at the international level. 
Perhaps more important in the context of non-hierarchical forms of decision-making 
is the participation of non-traditional actors in the cooperation, e.g. the airline industry 
representing by IATA and environmental NGOs, as discussed above. In regulating 
aviation emissions, the voluntary guidance provided by IATA contributes an example 
of multiple levels approach to fill gaps left by more traditional approaches. A global 
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emissions trading system for the allocation of the sectoral mitigation target needs 
IATA to lead the initial allocation of allowances and ICAO to monitor it. NGOs are 
important at all levels of governance and can contribute to top-down or bottom up 
approaches. They can contribute to international negotiations, to national or regional 
approaches. They may also provide information and education to the public, creating 
demand for action. 
Whilst heterarchy is a crucial part of new governance, its key role in my thesis is 
in its overlap with ideas of multiple levels of governance and multiple parties. My 
thesis relies largely (although not exclusively) on formal regulatory mechanisms (e.g. 
taxing and emissions trading) to counter the problems of industry self interest and 
externalities. Non-hierarchical approaches may however have a role to play given the 
practical difficulties of more formal regulations. Therefore, the emphasis of new 
governance on non-hierarchical solutions is of interest, filling gaps left by more 
traditional approaches. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter examines the international aviation emissions issue through a scale 
lens and, in the process, it focuses on the importance of exploring multi-scalar 
approaches. It emphasises that the impact of aviation emissions on climate change is 
not only an international problem, but also a local, national and regional problem. As 
such, any efficient legal regulation should not be limited to conventional inter-state 
approaches, rather it requires a re-scaling of the legal regulations on aviation 
emissions. 
Among the burgeoning literature that has engaged with the complexities of 
regulatory scale and the appropriate role of top-down and multiple levels approaches, 
I find that new governance theory is best suited to solving multi-scalar problems. 
Introducing new governance theory in regulating aviation emissions provides a 
theoretical explanation of the failure of tradition
 250 
aviation emissions provides a test for the ability of new governance theory to account 
in a real life situation for failure and to provide a solution. 
Drawing on the new governance theory, I argue that regulating aviation 
emissions should involve a full range of parties, including both public (formal 
regulators like the UNFCCC, ICAO and nation states) and private (airline industry 
and NGOs) parties. It should also involve multiple regulatory instruments, including 
a sectoral mitigation target, technology-based standards, fuel taxes and emissions 
trading. Multiple scales of action are required, including international targets, 
multi-level allocation of mitigation obligations, national fuel taxes, regional efforts 
on emissions trading, and (whilst not a focus of this thesis) some sub-state level 
governance. In this way, I draw a picture of a multi-scalar regulatory architecture of 
international aviation emissions. Recognising climate change as a multi-scalar 
problem that needs multi-scalar regulatory approaches might be able to move the 
international aviation emissions problem beyond the deadlock of conventional 
international inter-state approaches. 
 251 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
Neither the UNFCCC nor ICAO has made adequate progress in responding to 
the contribution of international aviation to climate change. And yet much legal 
scholarship contributes to focus on this conventional top-down international 
governance model. By contrast, in this thesis I look for ways to move beyond the 
deadlock in international arenas. The regulation of international aviation emissions 
needs to be approached through a scalar lens. When seen in this way, the impact of 
aviation emissions on climate change is simultaneously local, national, regional and 
international, and legal regulation must find a way of flexibly moving among those 
levels of governance. This does not involve a complete rejection of traditional 
international treaty making. But I conclude that neither conventional top-down 
international legal regimes, nor any single regulatory instrument can solve the 
problem of aviation emissions’ impact on climate change. New governance theory 
provides a theoretical framework within which to identify the failures of traditional 
regulatory approaches and explore the future of the regulation of aviation emissions. 
New governance theory provides a response to the failure of the international 
approach to aviation’s contribution to climate change, grounded in both a realistic 
analysis of the nature of the problem, and a solid theoretical framework. As well as 
providing a theoretical explanation of the failure of traditional regulatory approaches, 
new governance theory is tested in this thesis in its ability to account for the failure 
of traditional, top-down regulation, and to provide a solution. The design of 
coordinated multi-scalar policy responses to aviation emissions may help to 
motivate innovation from both the public and the private sides and to create 
emissions reduction efforts from multiple levels of governance.  
In this thesis, I argue that we should regulate aviation emissions in the 
following way. First of all, legal regulation of aviation emissions should involve 
multiple parties, including the United Nation’s Framework of Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), nation states, the 
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airline industry (represented by the International Air Transport Association (IATA)) 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Although the UNFCCC system 
cannot totally solve the problem, I argue that international aviation should be subject 
to a legally binding mitigation target through a sectoral approach in the UNFCCC 
system on climate change. But although I prefer this sectoral approach, and many of 
the other arguments in this thesis are based on the achievement of a sectoral target 
on aviation emissions, the legal regulations discussed in this thesis are not 
dependent upon it. For example, even in the absence of an international sectoral 
agreement, a domestic fuel tax on international flights and regional emissions 
trading will contribute to curbing the growth of aviation emissions, as will ICAO’s 
technology-based standards and environmental auditing programme. 
It is central to this thesis that ICAO is unable to play the role allocated to it by 
the Kyoto Protocol, (and in much of the literature), of sole delegated authority in the 
regulation of aviation emissions. A legal analysis of ICAO’s aims and law-making 
functions under the Chicago Convention1 shows the limitations of ICAO. However, 
it certainly has a role to play in solving this industry specific problem. ICAO 
provides technology-based standards on a broad range of aviation activities, 
including aircraft engine design, aircraft noise, aircraft safety and security. On the 
technical front, ICAO could provide a global forum which would enable emissions 
reduction related actions to be transparent, in particular in respect of trade-offs 
between CO2 emissions and non-CO2 emissions from aircraft engines, between 
reducing emissions and controlling aircraft noise, and between reducing emissions 
and ensuring aviation safety. In ensuring a safe, efficient and environmentally 
friendly development of the industry, ICAO can play an important role regarding 
performance monitoring, reporting methods and auditing processes on member 
states’ reduction actions. To fulfil this role, I have advocated a climate change audit 
programme by ICAO. 
Apart from their roles within the UNFCCC and ICAO, nation states are also 
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formal regulators which certainly have a role to play. In this multi-level governance 
regime, my preference is for mitigation responsibilities to be allocated between 
states, not solely by reference to nationality but through a multi-level approach. 
Regional, national, and city levels are more informative on contribution and 
capacity in respect of aviation than the national level. And rather than focusing on 
the developed/developing country dichotomy, differential treatment should consider 
the contribution to the expansion of international aviation at the regional, and city 
level as well as at the national level; consider changing contributions to aviation 
emissions; and consider changing capacity for the provision of cleaner facilities for 
international aviation. Nation states will respond to their mitigation obligations 
through domestic laws, including traditional command and control regulations and 
market-based instruments. Aviation fuel taxes on international flights would 
influence demand and provide incentives for innovation, whether or not a sectoral 
target is agreed through the UNFCCC. 
Apart from the formal regulators, private parties (especially the airline industry 
and NGOs) should play important roles in the regulatory system. I suggested in 
Chapter 6 that a global emissions trading scheme would provide an alternative form 
of allocation of the sectoral mitigation target if comprehensive multi-level burden 
sharing cannot be agreed. IATA would lead the initial allowances allocation, and 
ICAO would monitor it. In addition, IATA’s role in representing the airline industry 
and in developing the industry’s vision of environmental policies may contribute 
regulatory schemes. NGOs should be involved to ensure environmental interests are 
fully taken into account at every level. 
Second, legal regulation of aviation emissions should involve multiple 
instruments, including conventional command and control type of regulatory 
mechanisms and multiple market-based instruments. Different instruments might 
contribute to regulating aviation emissions from different perspectives. A sectoral 
target on international aviation under the UNFCCC system leads cooperative efforts 
towards a particular environmental outcome. ICAO’s technology-based standards, as 
discussed above, might contribute to the balancing of potential trade-off effects with 
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reducing emissions in ensuring a safe, efficient and environmentally friendly 
development of the industry. Regional emissions trading schemes such as the EU 
ETS ensures that there will be a clear mitigation target which has to be achieved, 
albeit that some of the emissions cuts will come from outside the aviation sector. 
Although fuel taxes cannot provide certainty in relation to the outcome of reducing 
emissions, they could provide incentives for the industry to improve energy intensity 
and for airline customers to modify their behaviour. None of these instruments could 
be a stand-alone solution to curb the growth of aviation emissions, but multiple 
instruments should contribute to the reduction of aviation emissions. 
Third, legal regulation of aviation emissions should involve parties at different 
scales. My preference is for a sectoral approach within the UNFCCC system, put 
into practice by multi-level governance, including ICAO’s technology-based 
standards and environmental audit programme, nation states’ efforts in allocating 
and implementing reduction targets on aircraft operators, nation states’ aviation fuel 
taxes, regional emissions trading schemes (e.g. EU ETS). In the absence of an 
international agreement on burden sharing, a global emissions trading system would 
be an alternative form of allocation, as well as incentivising the airline industry to 
improve energy intensity. In the absence of international agreement on a sectoral 
mitigation target, market-based instruments (domestic fuel taxes and regional 
emissions trading) and the role of IATA and NGOs discussed above may contribute 
a less traditional approach to regulating aviation emissions. 
Putting the above three points together, the preferred response to the 
contribution of international civil aviation to climate change would be to agree an 
international sectoral target on reducing aviation emissions. Burden sharing needs to 
be highly sophisticated, requiring multiple parties at multiple levels of governance 
to contribute to the sectoral mitigation target. If it is impossible to agree to burden 
sharing in practice, a global emissions trading system provides an alternative form 
of allocation of the sectoral mitigation target. As a second best response, in the 
absence of an agreed sectoral target at the international level, market-based 
instruments (domestic fuel taxes and regional emissions trading schemes) at national 
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and regional level will need to contribute to the regulation of aviation emissions. 
IATA, representing the airline industry, should also make a contribution as a 
response to failures of governmental action. 
It is crucial to break the deadlock of conventional legal approaches and 
overcome the barriers to international aviation greenhouse gas emissions abatement. 
Drawing on the scholarly literature on new governance theory, this thesis has 
explored the theoretical foundations of a multi-scalar regulatory approach to climate 
change associated with aviation. In the way that has been described above, the 
international aviation emission problem might move beyond the deadlock of 
conventional inter-state approaches and come to recognise climate change as a 
multi-scalar problem that needs multi-scalar regulatory approaches. 
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